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ABSTRACT 
This Thesis proposes a new epistemological ontology 
which has two peculiar characteristics: Objects in its Universe 
are formulated as being self-observers (i. e. reflexive); and the 
nature of observation of Objects by others is shosn to contain 
the logic for computing relationships between Objects in the 
Universe. 
This Universe is non-hierarchical, and permits of 
mutually contradictory beliefs about its Objects to be simultane- 
ously held by different observers. 
The logic by which observers construct hierarchies in 
the Universe is shown to need only one variable in order to 
operate, and to operate from the oscillatory nature of the self- 
observing Objects producing. a sense of local time in both observer, 
and observed Objects; the times of which must temporarily come 
together for observations to be made. 
Using these notions of Objects and observations, a 
means, based on the potential for observers to construct 
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hierarchies, is found for analysing arguments, and (potentially) 
for the improvement of computer performance. 
A way is described for the representation of observa- 
tions of Objects to be made, and a conversational idiom is 
established to account for communication between different 
observers. 
The views put forward in this Thesis are demonstrated 
by various experiments, stariei, and references. 
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THESIS MOTTO 
of ... If you could finish it. . you could rest. . sleep. . not 
before. . oh I know- the ones I've finished ... thousands and 
one. .. all I ever did. -in my life ... with my life. . saying 
to myself ... finish this one. . Ats the right one ... then rest 
.. sleep ... no more stories ... no more words ... and finished 
it, . and not the right one. . . 11, 
Samuel Beckett"14). 
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PREFACE 
When I set out on these investigations, I did not 
realise that I had been carrying them out already for ten years, 
nor did I realise that I would be carrying through such a general 
and broad-based piece of work. Nothing was further from my mind 
than the formulation of a philosophical system. Nevertheless, 
this work has grown itself, and I have, to the best of my ability, 
notated it. 
The recent origins of this work are in the attempt to 
provide a means (by "dimensioning models") of preventing the 
drawing of f alse analogies, and the construction of arguments in 
which the levels shift, erroneously. From this grew a general 
theory of model/object relationships, which, introducing the 
object, insisted on an examination of the qualities of an object 
that can be modelled. And from these two, the role of the 
observer, making the model, became critical, as did the way in 
which he could express his model making. Thus, a small work 
mushroomed into something rather larger. 
Undoubtedly, many of the types of view expressed here 
relate to my experience in studying and teaching architecture: 
indeed, the stated aim of the work is to examine certain aspects 
of space and time in architecture. The concept developed here of 
a Behaviour (BP) can be clarly related to difficulties in defining 
complex architectural objects, such as cities. Conversely, 
Awareness (Ao) can be tied in to experiences of psychological 
overload and break-down. And the whole idea of thý- type of 
linguistic representation put forward here ties into problems 
experienced in expressing spatial experiences. 
But equally, many of the ideas I can trace back to 
earlier works. The first clear statement I can find stems back 
four years, and is a piece of music "Tune into Memories of You" 
@ in-the Appendices 
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in which musicians interpret a common tune by playing simultaneously 
what each of them considers to be an appropriate accompaniment to 
that tune. In this case the tune is an Object with an Essence, 
and the accompaniment is the observer's attributed behaviour. 
But long before that, I can find stories which refer to this sort 
of Universe; not that, at- that time, I saw it at all clearly 
this is all post-rationalisation. 
I account for this because I believe that the Universe 
I propose in this Thesis is to many rather strange, at first sight, 
and so I wish it to be known that it has basically grown itself 
(with rae being essentially unaware of what was happening), over a 
long time-span. And, while I worked on it, I was still unaware 
of where the Thesis was going: new areas to look into, new 
-questions, new ideas, kept on presenting themselves, and then 
making answers. Indeed, at an earlier stage, I had proposed 
putting in the text that was thus produced, (the real Experiment 
of this Thesis), as the main body of work, since it shows not 
only the conclusions, but also the cybernetic work method 
(including some necessary revisions of parts for which, when I 
was writing them, I could find no appropriate terms) by which the 
Thesis came into being. 
However, in. the end, a more conventional consideration 
for the reader over-rode this idea (although the text may be 
examined by anyone who wishes), and the only survivor from that 
text to appear here is the collection of stories 'which try to 
describe the qualities of this Universe in a more immediate form 
that the more philosophical text which is the main theoretical 
part of this work. 
Having thus appologised and accounted for this thesis, 
--and before moving an to acknowledge the substantial and much 
appreciated help I have received in its growth, I should like only 
to reflect that, in writing this, I feel that as with the pupil in 
Reps'"883book, I have been learning to clap one hand. 
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Because of the length of time during which it seems to 
me that this work has been developing, I find it impossible to 
acknowledge the help and inspiration I have received, with few 
exceptions, other than generally. 
I should like to thank all those from whom I have learnt. 
That I cannot enumerate you does not reduce my gratitude, which is 
shown continuously to me by the way your sparks have made this 
work. 
I would like to thank the people who have helped me 
prepare this work itself: 
My wife, Tuulikki Leskinen, who has generously suffered and put 
up with a great amount during its composition and given me con- 
tinuous encouragement and sympathy. 
Betty Foxworthy and Hilary Lowday who have typed the text in 
various forms - an appaling task. 
The Science Research Council who funded my three years research 
at Brunel University, where this work assembled itself. 
My Supervisor, Professor Gordon Pask, who has been for many years 
a valued critic and has taught me to formulate and insist. 
My fellow student Dionyssius Kallikourdis who has unravelled many 
mysterious and valuable texts for me. 
My friend Richard Bunt, with whom I have talked about this work, 
more and more valuably, for many years. 
My colleague Annetta Pedretti, who has helped me discover and 
develop parts of what I was trying to say, has noticed the holes, 
and has shown some uses. 
Samuel Beckett, whose novels and Plays I have re-read during the 
writing of this piece; and who seems to me either to have formed, 
or to reflect several of my thoughts. 
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Finally, perhaps I can express the hope that this work 
-may help make some sense of the world, to those who try to make 
sense of it, and that this will be particularly so for Severi. my 
son. 
If sparks I have collected from you have gone wrong, 
the misfire has been in my head, not yours. 
Ranulph Glanville 
15th September, 1973 to 
14t. h February, 1975 
London, Helsinki, Lemlax, Spetisbury 
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REFERENCE MARKS AND NUMBERING SYSTEMS USED IN THE TEXT 
(EXCLUDING TECHNICAL TERMS IN THE GLOSSARY) 
Bibliographic references in this text are, denoted by an 
asterisk* followed by a number, in brackets one step above the 
line (i. 'e. (*144) ). The references will be found in the 
Bibliography listed in numerical order, with the number preceded 
by an asterisk. They have been so arranged that they are in 
author, then. title, alphabetical order. A certain number of late 
additions, however, appear-in the later numbers, out of this order. 
The alphabetical ordering is the reason for the bibliographic 
reference numbers in the text not being'in numerical sequence. 
Footnotes in the text are denoted by a raised at 
@ 
or 
plus+ sign, and appear at the foot of the page on which they 
appear. 
-, 
Statements in the Main Text are preceded by reference 
numbers(similar in form to those used by Wittgenstein). These 
have two purposes - they give a unique reference to each statement, 
and they highlight the form of the argument. 
It a reference number in the Main Text is preceded by a 
single apostrophe I, týere is a corresponding number in the 
Explanatory Text, expounding on that statement. This may be 
found by looking under the same number in the Explanatory Text (in 
which all reference numbers are preceded by a double apostrophe 
which denotes that the statement belongs in the Explanatory. not 
the Main Text). 
It is intended that bbth the Main Text and Explanatory 
Text can be read alone, or together (though in the case of the 
Explanatory Text, terms are assumed and are not described). The 
Main Text contains no bibliographic, or other, references (but the 
Explanatory Text does). 
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TERMTNOLOGY 
Like Humberto Maturana(*65), I have defined neither my 
terminology nor my formulations, at the outset. Instead, I have 
given labels and used them in a number of contexts. You, as a 
reading observer, can deduce from these Label-Objects the Objects' 
behaviour, and thus you will generate meanings for them. 
@ 
In this, I am being consistent with the general theory 
here propounded -a theory of Essence and observer. To define a 
Label-Object would be for me to tell you a behaviour I know, and 
not to tell you what is. 
No behaviour can make up the Essence of the Label-Object, 
which is for itself only. 
Some readers of various drafts have objected to some of 
these terms I have used. For instance, the terms "know" and 
"observe" are disliked, since they are applied to all Objects 
(inanimate as well as animate). I can only ask that readers so 
upset, should bear with the terms used: they areý the best I could 
find, and seem to me, in spite of objections, to be appropriate. 
If the reader can find better terms, please change them - and let 
me know the improved ones. 
There is, however, -a Glossary which may be consulted it 
meanings do not become clear. 
a 
INTRODUCTION 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Thesis relates to two seperate and distinct fields. 
It consists of an application of a Systems Approach to problems in 
both of these fields, each of which can be interpreted as being 
within the cybernetic domain. 
These two fields may be described (in the common sensical 
context) as "Architecture" and "Language". The relationship 
between the two of them arises from the need to find a means by 
which the perception of some architectural topic (e. g. the loca- 
tional structure of a city) can be represented. This involves 
the establishment of a system of Object relationships and qualities 
that can permit of the expression, simultaneously, by two different 
observers, of entirely different and contradictory descriptions of 
the topic, without the topic being considered to be absurd as a 
result of this incongruence. It also involves the description of 
a means by which each observation can be expressed in terms of a 
common Language, in such a way that these different observations 
may be communicated and*modified, while allowing the essential 
difference between both them, and the observersIviews of the 
languages they are using. Thus, the examination of the two fields, 
"Architecture" and "Language", also involves the formulation of 'an 
epistemological theory of ontology, based on observations of conmion 
Objects being essentially different; and the justification of 
such a formulation on an experiential (and hence epistemological) 
basis. The normal approach to both "Architecture" and "Language" 
does not permit such incongruence, and therefore, a new approach 
has had to be introduced, one of the characteristics of which is 
that it is non-hierarchical, and in this manner, permissive of 
containing its own description. It is not subject to the 
findings of Cý; del( *46) (that systems may not be assumed to be 
simultaneously complete and consistent), largely because it 
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relegates the concepts consistent and complete to the personal 
-: hierarchy building of each observer (for which a method of mapping 
Is proposed), allowing that inconsistencies are part of the com- 
plete system. 
In its non-hierarchical structure, the system may be 
seen as'being a theory of an anarchic Universe, in which ordering 
Is the personal domain of each observer, but in which each 
observer can communicate his own perceptions of his own hierarchies 
to others, thus allowing the arrangement of social and concensus 
orderings. In this respect, it echos the dominant architectural 
philosophy of the '1960's, that of the highly serviced environment 
allowing personal mobility, of plug-in and do-it-yourself, and of 
: flexibility that was forcef ully, - putIf orwardi In t the-aftgl fill i ldijqes 
(*6) 
of the Archigram group's magazine , given theoretical substance 
by Banbam ("The Architecture of the Well-Tempered Environment" 
*11) ), 
and actually practiced most effectively by Cedric Price. The 
-architectural climate has since shifted away from such playful 
expressions of the Idea, into a realm of political activity based 
on a more realistic and socially concious attempt to solve problems, 
but the idea still survives and has coloured all architectural 
(*83) 
, thinking, as in for instance Pawley's "Garbage Housing" 
Both "Architecture" and "Language" have been subjected, 
jLs fields, to examinations using the Systems Approach, before this 
attempt. But the limitations that such attempts as have been 
made put on themselves have meant that they have not been of much 
use in this context. 
_-In 
the case of "Architecture", the initial application 
of a Systems Approach was long delayed. As Gordon Pask(*80) has 
pointed out on innummerable occasions in lectures and conversa- 
-tions, there is some considerable similarity between "Architecture" 
and cybernetics. However, it was not until Alexander published 
his epoch making article "A City is not a Tree" 
(*2) 
that the 
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strictly non-interactive form of architectural descriptions 
became clear, and people, lead initially by Alexander himself, 
began to examine (primarily) the City as a system, ("Notes on the 
(*4) ,1 (*3) Synthesis of Form" and "From a Set of Forces to a Form" 
and then the research of for instance, the Cambridge Land Use 
Centre, 'McLoughlin's "Urban and Regional Planning"(*68) 
Chadwick's "A Systems View of Planning""25) , and my own "Tapiola 
(*43) 
is a Paper Tiger Expose yourselves It Is Legal" I 
culminating in Broadbent's erudite summarising in "Design in 
Architecture" *20)). 
-Paralleling this, there was a development of interest 
in the possibility of using the computer in architecture, an 
interest that was brought to real prominence in the conference 
(*113) held in York on the subject in 1972 at which various 
architectural computers from all over the world gathered. Much 
of the work discussed there was banal, showing a remarkable lack 
of understanding of the nature of the problem descriptions being 
utilised (e. g. non-consideration of Bremmerman's Constant - see 
Ashby (*7) ), or assuming the perfect outcome to a problem-by means 
of the union of sets of properties (how do you, to use Pask's 
(*79) 
term, "sani. tisell these sets, to exclude any incongruences? ) , but 
some was of considerable interest. In particular, the develop- 
ment by Negroponte 
(*75)(*76)(*77) 
at M. I. T. of a machine that 
could interpret drawings, was a significant step for both 
"Architecture" and A. I. work (summarised in "Hunch" 
*74) 
and "The 
Architecture Machinell"73), amongst others). Nevertheless, this 
work was closely tied into the semi-lattice approach of 
(*2) Alexander and was furthermore concerned with the establishment 
of unique conversations, rather than for the formulation of a means 
of allowing simultaneously existing contradictory descriptions, as 
was also Abells"') work using the computer as an interface in a 
Kelly Grid extension technique allowing the regulation of discus- 
sions between architects and clients, a piece of work epitomising 
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the other appirently fruitful approach to the computer and 
-"Architecture" union. 
Thus, the application of the Systems Approach to the 
field of "Architecture" was not relevant to the approach of this 
work: and indeed, such attempts as have been made to allow people 
to express their views, have been done with the specific purpose 
of reducing the discrepancies between such descriptions, rather 
than encouraging them. * The whole development of the concept 
"Neighbourhood" is an, extension of the adminstrative convenience 
of "Zoning", in which people's understanding of local space is 
tied together to provide a limited physical area in which a group 
of people will co-incide as much as possible (i. e. a ghetto). 
And the more recent attempts by Urban Geographers (e. g. Gouldi 
and White's "Mental Maps , 
(*45) ) to provide means for measuring 
locational preferences in people have concentrated quite explicitly 
on providing descriptions of group views of area desirabilities, 
ignoring the chn acteristics of the personal preferences of each 
subject. In other words, the views of people are aggregated by a 
coarse grained geographical distinction, according to the location 
of each subject, and are then represented as a map of percentage 
preference for other areas. 
In the area of "Language", the Systems Approach has a 
manch longer kistory. Indeed, one of the earliest examples of a 
Systems Aý)proach must be that of de Saussure in his "Course on 
General Linguisticsft(*93) (see later). 
The field of ýLanguagel' I have divided into five areas, 
according to the approaches thiy show to "Language": Syntactic, 
Semantic; Semiotic; Logical and Psychological; and Artificial 
Theories of Language. I shall summarise the approaches taken in 
each-of these five areas rather briefly: they are well accounted 
for elsewhere. 
In the case of syntax, the general linguistic develop- 
ments this century were rather un-systemmic until Chomsky's 
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"Syntactic Stiuctures" *28) was published in the mid 50's 
Previous work had either been "behaviourist" (that is, concerned 
with a one-directional S. -R. process, as exemplified, unfairly, 
by Bloomfield"'" and Skinner 
(*97)), 
or had been very mechanistic 
(the traditional view of a descriptive grammar operating on many 
levels from phonemic to clausal). Chomsky introduced a systemmic 
approach to linguistics, in that he managed to demonstrate that 
it was possible to consider linguistic structures as being not 
merely analytical, 'but also transformaiive and generative. In 
so doing, he took the position that a grammar does not only account 
for the form of a language and its comprehension, it also gives 
rise to those things that are utterable. He developed this view, 
later, into progressively less I'linguistic""and morerz"social. andu 
political" work( 
*27). Since his revolutionary (and somewhat 
cross-discipliniary) approach was first unveiled, the examination 
of syntax has remained essentially in the field of systemmic studies, 
and has spawned a massive research program in (and indeed the term) 
psycho-linguistics. 
By a similar yard-stick, semantics has not really deve- 
loped, at'least in the more directly linguistic fields 
@. By its 
nature, semantics is somewhat lexicographical and hence circular 
in form: and in this respect, it has always been systemmic. 
Nevertheless-, it seems that semantics has not given full con- 
sideration to this circular characteristic, and hence has found it 
difficult to turn the form to its own advantage. Certainly, 
progress has been made, but there must be some doubts as to the 
success of an area which negleýts its own form, and which confines 
itself to the examination (no matter how successful) of cross- 
cultural parts, and the mechanics of relationship of only its 
parts: in this semantics, of course, does not follow the 
cybernetic paradigm. 
General semantics an altogether different field - has. 
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In some respect this failure may be accounted for by 
-the development of semiotics, an area often confused (by mathe- 
niaticians in particular) with semantics, but in reality one 
which has far more chance of producing useful results. The 
origins of this area are in de Saussure's "Course in General 
Linguistics" (*93) (in which de Saussure coins the term 
"Semiology", meaning the science of signs, and proposes its 
initial operational principles. "Semiology"bas been generally 
replaced by the Americanised term"Semiotics'. but the essential 
intentions are the same). De Saussure's formulation of the 
interdependence of the signifier and the signified within the 
sign, his insistence on the importance of the temporal context 
within which a sign rests to give it a full meaning, and his 
rejection of the symbollic nature of the sign, place him in the 
forefront of early systemmic thinkers. Indeed, the whole of 
semlotics is riddled with systemmic thinking, and with some 
--. astonishing parallels and near parallels with cybernetic statements: 
e. g. Ejelmslev's continuous scale change in Glossematics 
(*52)(*53) 
(although he did initially subscribe to an atomic unit, which 
later became a logical unit for signification) and Stafford Beer' s(*16) 
(*17) 
insistence that all viable systems are parts of other viable 
systems, and contain viable systems. So much so, that the field 
might well be considered a model for much cybernetic investigation. 
Furthermore, the self -ref errential nature of semiotic systems 
closely relates to the "standard" cybernetic form (see Bunt 
(*22) 
Psycho-linguistics is a peculiar subject that has only 
really been considered self-contained since Chomsky's early 
publications, a sequitor of which appeared to be that there was, 
In the human brain, a structure onto which a common meta-deep- 
structure, which all linguistic systems shared could be maped, one 
to one (see "Language and Mind"(*26), Not that the field was 
previously non-existent, as Piaget's 
(*86) 
early work on the- 
a 
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acquisition of linguistic skills shows, but its earlier existence 
had been confined primarily to the study of either psychology or 
linguistics. The establishment of this inter-dependence between 
psychology and linguistics had been-most clearly stated before 
the mid 30's in terms of philosophy, where, fol. lowing, Ogden-, 
and Richard's formulation of Frege's 
(*38 )examinations (presented 
as his triangle), the whole field seemed for an instant to be 
purely an examination of the logic of psycho-linguistics, even: after. 
(*108) Wittgenstein, in his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" , in 
capping the achievements of earlier researchers, had temporarily 
killed off the subject. Indeed, it may be that linguistic 
philosophy is to psycholinguistics as semiotics; is to semantics: 
in that linguistic philosophy and semiotics are both concerned with 
the logical requirements for, relatively, a language system or a 
meaning, to exist, whereas psycholineuis tics and semantics are 
concerned with the actualities of existence of languages 
(communicating) and meanings (communicating) (see Houston 
(*54) 
(*47) 
and Greene 
In contrast with these primiarily analytical views of 
language, the artificial language area (about which one need say 
little) is synthetic: 'it concerns itself with parts of the other 
varJous areas, especially syntax and (usually unconciously) 
semiotics. Its intention is to find a mapping between natural 
language and the coding that a machine can understand and act on 
in a given context, so that conversation with such machines is 
less painfully unf3uent for the human conversant. The only 
reason for including, the area within this cursory 'summary, is that 
its success in modelling human language (especially in terms of 
Winnograd's"105) and Winston's 
(*107) 
work) manages to confirm 
some of the work of especially Chomsky(*28) and 11jelmslev 
(*52)(*53) 
In this respect, it confirms, by means of an interactive 
experiment, the interactive nature of each of these systems. 
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As we can see from these summaries, the Systems Approach 
has had a profound influence of the examination of "Language": 
indeed, one might even say that the study of "Language" has had a 
profound effect on the Systems Approach. And yet, the approach 
is again not of any great help in the terms of this Thesis, for, 
with the exception of the preliminary assumption of de Saussure 
(of the arbitrary connection), the work is not concerned with the 
relationship of the signifier and the signified. And even when 
these two components are assembled together, the approach is 
usually to consider the nature of the whole, not of their inter- 
dependence. One might suspect that this would be covered in the 
field of. Psycholinguistics (or in Linguistic Philosophy), but it 
appears not be the case; even Whorf's 
(*102) 
research into the 
relationship between the richness of North American Indian 
vocabulary and fire risk does not clarly make a statement about 
the relationship between the Object and that which describes it. 
My own "Some Parallels between the Formal Structure of Finnish 
-Language and Finnish Architecture" 
(*42) 
comes closer to making 
a statement about this relationship (considered as a psychological 
system), while the real statements of Linguistic Philosophy, 
essentially avoid the question altogether, ! by. stating that using 
a Language, the Object itself cannot be examined, merely some 
representation of it. * 
-Furthermore, the differentiation of the "Language" from 
the Object, that is the -establishment of a hierarchy of two levels 
of essentially different types of entity, works both against our 
statement of a non-hierarchical Universe, and a logic of a 
-semiot-ic system. -For, -semiotics is the study of the minimum 
requirements for a sign to exist, and not the study of the nature 
of the sign's own existence. And the establishment of a seperate 
level for signs is also the prescription of the distinction 
between the levels of existence of both sign and Object. Whereas, 
the insistence that the observer of an Object and of a Language 
41 
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finds some relationship between these two (the Language being 
thus an Object like any other Object), which will be made in this 
thesis, removes this difficulty. In this way, Occam's 
@1 
requirement is satisfied, and there is no longer any need to assume 
as Wittgenstein(*108), for instance, does, that there is a one- 
to-one relationship between the Object and its signifier, making 
up a sign function. And the experiential truth that, depending 
on who you are, and where you happen to be, almost anything may 
stand for almost anything else (i. e. that an analogy can be drawn 
within one's own mind), is more easily accounted for than the assum- 
ptioir-of either the simultaneous two level existence, or the level 
transference of Objects. 
The argument so far, then, ýs that the approaches to 
"Architecture", even those which are basically cybernetic, do not 
manage to encompass the concerns of this investigation, and that 
the same is essentially true for "Language" investigations, no 
matter which area of that field one examines, and that there is 
therefore a need to Instigate a different framework within which 
such work can be situated. 
In recording this argument, we should still check 6ver 
the means 1hat are currently used for the expression of spatial 
constructions, in order to verify that they too suffer the same 
short-comings as the approaches to "Architecture" and "Language', 
are claimed to suffer. And in doing this, 'we need not restrict 
ourselves exclusively to architectural examples, for there have 
. 
been a few attempts to explain similarly complex topics, such as 
sculpture, which may have some relevance. 
The traditional method of representing space is a metric 
means: that is, a representation is made using an agreed measuie 
of length. This results in the standard architect's drawings of 
plan, section and elevation, together with the projections, 
axonometric, isometric, and perspective. In this form of 
@ i. e. that the simpler solution, or the solution- which accounts 
for more, is better. 
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representation, only those aspects of space that can be considered 
as Euclidean are represented, and a special skill is needed to 
"read" the drawings thus produced. But there are clear examples 
where this type of representation fails quite completely to rep- 
resent what is significant in some spatial experience, as is 
shown in Piaget's work with small children ("The Child's Conception 
of Space"(*85) ), and as is also shown in the maps of spatial 
(*45) 
schemata included in Gould and White's I'Mental Maps" , as well 
as in this Thesis. The realisation that spatial experiences are 
not only metric is clearly shown in the refurbishing of a fixed 
space that Interior Decorators practice. This type of metric 
representation is also that used by cartographers, and the changing 
form of maps of the same landscape hiChlights th"e refinements 
made in means of measuring using this technique. The use of a 
metric is, of course, a sensible means for communicating informa- 
tion about a space: it is a common means of representation, which 
can be Interpreted by each observer to give a picture of a 
spatial experience: but it is not a representation of that 
unique experience, because it represents the interpretation of 
the yard-stick: indeed, one might say that it is the interpretation 
of the metric's experience of the spacel 
There have,. however, been other means of representing 
spatial experiences: the work of Wilmott and Young ("Family and 
Kinship in East London" (*104) )used one means, a combination of 
words and maps, to establish the already mentioned concept of 
"Neighbourhood". as a social entity: but, again, this is the 
representation of a social, rather than an individual, experience. 
A similar method, to express locationally generated views (not 
even social ones) was used by Gould and White. 
Nevertheless, there is, inherent in some of this work, 
the opportunity for each individual to express his own personal 
experience of. the space concerned (his own spatial schemata), if 
only a "Language", and an appreciation of the nature of the type 
a 
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of Object, and Object-observer relationship, can be discovered; 
that is, if a common means of expression can be found without too 
strong a set of concensus restrictions, allowing comparable but 
diTferent and personal expressions. 
Perhaps the nearest approach to this aim has been made 
by Laurie Thomas"100). in his work on extended reciprocal Kelly 
Grid(*56) techniques (non-verbal as well as verbal), at 
St. Martin's School of Art. In this case, a common language of 
criticism was established with a small group of sculpture students, 
using each other's work as examples. The trouble with this 
approach,, however, -(apart from the time needed to establish the 
language) is that it is essentially private, and furthermore it 
does involve a certain concensus agreement. 
Thus, there does appear to be a real and genuine need, 
for the establishment of a description of these Objects, Object- 
observer relationships, and Languages that. have been pointed to, 
and which it is the intention of this Thesis to present. For 
any "concensus" description, and the use of any non-personal 
metric, avoids permitting the expression of any of the contra- 
dictory statements that we all know exist in individual descrip- 
tions of Objects, and thus in individual realities. 
It might appear that the recently developed techniques 
for dealing with statistical information in such a way that the 
very hard and fast classes are softened (Zadeh's Fuzzy Set Theory(*109). 
and its various extensions and applications) could be exploited to 
resolve this problem. But that would be to completely mis- 
understand both the character of Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Algorithms, 
and the requirements we are setting up. Fuzzification is a 
process which recognises that the insistence on a small number of 
classes is bound, with humans making choices between them, to be 
inadequate in the sense that I may find something "more or less 
good" (when I have only the choice "good/bad"), or when I find 
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something "go6d" in some contexts, but not in all, or when I 
really cannot decide which class something fits in ("don't know"). 
This is not an attempt to avoid making a general statement, nor 
is it an attempt to avoid a concensus view: it tries soley to 
make the information contained within such a consensus view more 
realistic and relevent. On the other hand, our intention is to 
allow the statement of an individual experience in some com- 
municable form. Thus, we intend to maintain the quality of each 
observation at the expense of the concensus view, while a Fuzzy 
Theory tries to re-generate a general behaviour from a concensus 
view, thus failing to make real individual views, but describing 
their range of possibilities. 
As a result of these general shortcomings in 
"Architecture" and "Language", the existing formulations being 
either incapable of sustaining the-type of contradictions that 
exist'between different individual views, or too complex to use 
easily. and having tried some preliminary experiments to verify 
these shortcomings, I decided that it was necessary to put forward 
a description of a theoretical philosophy which would permit the 
type of Universe we wish to postulate to exist, and which would 
also permit the type of expression we are demanding to be made. 
This Thesis therefore consists of two main components: 
Firstly, a philosophy capable of sustaining the type of 
experience and description about which we have talked in this 
introduction, and; 
Secondly, some exploratory experiments that demonstrate 
the usefulness of this philos6phy, and its success at handling the 
requirements we have set up for it to account for. 
However, by themselves, these two components would not 
-provide a clear enough picture of the implications of this 
philosophy. And therefore, this format has been extended, for 
the philosophy proposed as the theoretical base from which such 
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descriptions can be made, appears to have much more general 
qualities than might be expected from its roots in "Architecture" 
and "Language", and seems to generate some techniques that may 
have quite general applications. For these reasons, the some- 
what curt derivation and statement of the philosophy is 
elaborated by a second text (using the same referrential frame- 
work), In which the relationship of the philosophy to other 
people's work, and its reflection of common experiences, is 
explored. 
This content is further elaborated by the inclusion of 
a set of six Short Stories illustrating the nature of this 
Universe, a Conclusion, which is intended to summarise the general 
lessons to be leirnt from this work, and point to further areas of 
possible development, Appendices (recapitulating the particular 
techniques that em rge from the philosophy), a Glossary of main 
terms used, and a Bibliographical reference. 
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MAIN TEXT 
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'0.0, In order to know something exists we must be -able to 
observe it. 
0.0.1 If we cannot observe it, we cannot know it exists. 
We cannot necessarily affirm its non-existence, either. 
10.0,2 If we do not know an Object exists, we can usefully 
say nothing about it. 
0.0,3 A Thesis says things about Objects. 
0.0,31 If we cannot say things about Objects, we have 
nothing to say. 
10.0,32 If we. have nothing to say, we should not try to 
speak. 
0.0,41 We state our Universe, thus, as being a Universe of 
observation. 
0.0,42 We are not concerned with other possible Universes. 
10.11 For an Object to exist in our Universe, it must be 
observable. 
10. i'l The Universe contains only observable Objects. 
4 
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1.0, The least imaginable conditions in which an Object 
can know anything are when it is the only Object it 
knows in the Universe. 
1. O'l To know it is in the Universe, it must observe itself, 
11.0,2 Unless an Object can observe itself, it cannot know 
it is in the Universe. 
1.0,3 If it cannot know it is in the Universe, it cannot 
know anything of the Universe as being of that 
Universe. 
11.0,4 If an Object knows some other Object exist, it must 
also know it exists, itself. 
. 1.0,5 All Objects 
in the Universe are self-observers. 
'1.2, In order to observe itself, an Object must have both 
itself to make the observation, and a means of making 
the observation. 
. 1.1.11 Call the Object 
Oa 
12. -1,12 Call the means of making 
the observation the Model 
Facility XQ .@ 
-1.1,13 The small subscript 
indicates the specific Object 
referred to. OC, is Object a, Ob is Object b 
OCI and Ob are both Objects and are both different. 
XQ is the Model Facility of Object Ci 
1.2, The Object only knows it has an existence, and there- 
fore only has an existence we can discuss, because it 
observes itself. 
1.2.1 The Object exists by virtue of its own self- 
observation. 
*1.2,2 The Object observes itself through its Model Facility: 
its observation is, 
-- (Xa) Oa . 
where the brackets denote an observational operation 
being made on that which the brackets contain. 
@ The Model Facility's further properties will be investigated 
later. 
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11.2,3 in the Universe of observation, the Object Is what 
it observes itself to be, 
(0a) = [(Xa)Oal, 
Where the brackets () denote the commonness of name 
of the stated Object, the brackets 
II the observation, 
and the equal sign the being of observation. 
That is to say, that the denoted Object is to the 
observer, that which the observer observes with the co- 
operation of that part of the Object observed called 
the Model Facility. 
1.2,4 This is the basic formulation for existence, in the 
Universe. 
1.3, In observing itself, an Object has recourse to 
nothing that is not of its self. 
1.3,1 Self-observation is therefore private. 
11.3,11 Self-observation is what the Object, and only the 
Object, observes itself as. 
11.3,12 The Object, being what the Object observes, calls 
itself the Essence, 
(0a) = [(Xa) Qa] 4 Ea, 
Where the arrowed equal sign =: ) indicates that which 
is given rise to by the observer, as his observation 
-of the Object 
1.3,2 The Object is observed by itself privately, and is 
its Essence, to itself. No other Object can see 
@ It should be noted that fýr any observer's observations, the 
various bracketings and equal-signs are essentially the same: 
that is, the normal equal-sign ; 9' could be used, and the 
bracket forms omitted. This is because, for the observer 
concerned, the Object is the behaviour (or Essence) is the 
act of observation, etc. 
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its Essence. 
91.4, Every Object, observing itself, has an Essence. 
Without an Essence, there would be no Object, 
(Pa ) 
-:: 
[(Xa)Oal =4 Ea, 
(Ob >= r/vb)0b14Eb- LV" 
1.4,1 In order for an Object to observe any other Object, 
it must first observe itself, to know it exists, and 
thus to know it can make the observation. 
1.4.2 In order for an Object to be observed by any other 
Object, it must first observe itself, to exist for the 
other-Object to observe. 
'1.5, An (externally) observing Object can observe another 
Object, but it cannot observe the other Object's 
Essence. 
1.5,1 The means for observation Is the observed Object's 
Model Facility (which the Object used to observe 
itself). 
11.5,2 The observation that one Object makes of another is 
called the observed Object's behaviour. The behaviour 
is what the external observer believes the Object to 
be, 
Ba a) Ob (Pa 
1.6, The observing Object cannot see the observed Object's 
Essence, but can infer that it must have one. 
11.6,1 The Model Facility is common to all observations, and 
maintains the specificity of reference of observations 
to the observed Object. 
1.6,2 The observation is the observer's view of the Object 
through the Model Facility, which is, to the observer, 
the Object. 
1.7, All Objects are self-observers. 
a 
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1.7,1 All Object -s may be observed by@ other Objects. 
1.7,2 All Objects may observe 
@ 
other Objects. 
1.7,3 When an Object is observing, it is called an observer. 
This is a difference of role. The Object's view of 
itself may be re-written to show the observing role, 
4pa ) =Fat-- 
[(Xa)Pa Iý [Qýa)Oal 
- 
11.7,4 The behaviour attributed to an Object by an observer 
may be re-written, 
(0ý)7- Balý [ýCI)Pbl- 
1.7,5 These are forms for all Objects. 
1.8, - The Model Facility makes observation possible, and 
maintains specificity. 
1.8,1 Objects may observe each other. 
1.8,11 The result of one observation of an Object by an 
external observer is a behaviour. 
tl. 8,12 The result of many observations of an Object by external 
. observers is the Object's Behaviour, 
(10a) = B0 (-- E a 
Da)Pb] 
Wl! n) 
'l. 9, The Object is its Essence and is its behaviour and is 
Its Behaviour, 
----(Oa) = Ea. 
(0a) = Ba, 
(Pa >= Boa- 
1.9,11 The Essence is private, in-that it is observed by the 
Object itself. 
1.9,12 The behaviour is public, in that it is observed by an 
external observer. 
But need not. 
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1.9,2 The Object, to be in our Universe, must be observed. 
11.9,3 There is a hierarchy in observations: there must be 
self-observation for there to be external observations, 
in both Object and observer. 
1.9,4 The observer, too, is an Object, 
(Ob >= Eb'ýý--[(Xb)Pb]- 
1.10,1 All inhabitants of our Universe are Objects. The 
Model Facility makes them observable. The observer 
observes them. The observation is the Object, and is 
its existence for the observer. 
1.10,2 The observer's view of the Universe is his view. 
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2.0, The observer is an Object in the Universe. z 
2.0,1 The observer observes himself, and that makes him an 
Object in the Universe, 
(0 b>= Eb (-- [(X b) Pb]- 
2.0,11 Because the observer observes himself, he can exist 
to be observed by others, 
. 
(00= Bb(-- [(Xb)Pa]. 
02.0,12 Because the observer observes himself, he can exist 
to observe others, 
/n- 
Wu >= Ba ý= [(X a)Pb ]- 
2.1,1 When an observer makes an observation, he attributes 
a behaviour to an Object. ' 
12.1,2 There is, another way to look at this. When an 
obserýer makes an observation, he creates for himself 
an awareness, 
Aci, t-- [(Xb)PCLI =4 ý lb- 
12.1,3 To every awareness there is a related behaviour, which 
differs only, in role. 
2.2,1 For the observer, the awareness is what he believes 
the Object of his observation to be. 
2.2,2 For the observer an awareness is also part of himself. 
2.2,3 'The observer exists on two levels. 
12.2,41 The observer's self -observation is his Essence, and 
is private. 
2.2,42 The observer's observation is his awareness, and is 
public. 
2.2,5 The observer makes an awareness through the Model 
Facility of the Object being observed. 
12.2,6 The sum of many of the observer's awarenesses is his 
'Awareness, 
0 (0a) = Aa 
n) 
[(Xb)Pa 
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2.3, The sum of all Behaviours and all Awarenesses in the 
Universe is the same. Only the distribution differs. 
2.3,11 In a Universe, for example, of only 3 Objects (all of 
which can observe), the following self-observations 
are possible, 
(Oa )= Ect [(X cl)Pa 
], 
'(P 0=Eb [(X b)P b], 
(00= Ec 4-- [ýc)Pc ]. 
2.3,12 The following external observations are possible, 
(0a)=Ba t-- [(XCL)Pb] =4 Ab, 
(00-Ba ý- [(Xa)Pc ] =4 Ac, 
(0b). Bb ý-- [(Xb)Pa I=) A a, 
<Ob)-Bb+- [(Xb)Pc] -)Ac, 
(00-Bc" [(Xc)Pa] ==)AcL, 
(00-BC " [(XC)Pbl -4 Ab. 
2.3,21 7be Behaviours of the Objects are, 
Boa 'ý-[(Xahl * I(Xa)Pcl. 
Bob 4-- [(X b) r3a ]+ [(X b) PC ], 
0 
BC +-[(XC)RL] + [(XC)Pb], 
Where the addition sign + signifies both (a logical 
form will be developed later). 
2.3,22 The Awarenesses of the Objects are, 
0 
. -Na(-[ýb)Ral + 
[(Xc)Pal, 
0 
-Ab'k-(ýa)9b] + 
[(XC)Pbl, 
0 Ac C-- [ýc, )Pc ]+ [(Xb) PC W 
2.3,3 The individual awarenesses and behaviours are the 
same. Their method of summation together makes the 
difference between the Behaviours and the Awarenesses. 
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2.4, All observers in our U. niverse are Objects. The Model 
Facility of observed Objects makes them observable. 
The observer attributes to Objects behaviours that are, 
he believes, the Objects. These behaviours are the 
observer's awarenesses. 
02.4.2 The observer's view of the Universe is his Awareness. 
0 
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3.0. 'the Model Facility is that in an Object which makes 
It observable. 
13.0,11 The Model Facility In an Object is not the Object 
itself, but must be present as a necessary part of the 
Object, for the Object to exist. 
3. OtI2 The Model Facility may be an Object, too. Then it 
will have its own Model Facility in it, to make it 
observable, 
(Pa)=Xa=[(Xa)Pa]=[(Xa)Xa]-0 Ect. 
3.0,13 This Model Facility Object is not the same as the 
Model Facility, which is a part of an Object. 
3.0,14 Within the Model Facility Object, there is a Model 
Facility of the Model Facility Object. 
13.0,15 The Model Facility Object can stand as a surrogate 
for the Model Facility in our Universe, being of 
nothing but the Model Facility. 
3.0,2 The Universe of observation consists of Objects. 
3.0,3 The Model Facility is not an Object. It cannot be 
discussed, but it can be inferred as necessary, and 
its necessity may be examined. 
3.1, The Model Facility is that part of an Object which 
makes the knowing existence of the Object possible. 
. 3.1,1 The Model Facility permits observation. The obser- 
vation made through it is the Object, in the 
observer's belief. The observation of the Object 
through it is not a Model, but is the Essence or 
-behaviour. 
13.1,2 The Model Facility is that within an Object which 
gives the Object integrity; permits its form to con- 
tinue; maintains it. 
3.1,3 The Model Facility is thus a calculus with an inter- 
pretation, though which an observer. projecting his 
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views, can see that of the Object to which his. views 
relate. 
3.1,4 The Model Facility regulates the projected views: if 
an observer's observation does not take account of the 
Model Facility, the observation will be false in that 
the Object cannot sustain it. 
13.1,41 The meaning of cannot sustain it is shown thus: if an 
observer predicts that an Object can do something, and 
that Object cannot do this something, the prediction 
is "untrue", and the observation from which the pre- 
diction was made was a "false" observation, for it 
lead to an "impossible" behaviour. 
3.1,42 In this case, the observation was made without proper 
regard for the Model Facility: or, without proper 
regard for the calculus with an interpretation that 
is the Model Facility. 
3.1,5 This is the structure of the Model Facility. 
13.1,6 In this structure lies "meaning". An observation 
made without proper regard for the Model Facility is 
meaningless, that made with proper regard for it is 
meaningful. 
3.2, All observations of an Object are made through its 
Model Facility. 
3.2,1 The Object exists by virtue of its own self- 
observation through its own Model Facility. 
3.2,21 An observation needs an observer as well as an 
Object's Model Facility, 
(Xa)Pb. 
3.2,3 Each observer is Unique and has its own Essence, 
Pb [(Xb)Pb] -4 Eb, 
(pc > rty LkA c)Pc E c. 
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3.2.31 Each observerts observation of the Object is, thus, 
differeat, 
(0a)l--E3af-[(Xa)Pbl, 
(Pa)=BcL4(---[(Xa)Rc ]. 
3.2.4 Each, ebservation is nevertheless made through the 
same Nodel Facility. 
13.2,41 Each observation of an Object is thus related, 
through. the commonness to all observations of the 
-Model Facility. 
3.2,5 Each observation, being different, is of the same 
object. 
3.2,51 The Object can thus be a topic of cpnversation since 
it can be held in common to different observations. 
3.3, For in observation to have Meaning, it must be 
related to the Object of observation. 
3.3,1 The Model Facility is that which allows the Object to 
be observed. 
3.3,11 The Model Facility is that which permits observations 
of the Object to be held in common. 
3.3,12 Th e Nadel Facility thus makes observations relevant. 
3.3,2 The Model Facility is thus the location of potential 
meaning. 
'3.3,21 The action of an observer observing on the Model 
Facility creates Meaning. 
3.4. Inasfar as the Model Facility makes all observations 
of the Object relevant to the Object, It has a 
structure. 
3.4,1 The structure is the location of potential Meaning. 
3.4,11 The observation made with this structure (with proper 
regard for the Model Facility), is a Meaning. 
3. S. The structure of the Model Facility prevents observa- 
tions of other Objects being confused with observations 
of the Object of observation. 
a 
--<D 
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3.5,1 The Model Facility affects the observations made of 
the Object through it, 
(0a) 0 [(Xa)Pb]- 
3,6, The observer has, similarly, his own Model Facility, 
Pd 2:: rfv a )Pa 
3.6,1 The observer's Model Facility has a structure, which, 
when observed, gives Meaning to the observer's 
observation. 
3.6,11 The observer observing himself is thus prevented from 
making irrelevant observations of himself. 
3.7, The observer observes the Object, 
r1V (Pa >= Ba ý-- LkAa) Pb 
3.7.1 The observer and the Object both have Model Facilities 
which ensure the relevance of observations, 
4)a = [(Xa) Pal, 
P rty Lk^b)pbl' V 
13.7,11 Since an observation of an Object involves both the 
Object's Model Facility, and an observer (who exists 
by virtue of his own Model Facility), there is an 
interdependence between these two Model Facilities, 
(0Ci)ý13aý'1(Xa)Pb1`I(Xa)1(X b )Pb11- 
3.7,12 All observations are therefore interactive. 
3.7,21 The Model Facility of the observer affects what the 
observer believes the Object to be (the Object's 
behaviour): as does the Object's Model Facility, 
Pb r- 10(b)pbl, 
(Pa)I2Ba ý--'RXa)[(Xb )Pb R 
3.7,22 The Model Facility of the Object affects what the 
observer believes the Object to be (the observer's 
awareness): as does the observer's Model Facility. 
r 
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3.7.23 The Model Facilities of both Object and observer thus 
. affect the behaviour and awareness made by the 
observation, 
. Ba 4'[(X CL) [(X b) Pb 11 -) Ab- 
3.7,24 The Model Facilities of both Object and observer thus 
affect the Object's and the observer's existence on 
the public level, 
(0a) = Sa. 
-Pb z: Ab- 
All Model Facilities in our Universe are necessary 
parts of Objects. They are not Objects, but they 
can become Objects. Model Facilities affect observer 
and Object in an observation. Model Facilities 
make observations relevant. The structure of a 
Model Facility, which makes observations relevant, is 
the source of the Object's potential Meaning. 
29 
4.0. There are two levels of existence. 
4.0,1 Any Object in our Universe must be observable. 
4.0,11 If an Object is not observable it does not exist (in 
the Universe). 
4.0,12 In order. to allow observation, all Objects have a 
Model Facility through which observations are made. 
4.0,2 The Model Facility is available to all observers. 
'4.0,31 When an observation is made through the Model 
Facility by the Object itself, the observation is 
private, 
(0a>=Ea(--[(Xa)Pa]- 
4.0,32 This observation gives rise to the Essence. 
14.0,33 When an observation is made through the Model Facility 
by another observer, the observation is public, 
(0a)= Baf. rfv a)P'] -#A b- LkA b 
4.0,34 This observation gives rise to a behaviour, of the 
Object, and an awareness of the observer. 
4.0,41 Many behaviours give rise to the Behaviour. 
14.0,42 Many awarenesses give rise to the Awareness. 
14.0,43 Public and Private are two different levels of 
existence. 
4.0,44 The Essence is Private. The existence of the 
Essence is implicit in any other observation, since 
the Object must exist for itself, to exist for other 
observers. There is thus'a priority of existences: 
the Essence is implicit in*both behaviours and 
awareness, behaviours and awarenesses are only 
potential in the Essence. 
4.0,45 The behaviour and awareness, and the Behaviour and 
Awareness are Public. 
4.0,5 The term "Public" is chosen because any Public 
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observation calls for a reference to an Object other 
than that being observed. 
14.1, There is a priority in these levels of existence. 
4.1,1 For an Object to exist it must be observed. 
4.1,11 It cannot be observed by any other Object unless it 
has a means for being observed. 
4.1,12 The Object must exist before it is observed by another 
Object. 
4.1,13 The Object must therefore first observe itself. 
14.1,14 The making of its own self -observation must be through 
the means for being observed. 
4.1,2 This means must be in the self. 
4.1,21 This means is called the Model Facility. 
'4.1,3 Until the Object observes itself, it cannot exist, 
(0a) = [(X a)O a]- 
4.1,31 Self -observation is existence, (in this Universe). 
4.1,32 Existence makes external observations possible, 
sa (Pa)=[(Xa)0a] 
(S*1)Q Bat-[(Xa)Pb], 
Where the letter S denotes a moment in time at which 
an observation is being made, and the subscript C1 
denotes that Object to which the time belongs. 
4.1,4 Observations must be made through the Model Facility, 
which is of the Object itself. 
4.1,41 No external observation can be made before there is 
self-observation. 
4.1,5 Public existence depends on private existence being 
already established. 
4.1,51 Similarly, observation of others depends on obser- 
vation of self being already established, 
sa (Ob ) =: Pbt--[(Xb )Pb], 
(S*I)a (0a)= Ba(==[(Xa)pb]. 
a 
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4.2. Existence is through self-observation. Without 
self-observation no external observation can be made. 
Private existence preceeds Public existence. 
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5.0, There is a sense of time inherent in this Universe. 
5.0,1 It has already appeared in the notion of priority. 
5.0,21 An Object must have an Essence in order to have a 
behaviour. 
5.0,22 An observer must have an Essence in order to have an 
awareness. 
5.0,3 Thus, time is a constituent of our Universe. 
5.1, An Object observes itself. 
5.1,1 In its self-observation it maintains its self, 
cyclically. 
5.1,11 This is an oscillation. 
15.1,2 Oscillators necessarily imply-a, time sense in them- 
selves. 
5.1,21 The observation of the self by the self involves the 
Object making Its own time sense. 
5.1,22 There must be the possibility-of a change, between the 
Object (being what it observes itself as), and the 
Object's observation of itself, for self observation 
to occur, 
(0a) ý [(X a) Pa I 
'5.1,23' Thus, the sense of time in this oscillator consists 
in the change of role within the Object (being either 
in the role of observed or of observer), which can be 
represented, 
>= Pa)Pal 
S'CL (0a) = [(X a) 
Where S' is the second half of the cycle beginning at 
S, (S+1)* 'is the second half of the cycle beginning 
at (S-1) , etc. 
5.1,24 These two states are normally compressed into the 
one statement, 
(0a) ý: [(X a) Pa 
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5.1,25 Without these two states, (the half-cycles of the 
oscillator), the Object cannot be a self-observer. 
For this reason, the whole statement is made, and a 
change in time state is normally represented over one 
complete oscillation. That is why the statement in 
5.1,23 was made at S and S' , and not at S and 
(S+J). 
5.1,26 A complete oscillation for any Object can be rep- 
resented as an are, with comparative lengths 
representing comparative time spans in a Reference 
Time (which is a convenience to allow expression of 
the comparison). Thus, for the Object Oa 
Object s 
oscillation 
Object's 5 Ls-i)a (s +7ja (s-3)cI(s-4)ct (s-5)cr timestate a 
5.1,27 The different length of the drawn cycle is a com- 
parative measure, and only means something to the 
external observer using a Reference Time. To the 
Object itself, the length of each cycle is the same, 
being the time needed by the Object in itself to 
change its role, and change back again. To the 
Object itself, there is only the difference between 
its time state as one cycle following another. 
5.1,3 Change involves a "before" and an "after". 
5.1,4 Time is a basic component for the operation of our 
Universe. It is inherent in our Object. 
15.1,5 The output of our oscillating Object would be, if we 
could observe it, a tape of an infinite regress. 
S. 2, The dependence of this time is on the Object only, 
and on no other Object than that of which it is a 
function. 
5.2,1 Each Object is unique. 
05.2,2 Each Object has its unique time. 
a 
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5.2,21 Time is local and belongs to the specific Object of 
which it is part. 
5.2,3 Reference Time and General Time are not a necessity, 
(except for convenient comparison). That each Object 
has its owd local time is. 
5.3, An observation requires the observer and the Model 
Facility of the Object being observed. 
5.3,1 The Model Facility allows access to the Object by the 
observer. 
5.3,2 All Objects have their own times. 
5.3,3. For an observation to take place, both Object roles 
must be present. 
5.3,31 In being present, they construct the Object, at the 
level of either the Essence or the behaviour. 
5.3,4 If the observer and the Object are the same, they have 
the same time. The observation is of the Essence, 
(0a)=Eat--[(Xa)Pa ]. 
5.3,5 The Essence is the Object. Each Object has a time. 
5.4, The observer and the Model Facility are part of the 
Object. 
5.4.1 
. 
The observer and the Model Facility have the same time 
as the Object. 
15.4,2 The observer and the Model Facility make ah Object 
possible. 
5.4,3 When the observer is not the same as the Object, the 
observation is a behaviour, 
-<0C0=BC14-- [(Xa)pb 
5.4,4 All-Objects have a time. 
5.4.5 The Object is the behaviour. 
5.4,51 The Object has a time. 
5.5, The observer is an Object, 
(0b )=[(Xb)Pb]. 
BEST COPY 
AVAILABLE 
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9.2,4 The behaviour of this complex Object, as it is 
observed by the observer, contains the relationship 
seen between the observations made through the Model 
Facilities of the two Objects. 
19.2,5 The complex Object is an Object, an observation through 
the Model Facility of which is believed by the observer 
to contain or eaual the related observations through 
the Model Facilities of the simple Objects. 
9.2,51 The complex Object is the "result" of the computations 
carried out by the observations made on its simples. 
9.2,6 The complex Object is an Object like any other in the 
Universe, to which the observer gives the role of 
complex Object in relationship to those Objects in the 
role of simple Objects. 
'9.2,61 Thus the result of the "and" connection between two 
observations may be shown, 
IlBct--[(X(I)PZIIAIE(Xb)pzl: 
--ýEýoll(-ýIBclt---[(X C )P z11) 
sirrple sirrple coryptex 
Where the tall vertical bars 
11 
indicate groupings, 
and where, 
(OC>=BC =[(Xc)P ZI - 
is the complex Object. 
9.2,62 Similarly, the implication is shown, 
JjBcj 
It=[ýC, )Pz]j---)j[(Xb)Pz]=ý BbjjHBC ý= [(XC)Pz]l. 
simple simple complex- 
shown by, 
V, 
)Pjj 
AU)"ý-"ý BbIl-ý11 4=[(XC)PAj- 
IlBa<=rlva P-'-- 
simple SWnIP: complex 
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5.5,11 The observer has its own time. 
5.5,12 The observer must connect to the time of the Object 
of observation. 
15.5,2 The times of the observer and the Object of 
observation connect. This is a correlation (of time 
@ 
5.6, Each Object has its own time. 
5.6,1 The times of the observer and the Object of 
observation correlate. 
5.6t2 When the observer is not observing the Object of 
observation, its own time does not correlate. 
5.6,3 There is correlation during observation. 
5.7, Observation is made through the Model Facility and is 
the Essence or the behaviour, 
Pa )Pal --4E= (0a)=B a aý= 
[(Xa)pbl- 
5.7,1 An Object must observe itself, to be observable by 
any other Object, 
(0a) = Et-- rfv LkAC Al 
Pb = Eb(--: [(Xb)pbl. 
5.7,2 The Model Facility is the means by which all 
observations are made by all observers. 
b. 7,21 The Object's Model Facility is common to all 
observations. 
5.7,3 The behaviour of an Object correlates with the 
Essence of the observer observing it. 
5.7,31 The Object observes itself, and correlates with 
itself. 
The word "correlate" is used in its Dictionary, rather than 
its statistical, sense. 
0 
36 
5.7.4 The Model Facility of both observations is the same, 
and is the means for correlation. 
5.7,41 In order for both observers (the Object itself and 
the external observer), to observe through the same 
Model Facility, it must be there for both of them. 
5.7,5 There is only one Model. Facility in the Object. 
5.7,6 If both observers want the same Model Facility to 
observe the same Object, and one observation is 
necessary to the other, the other must correlate with 
the one. 
5.7,61 The observer's time correlates with the time of the 
observed behaviour, which correlates with the 
Object's own self-observing time. 
5.8,1 We can summarise the correlation of observer and 
observed roles. 
5.8,11 For the Object Oa itself, 
SCI /t [(X a) Pa 
S6 I(Oct)= Ea [(X a) 
(s*0a 
Cl) PC, 
(5*1)'a 1(0a)= ECTý= [(Xa) 
(S*2)a 
f= [(X a) "'a 1, 
Where the heavy boundary indicates the boundary of a 
normal Object expression. 
15.8,12 At S6, (S+1)6 , etb., the observer role is "vacant" in 
0a and may be filled by another observer: thus at 
(S *')ý - 
Pb may observe OCI giving it a behaviour, 
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SC, t- [(X a) Pa ], 
S& (0a)=Ec, (=- [(Xa) ' 1, 
(S*I)CI, 
a 1, 
. 
4= [(Xa)P, 
(0a)=Ea ý+(Xa)Pbl 
(s*2)a B : a. 
l [(X a) Pa 
5.8,13 For Pb to be able to observe 0a he must be in the 
role of Object to his own observation, 
Sb 1ý b)PDI, 
S'b 1 (0 bEý 
Tot-- Pb)1, 
(S41)b 
4='[(Xb)pb I 
5.8.14 For the observation Of Oa by Pb at time (S+J)*a 
to take place, Pb must be in the role of Object of 
its observations (i. e. at time S'b )- Thus, the form 
of the observation at S'b by Pb Of Oa (giving only 
those parts that go into making the behaviour) will 
be. 
(S-Oct ý=[(Xa)pa 
(S-1)'CL (q t: = Sb H: E [(Xa)Pb]-- ocý 
(s#2). 
1ý=--[(Xa)Pa] (Oa>=) Ba 
(S*l)b 
5.8,15 And the form of Pbýs self -observation will be, 
4: = [("ý b)P b) Sb 
(0b) = [(X b) 5'b 
= [(Xb)pb 
(5-1)b 
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S. 8.16 Hence, a summary of the whole process of interaction 
Is, 
[(Xb)pb Sb 
[(X(: 
I) 
Pb=Fb)I "b 
(S-2)Ci 
. (0c). E3 
(S *1) b [(Xb)pb ] E 
5.8,2 Call the correlated times during which observations 
take place "shared time", and notate it with a sub- 
script from each Object sharing a "shared time". 
Thus, if ObjectOCL is observed by observer Pb - their 
"shared time" can be notated, 
S(a, b) I (s+1)(a, b)t etc.. 
5.9, The awareness of an observer is the same as the 
behaviour of the Object observed. 
5.9.1 The observer's time correlates with the behavioural 
observation. 
5.9,2 The observer's time correlates with the awareness 
observation. 
5.10, In making observations, the unique, individual times 
of, the Objects involved correlate. 
95.10,1 The times only correlate when an observation is 
being made. 
5.11, All Objects have their own times. Observation 
requires correlation between these times. No 
observation is possible without correlation. The 
times of public and private existence are the same. 
a 
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6.0, The observation made by any observer of any Object, 
whether public or private, is personal to that 
observer. 
6.0,1 No observation that can be made can be made except 
with an Object to be observed and an observer to 
observe it. 
6.0,2 All observations are made through the Model Facility 
of the Object being observed, 
, Bci += [(Xcl )Pb ] =ý Ab 
6.0,3 There is nothing in an observation that is not of 
. 
either the Object or the observer. 
16.0,4 No Essence can be experienced except by its own Object. 
16.0,5 No observation can be experienced except by its own 
Object. of observation and observer. 
6.0,6 The behaviour and awareness are the observation as 
experienced by, respectively, the Object and the 
observer. 
6.0,7 No observation can be observed other than by the 
observer who observes it. 
6.1, All Objects can be observed. 
6.1,1 Communication is the transmission of an observation 
from one observer to another. 
6.1,12 ýn observation cannot be observed by any other observer 
than the observer who made it. 
16.1,13 Thus, communication by transmission of an observation 
itself is'impossible. 
16.1.2 Representation is the making of one Object that stands 
for another. 
6.1,21 Representations must be Objects, otherwise they would 
not exist in our Universe. 
6.1,22 Representations, being Objects, can be observed. 
6.1,23 If an observation can be represented by another Object, 
it can be observed. 
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'6.1.3 Communication Can occur when observations are t 
represented by Objects which are observed by other 
observers. 
6.2, There are two Objects which can be seen by the 
observer. Call one Oa . the other 
OC 
, 
(Oa > Ea<== [(X a Pa 
(0 C>EC 4- 
[(X cPc 
6.2.1 The observer Pb observes the two Objects, 
rty Ba LV, a 
) Pb (0c), 
Bc [(Xc)pbl-(0c)- 
6.2,2 If the observer observes both Objects as being the 
same, they are identical to him, for these observa- 
tions, 
a)P b] '-: 4 E) aBCPC)P b], 
(Pa >- Ba B c-(O C>, 
Where the bi-conditional(--)indicates that -the 
behaviour of each Object to the common observer, appear 
to be the same. The origin of this computational 
ability (and, of all other computation abilities used) 
will be covered later. 
16.2.21 The two Objects are not identical; each Object has 
Its own unique Essence, 
(0a) -Ea, (-- [(X a) Pa ], 
<Oc>- Ec(;. [(Xc )PC ]. 
6.2.3 But for the observer, making these observations, the, 
two Objects, that is, the two behaviours' the observer 
believes are the two Objects, are the same. 
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"S. 2.4 Thus, for the observer, one Object can stand for the 
other Object, as a surrogate. 
S. 3, An cbserver cannot see the observation made by another 
observer, 
[(Xcl)pbl (--1-4 [(Xa)pdl 
Where the negated bi-conditional indfcates that 
there is not an identity between the two expressions. 
6.3.1 Both observers can see the same Object, each attributing 
a behaviour, 
(00)- E3a 0-4N Pb] 
(6a >- Ba (--[(X Ct Pd 
6.3,11 Both observers will observe the Object differently, 
Lad will believe they observe the Object. 
S. 3,2 If one observer takes a second observable Object to 
stand for his observation of the first Object, the 
second observer may also be able to observe that 
Object, 
E6 (pb) 4"' 
Da ) Pb It 
BC(p 
b 
[(Xc )Pb 
(OC) B qu (OC % 
Bc, 
(pd) 
[(Xa )Pd ], 
- 
B ('(Pd)' 4ý-[(Xc 
)Pd 1) 
(OcL>-Bag(--4BC(g -(Oc). 
There the sub-subscripts (%) and, (pd) indicate the 
observer attributing the particular behaviour. 
6.3,21 By observing the two Objects, the one standing for 
the other, the second observer can understand what he 
believes the first observer to have observed. 
a 
42 
6.3,3 Thus, by use of a surrogate Object, Communication 
is possible. 
6.4, An observer can communicate to another observer, by 
means of a surrogate Object. 
16.4,1 The other observer will construct a behaviour for both 
the Object and the surrogate Object, in order to make 
a picture of the observer's observation. 
6.4,11 There is no certainty that the second observer will 
understand anything similar to the observer's 
observation. 
16.5, In order for any Communication to take place with 
certainty, the second observer must represent the 
observation he makes of the first observer's observa- 
tion. 
6.5,1 The first observer may then try and reconcile what he 
believes the second observer observed with what he 
observed initially. 
16.5,11 This is an error regulator. 
6.5,12 This is a conversational idiom. 
6,5,13 A conversation WX consists, therefore, in three 
stages of representation. 
6,5,14 In the first stage the Initial observer states his 
observation, 
WX(S) PCL's view 
6.5,15 In the second stage the listening observer states his 
view of the initial observer's view, 
WNSA) PCs view of Pa 's view 
6.5,16 In the third stage the initial observer states his 
view of the listening observer's view of his own view, 
Wx(s+2) Pa's view Of Pb's view of Pa's view 
0 
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6.5,17 Computing the error consists in finding the difference 
between WxS and Wx (S*2) 
If there is no difference, 
Communication is good. If there is a large difference, 
Communication is bad, 
%S (---) WX(S+'2) good communication, 
Wxs'-'-"Wx(s*2) bad communcation, 
The means for computing differences of this type are 
covered later. 
6.5,2 A full explanation of representation in a'conversation 
is therefore, as below. 
6.5,21 To an Object 0a which is a topic of a conversation, 
the observer P, Y attributes a behaviour and then uses 
another Object Ob to represent his observation. 
This is, 
(0a) = [(Xa)Py]=4 Ba(py), 
(0b) - [(Xb)PY] =) Bb(p Y 
), 
Ba(p 
Y 
Bbpy) 
(OCI)ý-ý(Qt)- (stage Wx 
S). 
6.5,22 The second observer attributes a behaviour to this 
. surrogate 
Object, and represents the behaviour by 
another surrogate Object. This is, 
(0b) = [(X b) Pz] 4 E3b(Pz)) 
(0C> = [(X C)PZ] =ý BC (PZ), 
Bb(pZ)(---) Bc(p 
z 
(P b)'r-40 c>- (stage Wx 
6.5,23 The original observer attributes a behaviour to this 
other surrogate Object, and compares this behaviour 
to the behaviour he attributed to the initial Object. 
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This is, 
(Oc> = [(X C)PY] 4 BC (P Y) I 
(od>:: [(Xd)pyl=) Bd(Py)) 
BC(Py)(---)Bd(Py), 
(oc>(-ý(od). (stage W4(S+2))* 
6.5,31 If there is no difference, the second observer is 
assumed to understand, 
(Ocý I- Bci(Pyt--ý BdP f: (0d)- 
y 
'6.5,32 If there is a difference, a new surrogate must be 
found, either to re-express the original observation, 
or to express the difference, 
(00: `Eý(PyX-4 Bd(Py)`Pd>- 
6.6.1 A surrogate Object may be used to communicate an 
observation made by an observer of an Object. A 
surrogate Object is an Object in the Universe like 
any other Object, In the role of representing another 
Object. 
6.6,2 A conversation may be used as a check of the success 
of Communication between two observers. 
a 
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7.0, The observation, by an observer, of another Object, 
Involves a correlation of times. 
7.0,1 The result of such an observation is a behaviour 
attributed to the Object by the observer, together 
with an awareness developed by the observer itself, 
(Pcý ý 13017-'Lk XG) Pb Ab- 
7.1.1 All observations made in the Universe are made by 
Objects, of Objects. 
7.1,2 All Objects are self-observers. 
17.2, If one observer observes two separate Objects at the 
same time by his local clock, there will be two 
different behaviours attributed by it (one to each 
Object), 
(PCL)ýBe-- [(XG)Pbl 
(Pc>--BaOý[(Xc)Pb]- 
Where Pb Is the observer. 
7.2,1 Each observed Object has its own time. Observations 
are only made with the correlation of the observer's 
and the Object's time. 
7.2,11 For the twd observations Ba and BCthe shared times 
(i. e. the times of the observations) are shown as, 
S(a, b), 
Both of which have something in common (i. e. the local 
time of the observer, denoted by the b in the subscript). 
17.2,2 In terms of the 
* 
local time of Pb I the observer, there 
are five ways in which these shared times may relate, 
while having something in common. Using the arc to 
0 
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express the shared times, we have these possibilities, 
sla, b) 
or. case 0), S(CA kI 
S(a, b) 
or I case b), 5(c, b) I 
-S(a, b) 
case c) S(C. b) 
s(h, b) 
case d) L 'S(C. b) 
NO) 
case e) 
-s(c, b) I 
Where the dotted bar lines indicate the span over 
which the comparison is made. 
17.2,21 In case a, the observation made through local time 
S(a, b) contains s (c, b) , that is, the behaviour of 
Object Oa contains the behaviour of Object OC, 
attributed by the observer This is the form of 
implication, 
(Oa> = BCL(- 13C = (0c) 
17.2,22 In case b, Ba is completely contained by BC , giving 
the reverse implication to case a, 
4)a) = Ba --) Bc = (0c). 
'7.2,23 In case c, E3aand E3C overlap, but neither is wholly 
-contained in the comparison, giving a logical "and", 
. 
ý%) =BCLHBc = (0c). 
17.2,24 In case d, 13ais completely contained by, and com- 
pletely contains E3c# giving equality, or the bi- 
conditional, 
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(0c) = 13CL A BC = (OC). 
'7.2.25 In case e, Ba and [3 C overlap and they are both 
wholly contained in the comparison, giving a logical 
"inclusive or", 
(Oa) = Ba V BC = (Oc>. 
7.3. There is thus, in the necessary existence of each 
Object's local time, giving rise to the shared time of 
each observation, a computational logic in which 
implication in both senses (--->andý-), equality 
and logical "and" (A), and "inclusive or" 
V is already inherent. There is no negation, 
since comparisons can only be made when the observing 
Object can observe two other Objects during the some 
part of its local time. 
7.4,1 We have noted that implication is available in both 
senses. This means that cases a and b are the same 
computation with a different direction. 
'7.4.11 Similarly, allowing a fracturing of the shared times 
of case c, we obtain, 
S (a, b) case c) 
S(c, b) logical biconditional. 
Where the dotted arcs indicate the fractured times. 
17.4,12 This is effectively two implications operated succes- 
sively in opposite directio-ns. Thus the bi-conditional, 
can be treated as the implication, 
followed by the reverse, ( (or vice versa). 
7.4,13 Applying the same process to case d, we obtain, 
(a. b) case d) 
S(C. b) 1091CCLI and. lk 
1-1- ý__ 
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In which the central section (at which the logical 
and operates) now takes the form of case c, and, by 
further fracturing can be treated as a pairing of 
implications, Each are is, itself, 
fractured into two arcs, so that each of the little 
arcs is implied by the big are, but only one little 
are of which is involved in the computation. 
7.4,14 Finally, with case e, we obtain, 
case e) SýL. b) 
(c. b) s togical nclusive or. 
7.5, 
'7.6, 
This is essentially the same as case d, except that 
all the little arcs are involved in the computation. 
In this way, we have established a computational logic 
that has only the operation "implication" (with a 
reversible direction). 
The computation of comparisons between observations 
made by one observer of two Objects may be executed 
by comparing the shared times against the observer's 
local clock. All these computations may be considered 
as being sequences of directional logical implications 
If a fracturing of the shared times is allowed. 
a 
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18.0, The finding of a relationship between observations of 
different Objects is the making of a Model. 
18. O'l A Model exists In the Universe, and is therefore an 
Object. 
8.0,2 A Model is an Object placed in the role of a Model to 
another Object by an observer. 
18.0,3 By being placed in this role, an Object becomes a 
surrogate Object to another Object. 
S. 0,4 A surrogate Object is used, together with that Object 
to which it is surrogate, to communicate an observer's 
view. 
8.0,5 The relationship is between the observations, that is, 
the behaviours, '' 
(0a) 2: Ba '(-- RX CL 
)P b) i 
(PC)=E3C (--[(Xc )Pbl) 
(Oct)=13Q (--) BC =(0C). 
8.0,6 This relationship is one of identity. 
'8.1, When the relationship is one of identity, the Model 
may be referred to as a Language, and may be denoted 
11L 
subscript"* 
A Language is a Model which is, in the 
view of the observer, Identical to the Object, 
(0C1)=E3C1 ý=[(XCI)Pt)), 
<Oc>=Bc ý=[(XC)Pb]=LC. 
8.2, There are three other relationships that may hold. 
between two Objects. 
8.2,1 The first is containment or implication, in which one 
Object has all the qualities of the other, while the 
other does not have all the qualities of the one, 
(0a)=Ba (--[(Xa)Pbl) 
(PC >=BC ý= [(Xc)pbl) 
(Pa )=; Ba---)B c= (0 c>. 
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8.2,11 This relationship may operate in either direction. 
It is clear that the converse is also possible (while 
not the same), 
(0a)= BQ(-BC = (0 C). 
S. 2p2 The second relationship is logical "and", or sharing 
of a common area, 
(0a) =B CL (-- [(X (3) Pý 
(OC)=Bc ý=[(XC LV' )Pb1 
(Oc)= E3C, A Eý-- (Otý., 
S. 2,21 Here, only a part of one Object is implied by the 
other. Calling this common part Od , we have, 
APa>--Ba 4--RXG)PbJ) 
(00=E3C (--[(XC)Pbl, 
(od >= Bd ý= RUP bI 
Oct )= Bd- N= (P d), 
(0c)= E3cf-Bd=(Pd># 
E3d (--) Bd - 
S. 2.22 Thus, the logical "and" can be seen as the sequential 
operation of two implications. 
S. 3, The remaining relationship is summationp or the 
logical "or". Using Od again to denote the common area. 
(Oa>=Ba 'ý: Pa)Pbh 
<Oc>ýac (--[(XC)Pbli 
(Pd)ý-E3d (--[(Xd)Pbl) 
<Pa >= Ba v E3C=KO C >j 
(Oa >= BQ--4 Eýd=(P d >j 
<0 C>= 13C ---) Bdý (P q% 
<Od> :: Bd"Bd=(O d 
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8.4. The difference betweeR the logical "and" and the 
logical "or" thus lies not in the logic, but in the 
direction of the implications. 
8.4,1 The whole logic is made up of a series of implications. 
8.4,2 The means by which these logical computations can take 
place is through the correlation of the observational 
times of the different Objects. 
8.5, Where an Object stands as surrogate for another Object, 
it is a Model of that Object. 
8.5,1 There is only one type of relation that exists between 
these two Objects, although the relation may exist in 
either direction, and may be applied several times. 
The relation is implication. 
8.5,11 Equality consists of two implications, opposite in 
direction, in which the change from Object Oa to the 
Model OC is equalled but reversed in the change from 
the Model to the Object, 
(0(1)= BC17---)BC=(OC>; 
(Oa)=Baý--Bc=(Oc). 
8.5,12 Logical "and" consists of two implications, one each 
from the Object and the Model, to the area týey share 
in common, 
(PQ)=; Ba(---Bd=<0d), 
(C) c>ý: BC(-- Býý (0 d >. 
S. 5,13 Logical "or" consists of two implications, but in the 
reverse direction to Logical "and", 
(0a) ýBa--4B d-: (0 d)) 
<OC>= BC--ýBdý'«) ä> 
- 
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'8.5,2 Using, this one logical operation, together with, its 
two directions, we can account for all our computa7 
tions. There is no negation because if there, is no 
relationship between observations of two Objects, one 
may not be surrogate to the other. 
8.6, Let us call the type of Model, made by this operation, 
according to its direction of implication. 
S. 6,1 It the implication is from the Object to the Model, 
we have, 
(0C)= Bcl----)Bc ý(Oc) = MC - 
Where M denotes the role of an Object being surrogate 
to another Object. 
S. 6,11 Put another way, with 
PIC 
representing this type of 
Model, which we call the Anti-Model, we have, 
(0 c >7-E3 c (-- [(X c) P bl = 
Mc 
(C), ) - 
which means the same thing. 
S. 6.2 If the implication is reversed, we have 
ýOcj)= Ba (--BC= <OC) =MC- 
S. 6,22 Putting this another way, with MC representing the 
Interior Modelling process, we have, 
(Ocl>--E3a'(-- RXQ) Pbl 
- 
(Oc>=Bc ý=[(XC)Pbl=MC(OC, ). 
S. 7. Thus, we use the expression Airti-Model M for a 
Model which contains the Object it Models, and the 
expression Interior Model M for a Model which is 
contained by the Object it Models. 
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8.8,7be computing of a relationship between the behaviour 
of-two'ditferent Objects can lead to one Object being 
placed as surrogate to the other. The surrogate is 
called aModel; when the relationship is a bi- 
conditional, the Model is called a Language, when 
deduction an Interior Model, when inference an Anti- 
)Aodel. 
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9.0, A complex Object is an Object that standsýfor some 
-other-Objects, in some way, as observed by an observer. 
9. O'l A Model @ is an Object that. stands for some other 
Object. ' 
9.0,2 A Model and the Object of which it is observed to be 
a Model are related by an observed area of commonness. 
9.0,3 A Model of a Model is also a Model of the Object of 
which the Model is a Model. 
9.0,31 A Model of a Model is thus a Model of two Objects: an 
Object, and another Object which is a Model of that 
Object. 
19.0,4 A transformation is a Model of a Model. 
9.0,41 Thus, a transformation is an Object which represents' 
two other Objects and is a complex Object. 
9.1, Objects can be observed by an observer to relate 
together. 
9.1.1 The parts of Objects through which an observer sees 
them, are the Objects' Model Facilities. 
9.1.11 If Objects are observed by an observer to relate 
together, the relationship observed is in the observa- 
tions of the Objects' Model Facilities making the 
behaviours the observer believes to be the Objects. 
19.1,2 The possible relationships between observations 
through the Model Facilities ýf observed Objects, as 
observedby the observer, are four. as already 
examined. 
0 The word "Model" is used in its Dictionary, rather than its 
-Technical, sense. 
i 
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9.1,21 One observation through a Model Facility may share 
something in common with another in the observer's 
view, 
(()Q PZ] A RX b) P z1- 
This is a logical "and". 
9.1,22 One observation through a Model Facility may contain 
another, 
[(Y'ci)pzl--)[(X b) Pz I 
This is a logical implication. 
9.1,23 - One observation through a Model Facility may equal 
another, 
--- 
((X a) POHRX b) Pz ]- 
This is a logical equality. 
9.1,24 The possible connection by a logical "or" is 
compilation, 
F G)Pzl v RX b) Pz] - 
9.1,25 These relationships reflect those between Object and 
Model, but with this difference: a Model is an Object 
. surrogate 
to another Object while a complex Object is 
in Object which is the "resdlt" of a computation 
between two other Objects (simples). 
S. 2,1 Nothing in our Universe that is not an Object can be 
observed, and therefore exist. 
9.2,21 An observer gives behaviours to the two Objects. 
9.2.22 A commonness between these two behaviours can exist. 
9,2,3 The commonness is an observation made through the 
Model Facility of a complex Object. If it were not 
an Object, it would noi exist in the-Universe. 
f 
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9.2,64 And the result of the "or" connecti6n is, 
jjf3a4-KXa)P+j[(X b)Pz]=> E3bll4--)IBct-- [(XC)Pz]l 
simple simple complex 
9.2,71 A complex. Object stands for more than one other Object. 
9.2.72 A Model or Language stands for one other Object. 
9.3, A complex Object is an Object like any other Object 
in the Universe. 
9.3,1 The representation of an observation in the Universe is 
a surrogate Object. 
9.3,2 The representation of an observation of a complex 
Object must be by a surrogate Object. 
9.3,3 ýA complex Object exists, and is observed to be similar 
to, the simple Objects to which it is placed in the 
role of complex Object. 
9.3,4 The expression of this observation of the complex 
Object, is by a Model@. 
9.4, A Model is an Object like any other-Object in the 
Universe. 
9.4,1 If a relationship is seen by an observer to exist 
between the observations made of two Objects which 
are repr6sented by a Model, the relationship may be 
represented by a Model. 
19.4,11 If the complex Object representation parallels the 
relationship between the simple Objects and the complex 
Object, in relating to the representations of the 
simple Objects, there is a complex Model. 
9.4,12 A Model representing a complex-Object need not be a 
complex Model. 
9.4,13 A Model representing a complex Object will be a 
complex Model if it represents the simple-complex 
relationship observed between the Objects represented. 
@ In this context (9.3,4 to 9.6, ) the term Model includes Anti- 
Model and Language (which are types of Model). 
4 
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9.5, Rodel Objects may be observed to have something in 
common. 
9.5,1 This commonness is embodied in a complex Model. 
9.5,2 A Model is an Object like any other Object in the 
Universe. 
9.5,21 A complex Model is an Object, like any other, in the 
role of complex Object, like any other complex Object. 
9.5,22 Since a Model is an Object in the role of representing 
Lnother Object, a complex Model must represent some 
other Object. 
9.5,3 A complex Object demonstrates an observed similarity 
between two (or more) simple Objects. 
9.6, Objects which are observed by an observer to have 
similarities, have other Objects called complex Objects 
which also have the same similarities. Complex 
Objects are Objects ih our Universe like any other 
Objects, put in the role of complex Object by the 
observer. The representation of a complex Object is 
a Model. If the Model representing the complex 
Object parallels the relationship to the Models 
representing the simple Objects, that Model is a 
complex Model. Languages can be related together by 
. an observer. 
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110.0' There are five basic forms of argument. They are 
Deduction, Induction, Abduction, Analogy and 
Identification. 
10. O'l All arguments may be compounded from these, f ive. f orms. 
10.1, All five forms may be derived from our form of 
implication. 
10. I'l The form of a deduction from an Object to a Model is the 
form of an implication from the Model to the Object, or 
the form of an Interior Model, 
(0Q)=BCt(---; -MC'= (Od. 
10.1,2 The form of an induction is, conversely, an implication 
from Object to Model, or an Anti-Model, 
. 
<Oci> = Ba--ý M- C= 
(Oc 
10.1,3 The form of a tautology is the Implication of a Model 
from an Object, and the implication of that same Object 
from the Model, 
(0(2) =Bct--)Mc= (0d) 
(0c) Ma= (0a) Ba) 
(0a)= BcI(-4Ma=(0a)= Ba- 
That is, an Anti-Model which is itself modelled by an 
Interior Model which is the same as the orieinal-Object. 
110.1,4 A. tautology can also be achieved by the reversal of 
direction of implication, 
(0a)=Ba(-Mc=(Odj 
KO C> =M C-ýFAa = (0a) = Ba i 
<Oa>= BQ(--)Acj = (0a) = E3cL - 
a 
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10.1,5 An abduction is a making of an hypothesis, and the 
creation of a new statement from that hypothesis. it 
is thus the construction of an Anti-Model from an 
Object, and the statement of an Interior Model of the 
Anti-Model which is not the same as the object, 
(0C1)=BQ-AC =(0C>0 
(PC>=k*-Md ý(Od) = Bd- 
There Od is abduced from OCL , or. more precisely, the 
behaviour Of Odas seen by the observer is abduced from 
the behaviour of OCI. 
10.1.6 An analogy is the converse of abductibn, that is, it is 
the making of an Interior Model, then an Anti-Model 
which is not the same as the original Object, 
-. <Oa)=BCL(---Mc = (0c), 
(Oc>ýMc--iýd7-(Od>= Bd- 
Where Od is analogous to Oa. 
10.2, Thus, all five forms of argument may be achieved by the 
operation of our Model making bi-directional implication. 
10.3, It will be'noticed that the operation of an implication 
between an Object and a Model can be taken as the 
operation of a transformation on the Object, producing 
the Model (i. e. the transformed Object). 
010.4, If we wish to follow the various stages in a Modelling 
-process, we may 
find the notation we have used (especially 
with respect to the similarity, or lack of similarity, 
between the Object and one of Its Models) rather long- 
winded. It can be abbreviated to show the chain, 
read from left to right, using the forms M for Interior 
0 
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Model, M for Anti-Model, and Q for the initial 
Object@. The difference between the Object and the 
Model can be shown by a marking of the Remainder 
(notated R ). That which is omitted from the Object Q 
in making an Interior Model M is the Remainder R 
Conversely, the Anti-Model adds in the Anti-Remainder 
An index-is used for labelling purposes. 
10.4,1 Using this notation, we have the following, 
10.4,11 
01m 
ZL--ý3 
R 
1.2 
deduction. 
10.4,12 
1.2 inducton. 
10.4.13 
0mM where R )R 1,2 2.3 
R 1,2 R2,3 tautology, 
where R 
,. 
ý3,1,2 R2,3. 
1,2 R 2,3 
@ The notation is introduced to abbreviate and simplify the 
expressions. It should not be forgotten that we are, however, 
talking about one observer's computations carried out with the 
behaviours it attributes to the Objects. 
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20.4,14 
10.4.15 
where R -*4 R 2,3 1,24 
ý, 
2 R2, j - abducton. 
where R(1)P- 2.3 
ý, 
3 ancdogy. 
'10.5, Thus, the form of an argument may be deduced by com- 
paring the Model, Object and Remainder. 
20.6, Thus. an initial Object can be re-constructed by the 
reversing of the process. 
'120.7, Argument forms are the results of implications between 
the observed behaviours of different Objects. as seen 
by one observer. All five basic forms of argument 
x2ay be constructed from this one operation, and thus 
-the form of arguments can be understood from the Model 
types. 
63 
11.0, A tautology Is the statement of an identity, yet is is 
shown in our logic as the result of two Modelling 
operations: two implications opposite in direction, 
but. with the same Remainder and Anti-Remainder, 
I- 0MM )R 
1,2 2,3' 
R 
1,2 
R 
2,3 
1 k--)M 3 
QmmR1,2 )R 2,3' 
R1.2 R 2,3 
01 (---) p3 
Il. O'l In making this identity, we are taking two opposite 
Modelling operations, and with the Remainder and Anti- 
Remainder being equal, we are cancelling the two steps 
against each other. 
In making an abduction or an analogy, in contrast, we 
cannot cancel the two steps, since the Remainder and 
Anti-Remainder are not the same. If the Remainder 
and Anti-R6mainder were the same, the form of the 
argument. would be the form of a tautology. 
In the case of an abduction, then, ' we have, 
MM 1.2 2, V 
R1,2 R 2,3 
01 (7f4M3' 
A 
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111.1,2 In the case of an analogy we have, 
0mmR -4) 1,2( 
ý2,3' 
R 1.2 R 2,3 
11.1.3 Thus, under the circumstances that the Remainder and 
Anti-Remainder are equal but opposite, two successive 
implications of opposite direction can be cancelled 
together. 
11.2, Let us call each implication a dimension@ of Modelling. 
It has direction which is shown by the Model form 
(Interior Model, Anti-Model). 
11.2,1 A tautology has no dimensions, since its two Modelling 
stages are opposite and the Remainder and Anti- 
Remainder are the same, e. g., 
01 M2 M3 R1,2( )R 2,3' 
R 1.2 R Z3 
01 
11.2,2 By contrast, abduction has two dimension, firstly of 
Anti-Modelling, secondly of Interior Modelling, 
0M2M3 P1.2 )R 2.3' 
R 1.2 
R 2,3 
01 --)M 2 (--M 3' 
Dimension is used in a sense analogous to that in which it is 
. 
used by the Physicist and Engineer. The problem approached 
here is the starting point of this whole Thesis. 
a 
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M2 is the first Model dimension, M3 is the second. 
They cannot be cancelled. 
11.2,3 Similarly, analogy has two dimensions, but in the 
reverse order, 
0M2M3R1.2 ýý R 2,3' 
R1,2 R2 ý3 
01M2 ----)m 3 
is the first Model dimension, is the second. M2M3 
They cannot be cancelled. 
111.3,1 If two Models of the same sense follow each other, 
they may also be cancelled. Obviously, an Interior 
Model of an Interior Model of an Object is an Interior 
Model of that Object, 
M2 (--M 3 
M3 
'11.3.2 Similarly, an Anti-Model of an Anti-Model of an Object 
will be an Anti-Mod6l of that Object, 
01 )M2-)M3 
01 )3. 
11.3j3 The Remainder or Anti-Remainder does not affect the 
cancellation of one Model into another Model of the 
same sense. 
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'11.4, Thus, strings of Modelling processes may be cancelled 
into strings of simplified Model steps. These are 
called Model Dimensions. 
'11.5, Using this technique of dimensioning, Modelling strings 
can be simplified, and analysed into their basic 
argument forms. From each pairing of final Dimensions, 
the form of the argument may be seen. Thus, keeping 
the Dimensions of a Modelling process is a way of 
keeping track of the argument set up, and is, with a 
record of the Remainders and Anti-Remainders, a means 
for ensuring the recreation of the original Object! s 
behaviour, at some later time, by the observer, if the 
observer should wish to do this. 
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12.0, The Object must observe itself before any other 
observer can observe it. 
12.0,1 Nevertheless, its self-observation is private, and 
cannot be seen by others. 
12.0,11 Thus, public existence is separate from private, but 
depends on there being a private existence. 
12.0,21 Private existence allows existence in the Universe, 
but does not allow others to know of the existence. 
12.0,22 Public existence is the knowing by others of the 
existence of the Object. 
12.0,3 The progress of public existence is the Object's Life- 
span. 
12.0,31 The first observation of the Object by an external 
observer is its "birth". The last is its "death". 
12.0,32 There Is no way of knowing "how long" an Object has 
observed itself before an external observer observes 
It. 
12.0,33 There is no way to know if an Object observes itself 
after the last external observation. 
12.1, The Model Facility is that which permits observations 
to be made of an Object. 
12.1,1 The Model Facility is that which makes sure observations 
made of the same Object are made of the same Object. 
12.2,11 An observer observes the Object. The observation is 
a behaviour. 
12.2,12 The Object observes itself. The observation is the 
Essence. 
12.2,13 The Essence cannot be observed by the external observer. 
12.2,14 The Essence and the Behaviour are made through the same 
Model Facility. 
12.2.2 As more observations are made by external observers, 
the Behaviour increases. 
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12.2,21 That which is the Behaviour cannot be the Essence. 
12.2,22 As the observations' constituting the Behaviour 
Increase, the remaining possibilities for the Essence, 
remaining unique, diminish. 
12.2,23 The Essence must be that which the Behaviour is not. 
12.3, As the Behaviour increases, the possibilities for the 
Essence diminish. 
12.3,1 Without the Essence, the Object cannot exist. 
12.3,2 The Object makes its own Essence through its Model 
Facility. Other Objects observe this Object through 
the same Model Facility and make its Behaviour. 
12.3,3 A behaviour cannot be the Essence. 
112.3,4 Ultimately, a behaviour must be attributed that is the 
same as the Essence, for there will be nothing else 
left. 
12.3,41 As this point is reached, the Object can no longer be 
externally observed. ' 
12.3,42 When the Object can no longer be externally observed, 
it is dead. 
12.3,43 The time during which the Object is externally observed 
Is its Life-span. 
112.4, The same applies to the Awareness of the observer: as the 
AFareness increases, the observer's self -observation 
(Essence) is "threatened" the 'the observer's other 
observations. 
112.5, The increase of the Behaviour decreases the possibility 
of the Essence remaining private. If the Essence 
becomes public it is not the Essence. The Object 
becomes unobservable by external observers when the 
Essence is the only possible remaining behaviour of 
the Object. Once a behaviour has been attributed to 
the Objec: t, its Life-span has begun, and it will 
gradually tend to. the unobservable. 
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13.0, In order to know something exists we must be able to 
observe it. 
13.0,1 If we cannot observe it, we cannot know it exists. 
We cannot necessarily affirm its non-existence, either. 
13.0,2 If we do not know an Object exists, we can usefully 
say nothing about it. 
13.0,3 A Thesis says things about Objects. 
13.0,31 If we cannot say things about Objects, we have nothing 
to say. 
13.0,32 It we have nothing to say, we should not try to speak. 
13.0,41 We state our Universe, thus, as being a Universe of 
observation. 
113.0,42 We are not concerned with other possible Universes. 
13.1, For an Object to exist in our Universe, it must be 
observable. 
'13.1.1 The Universe contains only observable Objects. 
a 
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"0.0, The only way in which we can know things is by a 
personal experience of them: and that presupposes 
that we can, in some form and sense,, observe that 
thing. This view is established by Laing, et 
al(*60), and given wider, context by Bannister and 
Fransella"12), in their presentation of Kelly, s(*56) 
Theory of Personal Constructs. Bannister and 
Fransella make the quite reasonable point that it is 
difficult to talk about any set of personal constructs, 
without assuming a personal interaction with the 
World, and thus, personal knowledge. This is, 
clearly, the underlying belief of the cognitive view 
of the World. 
110.0,2 The same view lies at the base of Existential philo- 
(*92) 
sophies (as colourfully depicted by, e. g. Sartre 
in his novels): that is, we r1ay-only speak with 
authority about those things of which we hILve 
knowledge. 
110.0,32 The point thus becomes to eliminate those thirigs of 
which we have no knowledge from any attempted discus- 
spion. This can be done by pairing the "unspeakable" 
with the "unknowable". The same sentiment is used 
by Wittgenstein(*108) to terminate the discussion in 
his "Tractatus". 
1'0.1, This does not, in any way, deny the existance of 
other things than those of which we have experience, 
but it does insist that we can say nothing about 
them (not even that we cannot talk about them, which 
is the central paradoxical theme of much of 
Beckett's (*110) work, especially "The Unnamable"). 
"0.1.1 In this way, we provide the "entry qualification" 
to our Universe: that the Universe contains only 
observable Objects. 
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"l. 0,2 Bishop Berkeley's views of our Universe (i. e. the view 
of the Idealist School as discussed in Passmore 
(*112) ) is 
the one that immediately springs to mind. His basic 
interest was in the means for keeping Objects in the 
Universe observed, and to this end, he invoked God. The 
series of Limericks shows the argument perhaps more 
clearly than any other statement: 
There once was a man who said, "God 
Must think it exceedingly odd 
If he finds that this tree 
Continues to be 
When there's no one about in the Quad. " 
For which the Idealist answer was, 
Dear Sir, 
Your astonishment's odd: 
I am always about in the Quad- 
And that's why the tree 
Continues to be, 
Since observed by, 
Yours faithfully, 
God 
However, the stance of this Thesis is slightly dif- 
ferent, for we insist on the Objects in the Universe 
observing themselves (and hence being present In the 
Universe); 
Dear God, 
Why did'you forget me? 
I don't need another to see: 
I don't need no bod 
Around in the Quad: 
I'm observing, 
Yours faithfully, 
Tree. @ 
@ See the Appendices 
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Certain objections are normally set against this 
type of self-observing system: a complete descrip- 
tion which is consistent, is necessary (as shown by 
von Foerster 
(*37)), if an Object is to maintain 
itself in this manner. Yet G6del( 
*46 ) 
argued con- 
vincingly that it was doubtful if such a system could 
be assumed to exist. (The system put forward in this 
Thesis avoids this problem, as will be shown 
presently). However, Winnograd( 
*106 ) has made such 
an Object (an algorithm for self-reproduction), 
albeit a rather simple Object, and L6ffgren 
(*64 ) has 
demonstrated a theoretical condition for complete 
self-reproduction. 
111.0,4 This self-observational quality has inherent in it a 
concept of priority (which will be covered in depth 
later); all Objects in our Universe have to be self- 
observers, in order to be In the Universe. Clearly, 
for any Object to observe any other (in the Universe), 
both Objects must already exist (otherwise they 
could not observe/be observed). 
1, However. this isolation of each Object, its self- 
dependence, means that the Universe is built up of 
seperate entities, in the manner of Piaget's 
(*85) 
child's Universe; each Object observes itself, 
regardless of the observations made of it by other 
Objects. That is, each Object is isolated, and, 
if it has any relationship with another Object, the 
relationship is secondary to the Object's isolated 
existence. 
"l. 1,12 The ability to observe the self is permitted through 
the incorporation in the self of the "Model Facility". 
In each Object (and it should be noted that this is 
a characteristic of all Objects in the Universe, and 
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not merely "intelligent" ones: it applies equally 
to electrons and to elephants. In this respect, 
this Thesis is an advance on von Poerster(*36), who 
has come nearest to a similar formulation). The 
Model Facility within the Object is that which 
permits observations to be made - in this respect it 
is rather like a Cate into a field - and thus 
provides a means for Lilly's 
(*63) 
self-meta- 
programming to take place. 
111.2,2' Thus, the Object contains, in itself, not only the 
. Object (of observation), but also the observer, and 
the means for observation to take place (the Model 
Facility). 
111.2,3 This is achieved by the cyclic form of the Object, 
for the Object observes itself, and is thus both 
observer and observed. This involvement of the 
observer in the realisation of the Object is a 
cognitive view of observation, and its relationship 
to that which is observed, (von Foerster 
(*33) ). 
In other words, we must observe in order to know, and 
our observing also forms that which we can know. 
The circularity of this form of observation of the 
self echos the specification for life put forward by 
(*65)(*120) Maturana and taken as an a priori by von 
(*36) Foerster to the effect that life is that which 
sustains life. Other circular descriptive forms 
exist (the serpent eating its own tail Is one of 
ancient lineage), and Ashby(*8) has shown the need 
for this self-observational facility (the Model 
Facility) if any form of the necessary control to 
main stability is to exist in a system. 
"1.3,11 This explanation of the nature of the inhabitants of 
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the Universe leads to the understanding that Objects 
are essentially private, and therefore cannot be fully 
explained by any description. The Essence of the 
Object lies within the Object itself. Our common 
experience in consulting a dictionary (as with the 
feeling that we cannot see all), for example, shows 
us this: for if we keep on referring to each indivi- 
dual "meaning" in the dictionary, we will eventually 
end up looking up the original term we could not 
understand. This circularity of meanings is 
reflected in Pask's 
(*79) 
proposition of a "Knowledge 
Entailment Net", and is also parallelled in the form 
of our Objects, with their inherent cyclicity, lead- 
ing to the view of the Essence. 
I'l. 3,12 The privacy of the Essence is an old philosophical 
concept, as in, for instance, Ilegel"50). 
111.4, The inclusion of the Essence in the formulation of 
the Object, indicates the uniqueness o; each Object, 
and, indeed, the already talked about privacy of 
each Object. This is a spatial distinction between 
Objects. 
$'1.5 A possible explanation of this Universe is the 
SOliPsist! s contention thit'the Univeise Is ihe con- - 
struction of the observer. This argument would 
make the Essence of each Object basically irrelevent, 
but it has been well answered by von Poerster 
(*37), 
who suggests that, if"I"observe an Object which ýV' 
have supposedly invented, and that Object can converse 
with"me"(i. e. can form a "mental picture, " of "me"), 
then it is difficult to know that it was not he who, 
in the first place, invented"me, ' so that "I". could 
invent him. If this is the case, there is no point 
a 
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in accepting the Solipsistic argument, because it cannot 
lead us to any conclusions. This pragmatic dismissal of 
a point-of-view, as being "inefficient", is a very 
cybernetic stance. 
"l. 5,2 On the other hand, the statements of this Thesis do not, 
either, support the contentions of the archly contrasting 
Behaviourist School (as exemplified by Skinner 
(*97) 
The use we make of the term behaviour is a cognitive use, 
involving the interaction of both the observer and the 
observed. For this reason, many simultaneous (and 
possibly contradictory) descriptions of an Object can 
exist. 
@ 
-1.6.1 However, there are limits to the behiviours that can be 
attributed to the Objects, and these are limited by the 
Model Facility. This is how the Model Facility becomes 
the seat of "meaning" within the Object: and the observer 
attributing a behaviour to an Object must do so through 
the Model Facility. In this respect, the Model Facility 
resembles the means for operating at the Lo level in 
Pask's (*82) paradigm. 
"l. 7,4 The attribution by an observer of a behaviour to an 
'Object is,. however, the Object, to that observer (at the 
time). For the observer (not being the Object) has only 
this view of the Object. The differentiation in the 
text is to show formations and roles. But it should be 
understood that the behaviour which an observer attributes 
to an Object Is that Object, to that observer. 
"1.8,12 Many observations (by many observers and/or at many 
This is essential to the intentions of this Thesis, and, for 
this reason, any description that dismisses this ric: hness of 
views is contrary to our stated aims. 
0 
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times) of an Object can exist, full of apparent con- 
tradictions, for they depend on the observer as well 
as the Object. Thus, although each individually 
attributed behaviour may be clear-cut, the combination 
will not be. At the moment, the techniques evolved 
for the handling of such loosely defined collections 
are not really appropriate to this concept. 
Zadehls(*109) Fuzzy Sets are (as has been noted in 
the introduction) inapplicable because they fuzzify 
after the statements have been forced into a very 
tight and simple framework, and they are not capable 
of sustaining individual, and contradictory, views. 
Nevertheless, they are a better statistical technique 
than has previously been available, and the 
Behaviouý does share something in common with a 
Fuzzy Set. 
"1.9, We have now derived three different ways of looking 
at our Objects, the Essence, the behaviour, and the 
Behaviour: each is, in its own way, the Object for 
the observer, and the Object is thus all three. 
111.9,3 On the other hand, there is a priority in these 
views of the Object: the Behaviour assumes that 
there are already some behaviours, and a behaviouý 
(as has been explained) assumes the Essence of both 
the Object being observed, and the Object observing. 
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"2.0,12 Observing involves the interaction of the two 
participants in the observation: the Object being observed 
Is observed through the observer's connection with 
its Model Facility. Because of this, no observation 
can take place without this change in form: yet the 
Essence of the observed Object cannot be seen. 
This leads to an Uncertainty (which helps account for - 
the different views held by different observers of 
the same Object), and reflects aspects of Heisenberg's 
(*51) 
Principle, in that the Object as observed is not the 
Object as it observes itself For the external 
observer to observe the Object, involves the observer 
taking over the role of observer with the Object's 
own form, and producing the observer's view of the 
Object. There is thus, whenever an external observer 
observes the Object, a necessary change in the 
Information inherent in the Object. In the case of 
an atom, Heisenberg could talk about this as a photon, 
but there is no such physically measurable unit for 
epistemological "atoms". 
This analogy is perhaps a little farfetched, but it was of 
great help in the forming of this Thesis. The Uncertainty 
of Heisenberg's Principle comes from an observational problem 
In a space of reduced dimensions, and from the problem of 
significant energy transfer. Our Uncertainty comes also 
from the impossibility of seeing what is, but not because of 
energy transfers, which do not concern us. Rather, our 
Uncertainty comes from the very identity of the. Object and 
the observer. Nevertheless, Heisenberg himself was not at 
all averse to pushing analogies like this, especially in 
relation to "indeterminate art forms". 
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"2.1,2 In participating in this observation, the observer 
makes A behaviour. f or-the Object. vIcHowever,.. this 
behaviour Is equally a product of the observer as it 
Is the product of the Object'. The same observation 
could, then, be attributed to the observer: and when 
this is done, it is called an awareness. 
112.1,3 There is thus, a critical difference in roles. The 
observation is the same, but it can be related to 
the observer just as it can be related to the Object. 
Similarly, an Object in the Universe can be in the 
role of observing, just as well as it can be in the 
role of observed. 
112.2,41 And, as with a behaviour, so it is with the matter of 
priority In the awareness: for there to be an 
awareness, there must be an Essence, in both the 
Object, and the observer. 
112.2,6 The Awareness also bears a simil arity to a Zadeh(*109) 
Fuzzy Set, in the same way as a Behaviour. We are 
all aware, as a matter of Common Experience, how we 
can hold "inconsistent" and "contradictory views": 
to talk about the Awareness in the same way as we 
discussed the Behaviour seems therefore to be 
reasonable. 
112.4,1 In this way, the observer's Awareness becomes his 
view of the Universe: that is, an observer's 
Awareness is the sum of his views of the Universe, 
and is completely subjective. Even a set of 
observations of the Universe made by an "objective" 
observer would be uniquely and necessarily its own 
view, and would be thus subjective. 
so 
113.0,11 The totallity of an Object is vital: it needs not 
only that which is observed, and that which observes, 
but it also needs the means of observation. With- 
out all three parts being present together, the 
Object does not exist in the Universe. 
"3.0,15 In order, then, to consider the Model Facility as an 
Object (which it is not: it is part of an Object), 
we must turn the Model Facility into an Object itself 
(otherwise we cannot talk about it, in this Universe). 
We therefore make a "Model Facility Object", by 
letting the means of observation both observe, and 
be observed by, itself. This deception would appear 
to be a possible means of accounting for the re- 
production of organism (viz. 
* Maturana (*65)(*120) 
113.1,2 From the foregoing, it is possible to discuss some 
of the properties of the Model Facility, to try and 
better understand its character. As with And4eka, Gergely 
(*44) 
and Nemeti , (in their characterisation) the 
Model Facility (which they refer to as a Calculus) 
is the in-built means by which a system calculates 
its own characteristics. In order to do this, the 
Calculus requires an interpretation in a syntactic 
plane. on a semantic domain. In our case the 
observer interprets what he sees through the Model 
Facility: The Model Facility structure Is the 
syntactic plane, in which the semantic domain is 
operated on. In other words; the Model. Facility is 
that through which relationships (in von Foerster's 
sens 
g*36) ) are computed. 
@ the (observed Object) and the observer have already been 
stated to be Objects, and can be formulated as such. 
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113.1,41 The observer's observation through the Model 
Facility is thus regulated by the characteristics of 
the Model Facility. An inappropriately attributed 
behaviour can therefore be thought of as being 
"wrong". However, a "design intention" of'our 
Universe is that contradicting behaviours should be 
attributable by various observers at various times, 
and so the concept "right" cannot be held in the 
normal form: for that is an "objective" overview, 
and an external observation. Fortunately, Turing's 
Test (as reported in George 
(! 40)) 
can be used in 
this context, allowing the "rightness" of attributed 
behaviours while the Object itself does not act in 
some contradictory manner (in the observer's view). 
113.1,6 Nevertheless, the structure of the Model Facility, 
locating, as it does, meaning,, is the seat of 
Chomsky, s(*26)(*28) Deep Structure, for it is-through 
this that the Object takes on its, existence for each 
observer. 
"3.2,41 And it is also because of the commonness of the Model 
Facility to all observations, that the Object may be 
named (and notated <0a) ), as being the same Object 
in all views. Without this', the Object behaviours 
would have nothing in common, and we would not be able 
to assume any identity in an Object about which we 
speak. 
"3.3,21 In this manner, 11jelmslev's 
(*52)(*53 )"Glqssemell, 
'or 
basic structural unit of meaning bearing, can be 
identified with the Model Facility, which is that 
which gives the Object a meaning, when observed. 
This is the "atomic" unit of meaning! but it cannot 
be. as Hjelmslev would have liked, examined for its 
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characteristic structures, because an observer's 
observation using a Model Facility, yields an Object. 
This view is in comtradication, however, to de 
Saussure's (*93 ) belief that the relationship between 
the signified and the signifier (being the two 
necessary parts of a sign) is arbitrary, because, in 
our case, there Is a very clear structure in the 
Model Facility that participates in making the 
"appropriate" attributions that an observer may draw. 
In a certain respect, this view appears to have more 
in keeping with that of de Selby 
(*95) 
who takes a 
more symbollic view of naming, suggesting that there 
is a necessary link between the Object and its name. 
It should be pointed out here that we are not usually 
talking on exactly the same plane as the works we 
have-discussed: they are concerned explicitly with 
the representation of some Object, while we are 
talking of a pre-2inguistic level, in which we observe 
-the Object through its Model Facility, attributing to 
it an appropriate behaviour. However, later sections 
on representation will make the parallels clear on 
the overtly representational level. 
"3.7,11 It might appear that there is no'way in which the 
observer can "form his view" of the Object (i. e. the 
Object might appear to be dominant in this explana- 
tion). But this is not the case, because the 
observer, being a self-observer, as well, Is constantly 
reprogramming himself (in Lilly, ý; 
(*63) 
sense) through 
his own Model Facility. Thus, his ability to have 
a view of his own, depends on his own Model Facility. 
and there is thus an appreciable difference between 
a 
83 
obsýrvations made, acco rding to each observer's 
Model Facility. We would, of course, expect 
nothing else, and a considerable quantity of 
experimental work bears this out, for instance: 
Arbib(*5), in general cybernetic approaches; 
Lettvin et al(*62); in the field of physiology; 
(*48) Gregory in perception and bionics; and 
(*18) Berger in art. 
84 
114.0,31 Observations may be made by any observer which cares 
to make them. That is to say, any observer may try 
and observe an Object by means of its Model Facility. 
This includes observers outside the Object itself, as 
well as-the Object's own self-observation. 
The observation which the Object makes of itself 
involves no reference to anything that is not a part 
of the Object. In this sense; it is a private 
observation, in that not only can only the Object 
itself make this observation, but there is no external 
reference that is involved in making it. It is not 
possible to be insistent about this, but it would 
appear that this self-observation is probably un- 
communicable, and that this is why it is not possible 
to get an"laccurate" picture of what any Object really 
is. - This is, of course, an anti-objective view of 
the Universe: but then, so is the whole of this 
Thesis. 
114.0,33 On the other hand, an observation made of an Object 
by an external observer is a public observation, in 
the sense that it is made with a reference to something 
outside the Object itself (i. e. the external observer), 
and it is most definitely communicable (as we shall 
see). 
Thus, there are two levels in this Universe: the 
private and the public. 
This differentiation between the two levels is 
reflected in Ashbyls(*9) discussion of the predominance 
of the Black Box in his work. The Black Box cannot 
a 
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be examined except from the point of view of its 
behaviour (measured as input/output correlation). 
This is how we arrived at the use of the term 
"behaviour" in describing the Object when observed 
by an external observer. What actually happens in 
the, Black Box cannot be seen by an external observer 
(it is thus the Object's Essence), being private. 
Our interaction with this privacy is public, and is 
not the same as the private self observation. 
"4.0,42 Similarly, there Is a differentiation to be made in 
the observer: the observations that are made of the 
self are private, while awarenesses are public, in 
that they, involve a reference to some Object outside 
the observing Object's self. 
114.0,43 'These two levels permeate, therefore, the whole 
Universe. 
114.1, However, these two levels are not on an entirely 
equal footing, since one presupposes the other. 
Observations in this Universe have been shown to 
have certain pre-requisites: in order for an 
external observation to be made, we have shown, 
there must be already both an observer to make the 
observation, and an Object, of which the observation 
can be made. Both of these are, of course, Objects, 
else they would not inhabit our Universe. Yet, for 
an Object to exist in this Universe, it must be a 
self-observer. Self-observation is private, external 
observation is public, and self-observation must 
exist before any external observation can be made. 
Thus, an external observation presupposes self- 
observation by both the observer and the observed. 
a 
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A sense of priority of this sort is, of course, not 
unusual. Pask's 
(*78) theory fo intelligent funcion- 
ing involves itself in precisely the same sort of 
puppositions, where it I'm-individual" 19 the I 
result of the representation of a "P-individual". 
"4.1,14 However, both these types of observation are made 
through the same Model Facility (if they were not, it 
would be difficult to insist that they were of the 
same "Object"), and it is this which is essential 
to the possibility of there being observations, and 
to the establishment of the two levels. In effect, 
-the Model Facility acts as the description of the 
Object itself, needing the presence of an observer 
using it to establish an observation which is (to 
that observer) the Object. It is in this way that 
the problem of the complete and consistent Universe 
-that C; Sdel(*46) questionned is made irrelevant. 
Our Objects, containing the form of their own 
descriptions (their Model Facilities) do not need to 
refer externally to any other'Object, in order to 
exist. Each is, as it were, its own axiomatic 
system, and needs no elaboration in the form of 
theories that may or may not be consistent and 
complete. 
"4.1,3 The circularity of form of the basic Object 
description, that of the Essence, is not itself 
(*65)(*120) 
--unique: this form has been used by e. g. Maturana 
(in his description of what life is). in order to 
get over the problem of a recoursive definition, 
returning to some infinite nothingness, or some 
atomic axiom (and thus to Godel's problem). Indeed, 
the form of circular definition is becoming more 
pervasive, no doubt because it does seem to avoid 
these problems. 
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"5.1.2 The nature of an oscillator is to switch consecutively 
from one state to another, the switching on of one 
state being the trigger which will eventually switch 
on the other state (turning off the original state 
at the same time). In this switching, the oscil- 
lator actually generates a timesense of its own, 
based on the property of this state switching. (And4id 
nowadays we use this oscillatory motion, at an 
atomic level, to provide the yardstick against which 
we measure a concensus, General Time). De Selby's 
(*94) 
experiments with oscillators formed from Objects 
. and their self-observat ions in mirrors, reflect most 
accurately the sense in which, our Objects are 
oscillators, generating their own times. 
115.1,23 Thus, each oscillator has two half-cycles in its 
time unit: in our terms, that half when it is the 
observer observing, and that half when it is th6 Object 
being observed. This half-cycle delay in the 
watking of an observation (i. e. between the receiving 
of a signal, and its transmission, or, in our terms, 
the making of the observation and the being observed) 
is a standard feature of almost all computational 
and automata theories, especially those which are 
based on some biological or neurýphysiological 
understanding, e. g. McCulloch"67), George (*39), 
Minsky(*71) (*5), and Arbib where the receiving of 
an impulse (in a neuron) always implies a delay in 
the transmission of the impulse by the same neuron. 
(The delay is not necessarily a half-cycle, because 
the neurologist is talking of the transmission along 
a chain. However, the functioning of most neurons 
can be described in terms of their own half-cycles: 
a Although de Selby's times are reversed. 
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that is, the two halves are "being able to receive 
an impluse" and "being able to transmit an impulse". 
When viewed this way, a neuron is an oscillator, just 
as our Objects are). 
-15.1,5 As de Selby (*94) originally noted, and Brown 
(*21) 
Varela (*114) and GUnther 
(*49) 
later reaffirmed, the 
output of an oscillator produces an Infinite Regress, 
of the sort discussed by Dunne( 
*30)(*31), in his 
paradox of the painter painting the World. But 
whereas Dunne has no method by which to handle this 
regress (except for mapping it onto another regress, 
which is (temporarily? ) running parallel to the first, 
one time unit behind), the subtlty of the form that 
we give, here, to an Object, is that it is a machine 
that produces this regress (although we cannot observe 
the regress itself), and as such can be handled as 
an entity. 
"5.2,2 The generation of time, in our Universe, is, then, 
an inherent result of the actual formulation of a 
specification for Objects to exist in the Universe, 
and the production of time by each Object depends 
soley on the Object itself, and the changing roles 
It. must assume, to be able to exist. Time is, 
therefore, local, being produced by each Object of 
itself. A General Time, of the sort we use for 
measuring and for synchronisation, is a construction. 
of ours, rather thana general co-ordinating reference, 
basic to the Universe. Our common experience 
supports this view: for, even when referring to the 
reference clock of General Time, we have to say, 
often enough, "Oh! Is it really eight o'clock 
already? " 
89 
8 
"5.4,2 Since time is local to each Object it follows that 
the observer and Model Facility parts of the Object 
synchronise into the Object's own time (this is how 
the Object's time is generated). 
115.5,2 Equally, the times of external obs*ervatioýs must 
related to the times of the Objects being observed, 
at the moments of observations: otherwise, there 
would be no way in which the (external) observer 
could correlated with the time sense of the Object 
being observed, and thus observe the Object, in the 
way our formulation decrees. The correlation 
between the observer and that which is observed is 
(*30)(*31) 
another point which we have in cominon with Dunne 
115.8,12 Thus, the external observer, slipping into a vacant 
slot in the formulation of the Object which is being 
observed, can only observe during the half-cycle when 
that observational slot Is vacant. This characteri- 
stic of observing has been argued by Petri 
(*84) in 
his proposal for a temporally based system of computa- 
tion. His computation is, in this respect, very 
(*30)(*31) 
similar to our observation. Dunne . also 
depicted a' similar means of observation, which he 
related to Heisenbergls(*51) Uncertainty Principle, 
explaining that the minimum photon necessary fof the 
making of an observation, could only be transmitted 
when there was this observational correlation of 
times, and that, in this time sense, lay the neces- 
sity of the incomplete observation. 
The correlation of these times (that of the observer 
and that of the observed) is familiar in the latch-on 
effect that occurs between independent physical 
oscillators running at similar (but not identical) 
, frequencies, 
a 
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'IS. 10,1 It is important that the times of observer and 
-observed only correlate when there is an 
observation being made, for, since this temporal 
correlation provides the means for making 
observations, and for computing relationships, a 
general correlation could imply a constant obser- 
vation of all Objects by all other Objects, all the 
time! It could also be seen to imply an Object 
which was not like all other Objects in the Universe, 
a General Time which controlled all other Objects. 
-The same process of temporal correlation can if 
treated in this temporarily correlative way, account 
for memory (and that we do not remember everything 
all the time, or everything all at once). Miller's 
C*69) 
somewhat ngive paper on the rnumber i of parillel -. data7, we can 
process in our brains at one time, suggests a 
physiological and psychological limit to the number 
of simultaneous observations one observer can make, 
at any one time on his local clock: aýd, although one 
may disagree with his detailled conclusions (i. e. 
7ý2 independent simultaneous data), one must agree 
that a type of limited parallel processing does 
appear to operate in the human brain's performance. 
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1'6.0,4 The privacy of self-observation has already been estab- 
lished. Objects can observe themselves, and these 
observations, being only of the Objects' selves, are 
private. 
116.0,5 Equally, the observations made by external observers of 
Objects, are public, involving reference to an Object 
(observer) outside the Object being observed. 
However, this is not to say that the observation made on 
the public level of existence can be seen by any observer: 
for, in itself, each observation is made only by one 
. 
observer, of one Object. Thus, each observation is 
unique, and, leading to a behaviour (and an awareness), 
it Is made only of the observer and the Object. 
"6.1,13 Thus, an observation cannot, in itself, be observed by 
any observer other than that which makes it, and 
observations cannot be transmitted. Yet, we can transmit 
messages, as we know from Common Experience, and so our 
theory should account for this. The necessity of our 
accounting for communication is further emphas. ised by the 
development of a whole Communication Theory (Shannon 
(*96) 
with which our theory has certain differenceýo, -as will be 
ýxplained later. 
"6.1,2 If we cannot transmit the observation (i. e. the behaviour) 
itself, we must find another means by which we can trans- 
mit our messages. If we suggest a second Object, which 
the observer observes to be similar to the first, we have 
a means for the communication *of messages: for a second 
observer may also observe the two Objects, the one of 
which is similar to the other, and may thus compute a 
similarity. This second Object that stands for the 
first, is called a representation. In this respect, we 
@ because'it has-, different concernsi 
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(*108) 
agree with Wittenstein , when he talks of the non- 
observation of the Object itself, but the observation of 
a representation of that Object (which stands in an 
assumed one-to-one relationship výith that Object). 
However, our agreement only extends to the communication 
of observations, not (as does Wittgenstein's) to the 
actual observations themselves. 
116.1,3 We therefore require the presence of some second Object, 
for which a behaviour can be constructed which is to the 
original observer similar to that of the original Object, 
in order for communication to be possible. This reflects 
Pask's(*79) test for learning (i. e. the understood com- 
munication of behaviours) in a conversation, where the 
learner is required to construct an Object with a 
similar behaviour to the behaviour of the part of the 
system he is learning, in order to show he has understood 
the system. Pask refers to this as a Modelling Facility: 
but this should not be confused with our Model Facility. 
116.2,21 What we are communicating, therefore, is not the Object 
itself, but a similarity that we compute between the 
behaviours we attribute to two quite seperate Objects. 
And in this construction of the behaviours must lie the 
me. ans for the computing of similarities, for we have 
recourse, In our formulation, to*no other things than the 
two Objects, and the common observer. (How this is done 
will be covered later). 
116.2,4 Communication is by observation of two Objects, one of 
which is surrogate (to use Negroponte's 
(*73)(*77) 
word) 
to the other. This is rather like Turing's Test, (as 
recorded by George 
(*40) ) for intelligence: where if a 
communicating Object behaves as Intelligent, it must be 
assumcd tc; be intelligent 
t 
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"S. 4,1 However, pointing out some similarity between two 
Objects to a second observer (to whom the first observer 
wishes to communicate), does not mean that the second 
observer will make the same observations as the first: 
indeed, as we have already discussed, he cannot. But he 
will be able to observe the two Objects, attribute his 
own behaviours, and then compute a similarity between 
them. 
5, ffince the observations of the two communicating observers 
are not the same, the first observer needs more than to 
. be able to transmit his message in order to be confident 
that he has communicated: but,. If the second observer 
can transmit back to the f irst observer what he (the 
second observer) believes the first observer intended (by 
means of the same sort of surrogation), the first observer 
has the possibility 61 judging if the second has construc- 
ted a similar similarity to his own. This is known as a 
conversational idiom, and was initially developed by 
(*60) Laing , whose idea has been extended and justified by 
Pask"793(*82), through th6 extensive development of 
Reacher , s(*89 
) Logic of Commands. 
5,11 The initial observer now has both his view of the Object, 
wmd the second observer's view of his view: and this Is, 
of course, an error regulator, for he can act in order to 
correct the difference (if any) in these views. 
Ashby(*9)(*10) has examined the means for such corrections 
to be applied, but this is not our concern here. What 
we have established is a conversational form that is 
similar to Miller et al. 's 
(*70 ) TOTE unit. The presence 
of the TOTE unit (Test Operate Test Exit) here confirms 
Pask's"81) belief that it is not just a mechanism, but 
tar an. underlying form of cybernetic (and hence communica- 
tive) systems. 
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'16.5,32 In this sense, we have come up with a theory of com- 
munication which, while not matching the formulation 
of Information Theory (and, particularly, as we shall 
see later, allowing for new and unpredictable outcomes 
in situations), does match the requirements of Wiener 
(*103) 
for a cybernetic system. 
0 
a 
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"7.2, An bbserver must be able to attribute behaviours to 
several Objects at once, if It is to be able to transmit 
inessages In the manner described. This is made possible 
by the oscillatory nature of Its roles (observed/observer) 
In its self-observation. When, in its self-observation, 
It is observed, it can observe other Objects. The limits 
to the number of observations that can be made at once 
(maybe 7 12 for humans - see Miller( 
*69) ) depends not on 
the nature of the process of observation, but the nature 
of the observer. 
"7.2.2 Observations of Objects require the correlation of the 
iimes of the external observers and the Objects being 
observed. And it is in the relationships between these 
correlated times that we have an in-built means for the 
-computation pf similarities (and other logical relation- 
ships). 'The -partial overlapping of observations (made at 
the same time in respect of the observer's half-cycle) 
gives a 3neans for the inclusion of one observation within 
another. Thus our logical operators develop from the 
necessary times of observations, giving us a temporal logic 
(see Baer"111)). So, it is the behaviours, and not the 
Objects, which are related through the times of observa- 
t1JDnS. In this way, of course, the observer is establishing 
his own hierarchy from a set of non-hierarchically 
organised Objects. In this respect, our Universe consists 
of a vastly large number of little isolated things, . 
arranged -non-hierarchically, and for which behaviours, 
being attributed by different observers, are non-predictive: 
another -reflection of Wittgenstein 
(*108) 
.@ 
"7.2,21 Our means of combination, so gathered, account for the 
logical counectives of our Universe. Thus, the impli- 
cation, for instance, from the Object "Light Green", 
infers the Object "Green", 
@ Personally, I find this very depressing. 
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1'7.2,22 or its reverse from the Object "Green" deduces the 
Object "Light Green". 
117.2,23 The logical operation "and" can be demonstrated by the 
Object "Green" and the Object "Box" combining to form 
"Green Box", 
"7.2,24 while equality can be exemplified by the Object "Finnish" 
and the Object "The Language of the Finns". 
"7.2,25 Finally the logical operation "inclusive or" can be shown 
in Object "Green Field" or Object "Green Plant" combining 
to "Green Field or Plant"'k, iaa* 11; 
"7.4,11- However, all these operations can be "fractured" into 
a chain of implications (facing either direction), giving 
us but one logical operation facing in two directions. 
This fracturing is a descriptive convenience, and is not 
necessarily contained by our temporal logic which operates 
by the different possible relationships between two 
different observations. 
"7.4,12 Nevertheless, this means of representing the relationships 
(especially reflecting the bi-conditional), matches the 
techniques of GZnther 
(*49) 
, LBffgren( 
*64) 
, and Pask( 
*78) 
In explaining a cyclic means of evading G8del's 
(*46) 
problem 
by making a Model of a Model of an Object which is the 
same as the Object itself. 
117.6, The notable peculiarity of this logical system is that 
it has only one relator (although this has two directions). 
Previously, Brown(*21) had evolved a logic of two 
variables, based on the repeated crossing or the re- 
crossings of a line of distinction (although Varela(*114) 
has recently shown a third variable of self-reference to 
be necessary to complete the system, which Patrick Welles 
Is actually using In simulations at Columbia University). 
The reason forvi the need for only one variable would seem 
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to lie in the absence of the concept of negation, which 
Is missing because a negation is not the computation of 
a similarity. A'negation is being stated at any moment 
when two observations are not being made. 
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"a. 0, Using this computational relator, we can make Models of 
Objects - but Models which are extremely abstract, since 
they are not concerned with detailed mappings between 
Objects and Models. This does not imply any contra- 
diction with the work of, for instance, Klir(*59), and 
Robinson(*90) an Model Theories; our interest assumes 
the mappings of which they talk without investigating 
their classifications. 
I'$. O'l Not that this implies any hierarchical structure - for a 
Model must be an Object just like any other Object, in 
-order to Inhabit the Universe. 
fta. 0,3 This role taking is very important: what it means is 
that the "real world" is at whatever Objects one wishes 
to place It, and any Model Is equally real - but is 
placed In a relationships to an Object that reflects the 
observer's hierarchy, and thus appears, to the observer, 
not to be "real". Any Object with an Essence (i. e. any 
Object in the Unvierse), is, therefore, potentially in 
the "real world" of the observer. It is for the observer 
to choose those Objects that, at any one time, will be 
considered by him to be "real". In this way, the con- 
sideration of Models is essentially insignificant. 
fts. 1, Nevertheless, there is behind this a profound. truth: 
that it is never the Object which is observed, and that 
any insistent representation of any objective form of 
reality Is false: for the Object itself (i. e. its 
Essence) is never observed: instead, behaviours, attribu- 
ted by the observers, are treated as a reality, and other 
behaviours which are also attributed by the observer are 
treated as supplementary, in that observer's view. This is 
reflected 4n', Beckett IsC*", 10'Diftlogues with,, Geoig6bLDfifhuit11 
t7here are many ways in which the thing I am trying in vain 
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to say, may be tried in vain to be saidle). Nevertheless, 
there is not a total arbitrariness in the attribution of 
behaviours to Objects, for the "meaningfulness" of 
attributed behaviours is regulated by the Model Facility. 
In this respect, our Thesis is in agreement with 
Chomsky(-*283- and Hjelmslev 
C*52)C*533, 
as opposed to 
C*93) @ de Saussure , for we assert that verifiably at- 
irlbutable behaviours (and their representationg)frely*on. 
Internal structures of the observer and the Objects 
observed. 
"8.5,2 , This is how all Model and Language representations of any 
Object in the Universe may be made: by use of the one 
logical operation, with two. senses of direction (i. e., 
implication). 
although it appears that de Saussure's insistence on the 
arbitrariness of the relationships was Itself rather arbitrary. 
He certainly never investigated this claim. 
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"9.0,4 A Model has something in common with the Object of which 
it Is a Model, since it results from the computation of 
an Implication between the behaviours observed by one 
observer of two Objects. In this way, a Model is, 
itself, a transformation of the Object. But, more 
normally, a Model is made, so that, by means of a Model 
being made of that Model, there is a transformation of 
the Object. In this, we echo Ashby 
(*8)(*9) 
. 
119.1,2 Our means for computing these relationships between 
Objects and Model (and indeed between Object and Object), 
grows directly from the formulation of the nature of 
Objects In our Universe. This is a direct contrast 
with the work of most philosophers who invent a special 
class of inhabitants of their Universes, in order to 
account Yor these sorts of computations, called relation- 
C*108) 
ships. Wittgenstein again, epitomises this 
stance, but he is not alone, developing, as he does, 
Frege's (*38 ) division, and, himself, leading to Husserl s(*55) 
distinction in his phenomonological view. Perhaps this 
Is because these philosophers were concerned with a view 
that stems from logic and hence possible relationships 
between Objects, and their meanings, rather than a concern 
f9r the Object itself, from which a logic can be developed. 
In this way, perhaps it is thd work of Russell(*91), in 
his attempts to reduce the whole of mathematics to a set 
of logical functionings, which is the key to the approach 
of these philosophers. However that may be, it was 
obviously a valuable approach, resulting in a final 
clarification of the issue of the complete reduction of 
*46) 
systems by G6del( 
"9.2,5 Nevertheless, there are relationships drawn between 
Objects, iýhich result in the setting up, by the observer, 
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of, hierarchies of Objects (which themselves are non- 
hierarchical). This is a cognitive process, executed 
by the observer, and is essential If there is to be any 
communication between different observers, of the 
observations they make. 
"9.2,61 The setting up of complex Objects (i. e. Objects that 
result from the, logical operatilDm on two simple Objects: 
or, rather, Objects : for whIch a beahavlour is attributed 
by an observer. which is computed by the observer as 
being the same as some area -of ovexlap of the behaviours 
attributed by the observer to two other Objects, at the 
'same time), which can be communicated to another observer, 
involves a sense of communication vhich is distinct from 
that of Shannon( 
*96). Yor 'Shamman's description never 
allows the development of the pTevious-ly unknown (i. e. 
the probabilities can never exceed one) But, in our 
Universe, observers can continuously construct new com- 
plex Objects, each of which. is Itself a aimple Object, 
like anyýother, butwhich Is put in the role of complex. 
Purther, as we have pointed out, Objects can have no 
certain predictions : made about t-h-e behaviours that will 
in future be made of them, : from those that have already 
been made. For this reason, lone Df the greatest weak- 
nesses of probabilistic descripiions -must be overcome, 
and it would appear that von : Fo-exster's 
(434)(*36) 
Bug- 
gestion of a measure of "Diversity" could be capable of 
this. 
"9.4,11 Since we insist on the equa2ity of jLU Objects in our 
Universe, with only a structuring by the observer, we 
must re-affirm that, regardless of the Tole in which an 
observer places an Object, in building or representing 
his hierarchy, complex Object, Model, or complex Model, 
all the inhabitants of our Universe are simple Objects, 
in themselves, and are only put Into their roles by the 
observer. 
@ Hence, the Law of High Numbers. 
i 
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"10.0, There are five forms of argument in this scheme of logic. 
These are (as listed in Reichenbach(*87)), deduction, 
IrLductioa, abduction, analogy and identification. This 
is not to say that there cannot be other logical operators, 
but they are not used in this system. Notable omissions 
are negation (since we observe overlaps between Objects 
to, make computations negation is simply the lack of an 
observation), and the existential operator, 3, which is. 
used to make statements of existence. In a way, this 
existential operator is similar to our Object formu- 
lation: the form, 
3 x, M x. 
Is quite similar to our formulation, 
Qa=KXa)O a] - 
where 3 (together with, ) corresponds to X cor- 
responds to Oa , and 
(f) to (X a) - 
These five forms are, in themselves, not basic units, for 
induction and deduction are the same operation, 
(implication), applied in opposite directions., and the 
athers can be taken as the application of chains of 
impl1cations, in both directions. 
"10.1,4 The difference between the three argument forms that are 
made of chains of implications lies in two factors. 
Firstly, the difference between an abduction and an 
analogy, lies in the sequence of the implication 
directions: if the first implication is deductive, the 
form is an analogy, while if it is inductive, the form 
is an analogy. For a tautology, this sequence is ir- 
reIer-ant (i. e. a tautology can begin with either an 
Induction @ or a deduction). The difference between a 
tautology and, on the one hand, an analogy, or on the 
other, an abduction, lies in what is omitted and included 
Although an- initial induction is easier, because none of the 
original character is obliterated. 
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in the two operations. If that which is included in 
one operation is the same as that which is omitted in 
the other operation, the form is a tautology. If not, 
it is an analogy or abduction. 
The form of the tautology is a'vital form, in any Model 
theory. For, while Models are not the same as the 
Objects for which they perform the Modelling role, 
whether the Model is (in our terms) an Interior or an 
Anti- ý., Model, the -Object,: mut t ý, be able -to'*-be- re-creatddzby 
reversing the Modelling process. And the reversal of 
the process, together with the original process itself, 
is the form of a tautology. In this Thesis, the 
reversal of the process of making the Model, is called 
physicallisation, since Models are usually made, - in 
order to execute some form of transformation of the 
Object, and, without physicallising the Object from the 
Model, the Object will not be transformed. 
There is another way in which the tautology Is of funda- 
-mental Importance in this Universe. For, as we have 
pointed out, the circular form of definition (which we 
use to formulate an Object: tritely translated from 
the formulation as The Object is what it thinks the 
Object is .. . ), 
Oa = N)OCI 
is a nowadays common form used by, amongst others, 
(*65)(*120) ' *46) *36) Maturana Giinther( von Foerster( and 
(*64) lZffgren In particular, the tautological 
relationship of a system and Its description, allows 
CTSdel's (*46) problem to be overcome, by making the Model 
, of a Model of an Object identical to that Object. 
Pask(*79)(*82), in developing his Entailment Nets, makes 
extensive use of the tautological form (on a vast scale), 
related to this system and description arrangement. 
a 
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1110.4, In making an Interior Model from an Object, that which 
Is omitted is called the Remainder. Conversely, making 
an Anti-Model, we include the Anti-Remainder. This 
Remainder (or Anti-Remainder: but we will refer in 
general only to the Remainder for the sake of simplicity) 
is made up of potentially two parts. There is the 
Information which is omitted (referred to as "I"), and 
the means by which that Information was omitted (referred 
to as the algorithm "f"). Thus, the Modelling process 
can be shown as, 
N-)MMI 
However, it is possible that, in certain circumstances, 
the Information is contained within the means of opera- 
tion of the algorithm on the Model, i. e. the algorithm 
is reflexive, 
aM 
R 
Q(-)M(f) 
The difference between these two cases is a difference of 
self-containedness, or reflexivity, and is paralleled in 
the assumptions of Semiotics and Linguistics (which is 
assumed to be a special branch of Semiotics, as well as 
a General Model). In general, the Semiotic approach to 
a system of meanings, assumes that there need be no 
external referent in the system. while the Linguistic 
assumption is of some sort of referent (see Bunt 
(*22) 
We will therefore refer to the two modelling systems, In 
order, as Linguistic and Semiotic, respectively. As 
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(facile) exemplars, we may cite the following two 
examples. Firstly, a Linguistic system in which Q is 
4, M is 2, f is +, and I is 2: 
Q (--4m (f) I 
4 (----)2 W2 
Secondly, a Semiotic system, in which () is -4 M is 
2 and f is square 
(2): 
0(---)M (f) 
)2 
Notice how it Is possible, even with Q and M the same, 
to find different ways of formulating f and 
depending on the need for a Linguistic or Semiotic system 
(althoueh this may not always be possible): and notice 
also how the Semiotic system is a generative system, and 
uses far less storage; an understanding exploited by 
computer programmers (especially Jackson 
(*115) ) in 
reducing Memory storage requirements, and "kidding" 
computers that their memories are larger than they are. 
"10.5, The omission or inclusion of the Remainder in making 
-Models also identifies what sort of Modelling proceduree 
we are using (Interior or Anti-), and may thus be used 
to compute the form of an argument, by computing the 
difference between the Object and the Model, or looking 
to see if we are left with a-Remainder or an Anti- 
Remainder. 
"10.7, It is because of the simplicity of this computation of 
the form of arguments, involving only one type of logical 
operation, the direction of which can be Interpreted 
from the type of the Remainder in a Modelling process, 
that this technique would seem to have a potential at 
the level of a direct application in computer technology. 
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Not only is it, apparently, very simple, but it is also 
very fast. Furthermore, because the computer can analyse 
the form of an argument being put to it, so simply, it 
would seem that there is the possibility of it developing 
an understanding of new terms when introduced in an 
argument, and hence of extending both Its vocabulary and 
Its understanding of its vocabulary. If this is so, it 
would seem that we have stumbled on, not only a method 
for mapping cognitive processes and arguments (which will 
be detailed later), but also a means to make more ef- 
ficient and more "intelligent" (according to Turing's 
Test) the operation of our computers. 
a 
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-11.1,2 In using the technique of measuring the Remainders in 
order to find the forms of arguments (i. e. do they 
cancel, are they Remainders or Anti-Remainders initially? ), 
we highlight a common experience in techniques of 
Ineasuring: that is, measurement by the comparison of 
Objects for their differences. And this provides us 
vith a means for cancelling various parts of argument 
strings together. 
1111ý Z1,1 This technique of cancellation is, however, more simply 
-introduced with the cancellation together of two con- 
Secutivp Models of the same type: thus Interior Model 
lollowed by Interior Model gives Interior Model: this 
Us a clear parallel to Brown's 
(*21) law of crossing 
(that a crossing made once is the same as that crossing 
: made again). 
Itat this is so, is immediately clear, upon reflection: 
An Interior Model of an Interior Model of an Object must 
be entirely contained within the original Object, and 
the first Interior Model, of which it is an Interior 
Model, and must thus be an Interior Model of the Object, 
as vell as of the Interior Model. of which-itzis an 
Interior Model. 
3,: n Sizailarly, an Anti-Model of an Anti-Model of an Object, 
: is an Anti-Model of that Object ,. 
And cancellation of implications of, opposite direction 
tan occur when the Remainders are the same, giving a 
'tautology, (as already explained), but 4nalogies and 
abductions cannot be cancelled (if they could, you would 
loose the whole form of the argument). 
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1111.41 Tixis Is Xodel -Dimensioning 
@. 
'5' This -recording of the Model Dimensions of processes of 
zmaking Models (and, indeed, of making complex Objects) 
-11--d to -several things: firstly, it leads to an 
, economy -in the processes of 
Modelling, for chains of 
, nimila (and on occasion, contrary) Models may be 
adumbLrated under one heading, and one stage, thus 
: removing any extra steps that may have been included. 
Semandly., this record may be used to help make sure that 
-1he. pTocess of physicallisation is properly carried 
a=t., axnd 71hat arguments are fought on similar levels. 
Mh-ixdly, It allows a computer (or anyone elso) to unravel 
the lorm nf, a -long argument. Fourthly, it shows the 
mue-ans vf building hierarchies used by some observer, and 
In -this is a map of the cognitive process that that 
cibm=, veT -used (in this sense, it might f ulf ill the 
-requirement set up by Cowan 
(*29) for machines to act 
AmtellIgently; and it clearly relates to the mapping of 
7the Aevelopment of grids of several Constructs as seen 
Am Xe: lly (456) ). It also refers back to the concept of 
a "treality", Inasf ar as it can demonstrate the construe- 
ti= cof mrealities (in von Foerster's 
(*33) 
sense) by 
Mhe 31imenslanIng mf Models, the correlation and adumbration of 
! Mode2s, : also 2eads us to the conclusion that we have a non- 
; hl. exarchical -Universe: for, if some stages in hierarchical 
st. Tuctures can be removed, where is the hierarchy - and at what 
31ervel ±n the hierarchy are these Objects to be found? Our non- 
kdexmxzhir_a: l ', Universe has produced a logic for the construction 
qof (peTsonal) hierarchies which is, in itself, essentially non- 
bleraz-chical and depends on a non-hierarchical ordering. One 
Is tem -E. D. 11! pted -to say *'IQ. 
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individuals, and it also shows that, in our non- 
hierarchic -Universe, it is possible for individual 
observers to create hierarchies, and that, from th6ir 
points of view, their starting points are their "real 
bases". 
It has been the continuing concern of science to dis- 
cover Models, for which the Dimensions are known, and 
in which the Remainder is designed so that material can 
bo fed in, and the output of this process of physical- 
lisation will be the "reality" of the world around us. 
In general, the fields of science manage this well 
enough: yet there are areas outside those normally 
thought of as sciences, where this attempt to provide 
means of physicallising Models is being tried. In 
particular, the work of Alexander 
(*2)(*3)(*4) 
, Flemming( 
*32) 
Glanville (*41)(*43)(*121) 7)(*58) (*99) , Klee(*5 . -. , and Thompson 
has attempted to deal with this problem, of re-creating 
a "reality" from a Model (i. e. of re-creating the Object 
from which the Model was made, from the Model itself). 
In these attempts, a record of the Remainder, and a set 
of Model Dimensions, is of the greatest importance. 
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"12.3.4 The number of descriptions of an Object made and com- 
municated by different observers has a rather peculiar 
effect on the Object described: for, as the Behaviour 
increases, so the precision of understanding of the 
Object becomes less. Thus, we are left with the seem- 
intly strange belief that, the more we describe Objects, 
the woollier they become. In this respect, our use 
of the dictionary is interesting, for the dictionary is 
an attempt to give one behaviour an authority over the 
others, and thus to limit the Behaviour. Hence, the 
need for Objects to 'Ire-define" themselves. 
1112.4, By the same taken, the effect of a large number of 
awarenesses seem to be reflected in the need that humans 
have to 'Ire-define" themselves, when they let their 
brains run wild, and they have too many influences on 
them at one time. If they do not do this, they "break- 
down" (usually quite literally, in a psychological sense), 
overburdened with awarenesses. 
"12.5, The implication of this might seem to be that there can 
be no generous people: but this may not be the case, 
for a generous person, being one who assembles large 
numbers of- awarenesses, might not break-down if his 
(unobservable to us) Essence was reflected outwards. 
However, this is all pure speculation, and is only 
intended as a passing thought. 
a 
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1113.0,42 Cage (*24) reports a debate between Dr. D. T. Suzuki, 
and a Hindu lady, on the nature of reality, and of the 
Universe that such a reality implied. After a long and 
heated argument, Dr. Suzuki and the lady left, arm in 
arm, and Dr. Suzuki, turning to the lady, said, "You 
know, that's why I like philosophy: nobody wins". 
This whole Thesis has only concerned itself with the one 
Universe. It is not the only one, and it is not argued 
that this is the only one; only that it seems to be a 
useful one to look into. But it does appear to have 
one interesting characteristic: it seems that, in 
permitting the erection of hierarchies by observers in 
the Universe, it may be able to contain many different 
Universes. It can certainly contain many different 
views of the City, at once, and without any conflict. 
1113.1.1 As a parallel to this multiplicity of views of the City, 
Pirs ig(*116 ) discusses the nature of the multiplicity of 
views of a motorcycle, with reference. to Kant's 
(*117) 
extension of Hume's 
(*118) Solipsistically based 
empiricism. Kant specifies the"a priorillinternalised in 
the observer's mind, as that against which empirical 
knowledge-is arranged. Our twist on this is to inter- 
nalise each a priori to its own observation, but not 
(necessarily) for others, by making it a self-observer, 
which can also be observed by others. Thus Pirsig's 
"Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintanancell poses a 
problem of the multiplicity of views of the motorcycle 
(or the motorcycle's Zen), which we solve in a manner 
at once similar to, but different from,. Kant. 
1113.2, "Before studying Zen, lien are lien, and Mountains are 
Mountains. 
While studying Zen, all is confused. 
4 
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After studying Zen, Men are Men, and Mountains are 
Mountains. 
The difference is that, in the former case, the feet 
(*23) were a little bit off the ground" (Cage Reps(*88)). 
or, 
"Before studying Cybernetics, Men are Men, and 
Mountains are Mountains. 
While studying Cybernetics, all is confused. 
After studying Cybernetics, Men are Men, and Mountains- 
are Mountains. 
The difference is that, in the former case, the feet 
were a little bit off the ground". 
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EXPERIMENT REPORTS 
(London Knowledge Test) 
(London Structure Test) 
(Conceptual Space), - 
(Leadenhall Market) 
I 
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FOREWORD TO THE EXPERIMENT REPORTS 
The experiments reported on in the following sections 
were executed by the author, with the assistance of 
Annetta Pedretti (experiment three) and Tim Richardson@ (experi- 
ment four). The subjects for the first three experiments were 
students in Grahame Shane's first year study unit (Urban Topics) 
at the Architectural Association School, London. The fourth 
experiment's subjects were clerks at Lloyds of London. 
The results of the experiments were sets of drawings, 
some of which are included in each report. These drawings have 
been subjected to a coarse analysis, presented in (in general) 
simple tables, or summarising drawings. 
The results have not been subjected to a rigorous 
statistical analysis: the form of the data makes this both 
difficult and irrelevant. Difficult because it is hard to count 
discrete units in freehand drawings. Irrelevant because the 
drawings themselves present the findings in the-clearest possible 
way. 
Kany drawings have been re-drawn: the originals, drawn 
In pencil, would not print up properly. The re-drawing makes no 
difference to the main content (from the point of view of the 
experiments). 
Their work Is included with their permission. 
115 
4? 
EXPERIMENT ONE: REPORT 
REPRESENTATION OF THE BEHAVIOUR (B) OF AN OBJECT BY THE BEHAVIOUR 
(B) OF ANOTHER OBJECT, ACTING AS SURROGATE FOR THE FIRST OBJECT. 
(LOI, i9DQN KNOWLYDGE TEST). 
Aims of Test 
There were two main aims. for this test. The first was 
to persuade individual observers to attribute Behaviours to a common 
Object, and to represent these by behaviours attributed to another 
common Object. These behaviours may themselves be collected to 
Iorm a Behaviour (B9), containing the contradictions that exist, 
between the different observers' different views. Contained in 
this aim, was the intention that the observers should be shown that 
their attributed behaviours will be different, but that this is not 
-Important, since they can nevertheless represent their 
beliefs. 
The second aim was to demonstrate a means for an 
approximate expression of the Object's own view of itself (its 
Essence) by the used of a formalised version of the Behaviour (Do): 
unless this can be done, no inarticulate (and maybe no Object at 
all) Object can talk about itself, and it becomes very difficult to 
consider the Object in any generally agreed manner (without setting 
up the behaviours of both the Object and the Surrogate, for each 
observer, on each occasion: and then holding a conversation about 
these views until a concensus is reached). And, having set up 
this representation of the Object, to carry out an. assessment of 
the "correctness" of the different views of the Object, based on 
the concensus view of the Behaviour. Contained in this aim, was 
the intention that the observers should realise that they could 
cone of them have the Object's own self-view, and that they could 
survive an interaction with the Object in spite of this difference 
of view. 
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Origin of Alms 
The origin of the aims of this experiment lies in the 
frequent arguments that arise amongst architects as to the exact 
location of places within the City. The ability of every person 
living in a City to use it. in spite of these differences in view, 
also needs to be expressed (i, e. not knowing where, for Instance, 
Biggin Hill, is, will not prevent anyone getting there), In this 
way, it seemed that a form of expression that, did show the different 
behaviours attributed, and a means of refering them to some 
standard picture of the Object itself, would be valuable. 
Method: conditions 
The Exp6riment was given to twenty-one students, in the 
first year course at the Architectural Association School, in 
November 1973. These were all students who claimed to have a 
particular interest in Urban Problems. The students were given a 
blank form, and invited to locate the nineteen specified areas of 
London on an outline map of the G. L. C. 'O boundary, showing also the 
River Thames. The nineteen areas were chosen to mix well- and 
less well-known areas, _and 
to take areas, fairly randomly from those 
which constitute London. 
The students were given. fifteen minutes in which to locate 
the specified places, and were then shown an Ordinace Survey Map 
against which they could judge their results. At a later date, 
their results were measured more precisely by the author. 
The students whose work is analysed here in detail, were 
0 Greater London Council - the administrative London. 
+ The official cartographic survey in the U. K. 
2 
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part of a larger sample of one hundred and twenty students, a 
coarser analysis of whose work reveals no significant difference 
in results. 
Method: Language, Object and question forms 
In this test, both the Language and the Object. to which 
behaviours were to be attributed,. were pointed to. The Object was 
said to be "the location of the following nineteen places which are 
within London", followed by a list of the places arranged . 
alphabetically. The Language was pointed to by "marks made on 
this Map of the, G. L. C.. area, with the River Thames marked in". 
The question that the students were asked to answer was "where are 
the places to be located best represented on the map of London". 
Thus, both the Object, to which the students were to. - 
attribute behaviours, and the Language in which they were to 
represent the behaviours by drawing comparisons between the 
behaviours of the Object, and the behaviours of the Language, were 
specif ied. 
One might expect, specifying both the Object and the 
Language to which the students had to attribute behaviours, that 
there might be mis-match. That is, that students might not be able 
to attribute behaviours to the Object and/or the Language, or that 
they might not be able to draw a comparison. 
That this was the case is shown by the results. Not 
one student was able to attempt to locate all nineteen places. named. 
Within terms of this test, it' is not, possible to state that the 
perceptual difficulty was with either attributing the behaviour to 
the Object, or to the Language, nor is it possible to state that 
there were difficulties in drawing the comparison (or surrogating 
the Language Object to the Object itself). 
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Method* test methods and ineasurements 
The test was set 'to the students in a group, all at the 
same time. The instructions were verbal and written: the list of 
places to locate came on the same form as the Language outline. 
Results were measured initially by students themselves, 
from an Ordinance Survey Map. However, certain students allowed 
themselves some degree of licence in this, and a map showing the 
areas as 4 Km (nominal) diameter circles, and then as 8 Yin circles, 
was produced by the author against which the Language representation 
was measured (by over-laying the correction map). The most 
generous interpretation of all the student representations was 
taken. The two scales were used to check on the refinement of 
the experimental checking. 
This correction map is an interesting item. In order to 
show the difference in the different representations, it is only 
necessary to take one as being "correct", and demonstrating the 
others in its framework, or to map all representation together 
(this is the complete and articulate statement of the Behaviour 
attributed to the Object by the group of observers at that time). 
However, the use of a common referent was chosen instead. There' 
is a very good reason for this: not one student located all nine- 
teen places, so that not one student's map could be used as the 
referent. And the graphical difficulties of representing the full 
Behaviour (Bo) would be immense It was therefore simpler to use 
one "artificial" referent, and this choice of tactic was further 
strengthened by the advantage that thig has in allowing the dif- 
ference between the best possible representation of the Object's 
@ i. e. to represent say twenty-one different represented locations 
for nineteen places would be extremely difficult (but see 
Experiment Four). 
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self-view, and the observer's view, to be seen. For, an Ordinance 
-_Survey-Map (which is what was used as the measure) is the result, of 
a eoncensus; operation making a very large Behaviour (Bo), accumul.; -. 
ated over many years, by many observers, (almost all of whom manage 
to use the Language representation thus developed to represent the 
Object), -which permits the expression of many attitudes, and which 
be Interpreted back by many observers into many attributed 
b, ehnviours; which can be related to the Object's behaviours; hence 
Its authority. 
lbipeyirnental data 
The results of the experiment have been edited, and 
certain Language Objects are presented here as being in some way 
"'typical" or "exceptional". 
Pirstly. the "correction" map is presented. This is 
derived, as has been stated, from the Ordinance Survey, and is con- 
sidered the nearest approximation that the external observer can 
acIiieve to the Object's self-observation (although it is not this 
self-observation). 
A further seven maps are presented. These are chosen to 
show the difference between substantially "correct", and substan- 
tially "incorrect" maps (although the most correct map probably 
only achieves its accuracy by means of graphical laziness), changes 
In degree of "correctness" depending on which scale (4 or 8 Km) was 
used (and thus showing the effect of the experimental checking's 
refimement), and, in the case-of student f) +, the effect of allowing 
a shift in the marking sheet to the East of normal place; it could 
be argued that the increase in accuracy thus afforded to 
4, Student f) is also shown in the tables as student v). The 
reasons are explained in the tables. 
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student f) indicates that, in his case, there was a genuine 
difficulty in attributing behaviours to the Language (it's not a 
problem of observing the Object's behaviour). 
Maps (See over) 
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LONDON KNOWLEDGE 
Measure Sheet (derived from Ordnance Surve. y Maps) 
S, 
rL 
41 
I Kim 
Pý4 
I 4 04A 
STUDENT'r) 
Very high accuracy compared to places located (14 located: 6 accurate within 4km, 
11 within 8km). This may be partly accounted for 
$Y4 
S 
çc) 
o4" 
0 2.4 6 M( 
L=Cl Vc 
a 
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STUDENT p) 
Increase from 3 correct to 12 correct with scale change from 4 to 8km. 
t, &- tMDA 
ukk! 3" 
C>1 
CLAhthm 
.4 1"ES 1, 
ISR%U- 
. A, 0+ W< 
*i44 sm 
,. 0 r I- 
-STUDEKT c) 
Places known correctly increases dramatically from 2 at 4km to 6 at 8km. 
)C, rtM CN'ROW 
3CIbVib )eL64TUN 
z 
K-1 tlAlq 5 Olt 
Ix 
-. JWAES .. 
gi MW 
0+* aL N" 
M 
LCrDM Vc ILIM^T 
123 
STUDENT g) 
No change in acpracy with the change in scale from 4 to 8km. 
tU 
go FIT ýA LMDC! VC FL': r: '! 
STUDENT f) (also known as STUDENT v)) 
An Eastward shift of the measure gives an increase from 0 places located to 7. 
V. 
Kift 
A4 
5 
rl 
IZ I 
Cýj 
0+9ý it, F, %% 
h-n4-ya-r--4 
I-ernoll XT ILIM^3 
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STUDENT a) 
Very Inaccurate at both 4 and 8km scales. 
IVA F-S j 
I 
STUDENT k) 
Remarkable for the peripheral markings, and the extreme inaccuracy. 
HxrnmerS LA, twio'"Y 
-Z 
C5 
M 
0x46, tm 
LameT X: -c a--DIE 
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Experimental Results 
The results of the experiment carried out on the twenty- 
one students is shown in the following tables. 
Table One shows the results by students. Each student 
is labelled (and those, samples of whose work appears have a cross 
by their reference letter). The student's success at representing 
the location of places is given on both scales, and taking both the. 
total number of places named, and the total number of places located 
by each student as a denominator. The difference in these two 
denominators could be a type of confidence estimate However, 
this may be, the experiment does not clearly differentiate between 
confidence and "correctness", nor between the behaviour of the Object, 
and that of the Language (other-tests do this). It is Intended 
to make different points. 
Table One (See Over) 
@ Relating to the observer's ability to either observe the Object, 
or to represent the Object's behaviour in the Language. 
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TABLE ONE 
Table of test results (by students) 
No. of No. No. % Cor- Cor- 
Cor- 
rect 
Cor- 
rect Stu- Places with- with- Places rect rect 4 Km/ 8 Km/ 
dent Loca- in in Ioca- K/ 4 'm 8 Km/ Places Places 
ted 4 Km 8 Km ted Total Total LoCa- Loca- Places Places ted ted 
a)+ 15 0 0 78.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
b) 18 4 6 94.7 21.0 31.6 22.2 33.3 
0+ 3 1 1 15.8 5.3 5.3 33.3 33.3 
d) 14 2 3 73.7 10.5 15.7 14.3 21.4 
e) 17 2 6 89.5 10.5 31.6 11.8 35.3 
f) +@ 10 0 0(7) @ 52.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
g)+ 5 2 2 26.3 10.5 10.5 40.0 40.0 
h) 12 2 5 63.1 10.5 26.3 16.7 41.7 
1) 15 3 10 78.9 15.7 52.6 20.0 66.7 
J) 3 1 2 15.8 5.3 10.5 33.3 66.7 
k) + 8 0 1 42.1 0.0 5.3 0.0 12.5 
1) i5 6 7 78.9 31.6 36.8 40.0 46.7 
in) is 1 5 94.7 5.3 26.3 5.5 27.7 
n) 7 0 2 36.8 0.0 10.5 0.0 28.6 
0) 6 0 1 31.6 0.0 5.3 0.0 16.7 
P)+ is 3 '12 94.7 15.7 03.2 16.7 66.7 
q) 7 2 2 36.8 10.5 10.5 28.6 28.6 
r) + 14 6 11 73.6 31.6 57.9 42.9 78.6 
11 0 4 57.9 0.0 21.1 0.0 36.4 
t) 5 1 2 26.3 5.3 10.5 20.0 40.0 
U) 10 2 4 52.6 10.5 21.0 20.0 40.0 
V) +@ 10 0 7(0) 
@ 52.6 0.0 . 36.8 0.0 70.0 
+ 
student's work included as example. 
@ 
student f) is student v). In the case of v), an Eastwards 
distortion was allowed on the 8 Km measurements. 
a 
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Table Two shows, by contrast, the data arranged by 
location asked for. In this, it reflects the Object's (and 
Languagels) side, rather than that of the observer. It is clear 
that the behaviours attributed to the Object and Language are very 
different from this table. The previous table showed that each 
observer's attribution of behaviours was different (in this, it 
showed a difference in the observer's awareness). 
TABLE TWO 
Table of Test results (by places) 
4 Km 8 Km Marked Unmarked 
Acton 3 3+25 8 8 
Bigginhill 1 1+45 7 9 
Bromley 2 2+35 12 4 
Clapham 3 3+58 7 6 
Dagenham 3 3+58 5 8 
Dulwich Village 2 2+68 3 10 
Edmonton 1+4-5 6 10 
Hammersmith 8 8+2- 10 7 4 
Ramps tead 3 3+4-7 13 1 
Hornehurch 3 3+6-9 5 7 
Leyton I I+4-5 9 7 
Millwall 0 0+2-2 10 9 
Morden 3 3+2-5 9 .7 
Richmond 3 3+3-6 9 6 
Sideup 4 4+1-5 .6 10 
Soho 5 5+3-8 8 5 
Streatham I I+5-6 8 7 
Tottenham 2 2+5-7 9 5 
Uxbridge 1 1+3-4 8 9 
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Results 
The results of this experiment are shown in the following 
tables. Table Three is a table of the results by students; 
TABLE THREE 
Highest 1% places located = 94.7 (students b, 
I 
M, P) 
Lowest % places located W 15.8 (students c, J) 
Highest % places correct (4 Km) - 31.6 (students v, r) 
Lowest % places correct (4 Km) - o0.0 (students a, f, k, 
n o s v@) , , , 
Highest % places correct (8 Km) - 63.2 (student p) 
Lowest % places correct (8 Km) W 0.0 (students a, I@ 
Highest % correct 4 Km/places located - 42.9 (student r) 
Lowest % correct 4 Km/places located - 0.0 (students a, f k, 
0 S n v@) , , , 
Highest correct 8 Km/places located - 78.6 (student r) 
Lowest correct 8 Km/places located - 0.0 (students a, f@) 
These results show clearly the difference in each 
ztudent's expression. of attributed behaviours, as a g6neralisation 
of the data in Table One, which itself is an ordering of the 
Information submitted, in the form of a map, by each student. In 
doing this, Table Three shows the differences in student awarenesses, 
and also shows the way In which the measuring of "correctness" 
affects the understanding we (as the experimenter observing the 
statements of the students) have of the student's statements (i. e. 
some students seem to be much more "correct" given a larger 
measuring scale, and almost all gain by a measurement against the 
places they locate as opposed to those they are asked to locate). 
It also shows student attributed behaviours In comparison to the 
Behaviour of London through the use of the concensus represention 
of this Behaviour (and hence the Object's self-view). 
@ Students f) and v) are the* same. 
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Table Four shows the results by places; 
TABLE MUR 
Place most often correctly marked at 4 Km - Hammersmith 43.0% 
Place most often correctly marked at 8 Km - Hammersmith 47.5% 
Place most often incorrectly marked at 4 Km - Hampstead 62.0% 
Place least often marked - Dulwich 
Village 
Edmonto 47.5% 
Sidcup 
These results show the differences in the behaviours 
attributed to each of the places that the students were asked to 
locate. In this, it shows different behaviours attributed to the 
Object, and expressed through the Language. It also shows the 
effect of the measurement, and it expresses the different accuracy 
of place location against the general concensus Behaviour description. 
The results are quite amusing: Hammersmith (because of its 
Motorway and riverside locations? ) is most accurately located - 
although the best increase in location is Dulwich Village (two at 
4 Km to six at 8 Km - increase of 300%). Surprisingly, perhaps, 
Hampstead is most often inaccurately placed - although that may be 
because, itý name being famous, students tried to locate It by 
guessing. The three joint least known places are perhaps less 
surprising (Dulwich Village, Edmonton and Sidcup), although 
Dulwich also appears as the "most improved" place in the change in 
measuring scale. 
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Conclusions 
The main, conclusions to be drawn from this experiment are 
that it Is indeed possible to set up a situation in which, in spite 
of the Object and the Language being the same for all observers, it 
is possible to show that each observer represents his observation 
of the Object differently in terms of the Language. In this way, 
the aims of the experiment have been fully realised. The partici-. 
pating students, on being shown the test results' were astonished at 
the "Inaccuracy" of their views. Nevertheless, they have all 
survived. (and continue to survive) in the "alien" environment, 
about which they know so little. 
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EXPERIMENT TIVO: REPORT 
REPRESENTATION OF THE BEHAVIOUR (B) OF AN OBJECT BY THE BEHAVIOUR 
(B) OR AN0711ER OBJECT, THROUGH DIFFERENT TIMES. (LONDON STRUCTURE 
TEST). 
Aims of Test 
The aims of this test are obviously rather closely 
related to those of the previous experiment. This test permits 
the statement of contradictory but simultaneously held views of a 
common Object. But the main interest is not In this necessary part 
of the test, although it is an aim. By inviting the students to 
perform the test live times during the Academic Year 1973-4, it was 
possible to show the students the way in which their views had 
changed, that is, to demonstrate the effect of different observa- 
tions and making different behaviours of an Object. (The students 
used were from the same group as those in the previous test). 
Bowever, there was also another aim, related to the 
previous test: for In that test, we found we could not decide if, 
when a student could not represent one of the locations, the 
problem was in observing the Object, of the Language, or if, perhaps, 
the problem lay in seeing a similarity between them (for Instance, 
I might have a good "picture" of a map of London, and I might have 
a Knowledge of one of the places as being on the tube map, and I 
might not be able to relate the tube organisation to the London 
map). 
So the other main aims of this experiment were to show 
examples of difficulty in relating to Object, or in finding a 
suitable Language in which to express the observations made. And 
to this end, although the Object was pointed to, the Language in 
which representations were to be made was not specified. 
a 
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Origin of Aims I 
This test originated as a teaching aid, evolved informally 
by the author and Leon van Schaik, to help students make statements 
about beliefs they held of the role of things in the city. It was 
made expressly clear to them that there was no sense in which any 
of their statements were more correct than any others; correctness 
is an irrelevant concept for them. It was further developed as a 
teaching aid, not only in helping students make their own views 
clear to themselves, but also to allow them, from their own 
statement. of view, to investigate the implications of their views, 
and the limitations. 
However, there is, in contrast to this somewhat pragmatic 
Ideal, also a pedagogical intention in the experiment, stemming 
from its roots In the view held by the author that, in looking at 
complicated objects (and now, at all Objects, in the sense of this 
Thesis), it is not possible to talk about any degree of 
"rightness"; rather, one should talk abýut the need for a subjec- 
tive knowledge to show itself appropriate, and for an understanding 
of the implications inherent in any view. 
Metbod: conditions 
The experiment was given to twenty-four students in the 
first year course at the Architectural Association School, on five 
occasions during the Academic Year 197i-4, as a part of their 
course. The students are substantialfy the same as those who took 
part in the First Experiment; 
The students were given a blank form to fill in, and 
asked to represent what they thought London's structure was, on 
this form. In order to help them, five architypical structures 
were shown them, as follows, 
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a 
concentric 
II 
-- 
, 
EH 
grid semi-lattice radial 
IE 
zone 
They were told that they did not have to use one, or any, 
of these, that they were only shown them to help with the 
explanation of the task. 
The students were allowed between five and ten minutes to 
complete the task, and the representations were then taken away from 
them, without any further comment, except the observation that they 
were all different, in spite of the Object being-the same. 
The five occasions during which the students were tested 
break up into three groups. The initial test, carried out at the 
beginning of the course, may be largely discounted as familiarisa- 
tion@. The second two tests were used to re-inforce the students' 
views: after the second test, the students were asked to state 
which of the live architypes (above) their views most resembled, 
and then to go away and prove that this view was the only correct 
one. The third test was carried out at the end of this exercise. 
There followed a long period of intensive teaching input, during 
which many different ways of looking at the city were developed, 
@ The Test was a rather unusual one, for school leavers: and they 
needed a chance to even understand what was being asked of them. 
a 
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after which the fourth test was applied. The fifth test was 
carried out at the end of the course, and serves mainly to re- 
inforce the view expressed in test four, where the major change in 
view would be anticipated. 
Method: Language, Object and questlon forms 
In this test, the Object to which a behaviour was to be 
attributed was pointed out, while the Language to be used as a 
representation was not pointed out. The Object was said to be 
"The Structure of London", and was further exemplified by the five 
architypes mentioned above. The Language was to some extent 
inferred by the diagrammatic representation of the five architypes, 
and the request for drawings, but it appears that these requests 
did not have an oýerpowering effect. 
By not specifying the Language, it was intended to over- 
come the ambiguity re mis-match that was possible in Experiment 
One: if a student could observe the Object, thus giving it a 
behaviour, but could not represent It, we would thus know that the 
problem lay In the finding of an appropriate Language behaviour: 
and the student could say this. If, on the other hand, the 
Language represented something that was not a Structure, it was 
clear that the student had problems in observing that particular 
Object, and thus in giving it a behaviour. (There could be many 
reasons for this: not only difficulty In observing the Object, 
but boredom, reluctance to try, etc. ). 
Method: test methods and measurements 
The test was set to students In a group, all at the same 
time. The instructions were verbal, written, and drawn, with the 
five architypes appearing on the sheet the students were asked to 
fill in. 
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The completed sheets were taken from the students and 
filed. The stude nts had no access to them at 
ýny later date. 
Consequently, the students could not copy an earlier form of rep- 
resentation, but had to create a new one every time. Some 
students clearly tried to repeat the same representation every 
time, but even in these cases, there were changes in the 
representational form that could be given significance, (i. e. the 
differences had an interpretable meaning). 
The sheets were divided into three groups, according to 
when the tests were taken, as has already been explained. While 
there was a difference between every representation, difficulties 
of expressing this difference in any general way led to the 
adoption of a simple means of differentiation, and also in the main 
change in representation being looked for betweýn the pairs of tests 
two and three, and four and five. The initial test was largely 
discounted as familiarisation, since the idea of a "Structure" for 
something like London was a hard one for new students to get hold 
of. Each student's representation was classified as being either 
of the form of one or more of the archetypes,. or as being "Trivial" 
(i. e. the Object was not observed), "Special Language" (i. e. the 
observation made of the Object needed a special representation, 
that is, a non-archetype Language), or "Unexpressed" (i. e. the 
student could not find a Language behaviour which resembled his 
Object behaviour). This is a very coarse measurement of differences, 
but it 
Iseems 
adequate to make the general points that it is the 
intention of this experiment to make. There there is a "Special 
Language", and there is a significant difference between various 
"Special Language" representations, these are marked by a numerical 
subscript. 
Experimental Data 
The Experimental results have been edited, and certain 
a 
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Language Objects are presented here as being in some way. "typical" 
or "exceptional". 
Initially, examples are presented of Language Objects 
which are "pure" examples of each of the five archetypes, to show 
that each one was found to be applicable. ' (This is almost 
certainly a peculiarity of London: it is doubtful if a city with a 
much more defined physical form, such as Manhatten Island in 
New York@, would offer itself to such a variety of understandings, 
partially since most architects are taught to think of form as an 
essentially physical phenomenon). It will be noted that four of 
the five examples were taken from the first test (familiarisation), 
during which time students probably did not fully understand the 
intentions of the experiment. 
There then follow a further three Language Objects, one 
representing each of the three other categories into which the 
representations were sorted: ("Trivial", "Special Language", and 
"Unexpressed"). These tended to come from later tests, and 
reflect the students' development of much more subtle ways of 
looking at the Object "London's Structure" than were Initially 
expressed by the archetypes. (The shortage of means of expression 
in Architecture is, of course, one of the major concerns of this 
Thesis: the paucity is here brought out). 
Finally, there are sets of test representations from 
three different students, showing, In this order, virtually '"no 
change" in the Language Object, "extensive change" in the Language 
Object, going from one view to another completely different one, 
@ 
at least in terms of Its street layout - an effect hightened by 
both its maps and its block numbering system. But the Bronx 
may be a different story! 
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and the "refinement-and development" of a view as shown by the 
Language Objects. It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that 
in the "no change" case, there are differences of some significance: 
the Thames has been removed, and the centre of the Zone is omitted, 
and then re-included. The complexity of the structure also 
changes. 
Experimental Results 
The results obtained from the experiment apart from the 
samples of Language Objects already discussed, were In line with 
the expectations expressed at the beginning. They are summarised 
in Table One. 
As will be seen, even with the very coarse categorisation 
used, we only have two students who have not changed their rep- 
resentations across the specified pairs, (students e) and h)). 
Four students did not provide enough data to determine If their 
representations changed, or not (students b), q), s), and x)). 
But, as has been shown in the case of student e), a detailed look 
at the evidence demonstrates that there is a difference between the 
various representations, and it is only one coarseness of our 
differentiation, for measuring, that does not show this. 
As to the difference of views expressed by different 
observers, the total of their five observations may be taken as 
the observer's Awareness (Ao),, of the Object (London's Structure). 
Each of these is different, even given our coarse categorisat. ion 
(as can be seen in Table Onel. The Behaviour of the Object 
can be seen as the total of observations recorded in the table, 
and clarly contains contradictions: it is hard to reconcile the 
structure of Zone with that of Semi-Lattice. 
Furthermore, the expected results as regards the choice 
of Language were found: students did indeed provide their own 
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Languages in which they made their statements (which is one of 
the-reasons for the difficulty we have in categorising these 
statements). And the evidence of students i) and w) point out 
the possibility of differentiating between students who cannot 
observe the Object, and those who cannot find an appropriate 
Language in which to express themselves. 
Maps and Table One (See over) 
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LONDOWS STRUCTURE: Examples of each of the prototype forms appearing in ansWrs. 
STUDENT u) 
CfIMCENTRIC 
Toct I 
SwULN1 P) 
GRID 
Test 
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ST. 1iDENT a) 
LATTICE 
Testl 
:0 
STUDENT v) 
RADIAL 
Test I 
cr 
11" 
b 
I 
141 
I 
STUDENT I 
ZONES 
Test 5 
sw Moclu*Irlý. 1 
%'ý, Vrlas swig 
r4ki 
84 
se 
j 
z3w 
6 
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Ikor-les of each of the non-prototype froms appearing in the answers. 
STUDENT i) 
'TR, J VI AL 
'Test .5 
STUDENT n), 
: NDN - fTWMTPE REPRESENTATION 
Test A 
: STUDENT w) 
INAPPROPRIATE 1;, NGUAGE 
'Test 5 
110ý 
4L -C4, - 
jZf 
71 
a 
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EXAMPLE OF NO CPANGL bET"ER TESTS 
STUDENT c) 
Test 2: Zones 
Test 3: Zones 
Jest 4: Zones 
Test 5: Zones 
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EXAMPLE OF GREAT CHANGE BETWEEN TESTS 
STUDENT t) 
Test 2: LIKE 
-Vo"E I-sus, 
RadISI. Cc, ncentr. 
Lattice 
JýQINL )aT 
iowcrn 
TO _rP 
'JA 
06ik 
Ill ES ACIES 
Test 3: ACC49 WMi allrM 5'MflTle- 
Zones, Lattice 
PLZCZS 
Tes t 4: 
Lattice, 
Radial ,I 
cob. fr4 
{tt4t 
*ct4a2Lt 
F49 
145 
7est, -4: 
Non - Prototype Representation 
(1 
.9 
D9 
9) 
0* 0 
69 
N 
a 
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EXAMPLE OF REFINEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF ONE REPRESENTATION 
MUST f) 
Test 1: Radial 
Test-2: Radial 
1 
Wey, 
7est 3: 
-Radial, 
Lattice 
14 
Vc- A -? Lý, ý- tt-, ý- 
a 
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TABLE ONE 
Table of Test Results 
Test Test Test Test Test 
Stu dent 1 2 3 4 5 Change 1-3/4-5? 
a) L - - RC GRC yes 
b) L CL C NIA 
C) w2 w2 yes 
d) RC L L LC yes 
e) L z z z z no 
f) R R R RL yes 
g) CL RCL RC yes 
h) RCL RCL RC no 
i) T L L GCR T yes 
J) LC LC LC ZLRC yes 
k) L RC RCG N1 w2 yes 
1) CL L L z yes 
M) L L w T yes 
n) T v1 w2 w3 T yes 
0) CL yes 
P) G GW x yes 
L ZG ZL N/A 
r) L LG yes 
B) 
. 
LC L L X/A 
t) RLC ZL LZRC w yes 
U) C C CR yes 
V) R RLG RLC LGC yes 
W) RC RCGL RCGL x x yes 
X) RCGL CW 2 Cw 2 N/A 
Introduction Before main After main course 
course 
a 
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Key to Table One 
C Concentric prototype used 
G Grid prototype used 
L Lattice prototype used 
R Radial prototype used 
Z Zone prototype used 
T Trivial (i. e. not observed) 
w Special Language 
x Unexpxessed 
a 
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Table Two summarises these results in a concise way. 
TABLE TWO 
RESULTS (out of 24) No. Students 
Not enough evidence to decide 4 16.7 b, q, so x 
change 
No change 2 8.3 e, h 
Significant change 18 75.0 
Difficulty' with representation 2 8.3 Pt w 
(on occasions) 
Cannot observe (oq occasions) 3 12.5 1, M, n. 
Need other Models than proto- 8 33.3 c, k, m, no o, 
types (on occasions) po to x 
Did all five tests 5 20.8 e, i, k, no w 
Conclusions 
The conclusions that can be drawn from this experiment 
are that it is possible for observers t9 observe a Common Object, 
and to present not only different views of the Object. but also to 
find quite different Languages in which to make these statements. 
Indeed, it is possible that observers sometimes cannot observe the 
Object, or else they cannot express their observation in a Language, 
and the difference between these two problems can be pointed out 
from the form of statement made. 
Not surprisingly, it was found that the observers' views 
changed in time, and that different observers could hold apparently 
contradictory views of the same Object simultaneously. 
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EXPERIMENT THREE: REPORT+ 
REPRESETTATION OF THE BEHAVIOUR (B) OF AN OBJECT IN TERMS OF THE 
LANGUAGE REPRESENTING THE BEHAVIOUR (Bo) OF THAT OBJECT. (CON- 
CEPTUAL SPACE). 
Aims of Test 
The Aims of this experiment were to find a means', held 
in common by several observers (i. e. a Language), by'which these 
observers could express an experience of "Conceptual Spacell'of a 
common Object. Secondarily, these expressions should be capable'' 
of being transformed in form into another Language, representing 
(as closely as possible) a generally tenable view of the Object, 
so that the differences between the individual experiences, and 
the generally tenable view become clear. Tertiarily, these two 
expressions in the same Language should then be discussable. 
Thus, the aims of this experiment were not to produce classifiable 
"results", but rather a means which allowed the expression of 
personal "spatial concepts" in a manner which highlighted the 
difference between the "mental pictures" (for want of a better 
word) which we have, and the "true nature" (! ) of the Object being 
observed 
The work reported here was designed and executed by 
Annetta Pedretti under my tutillage. The report, which I 
wrote, has been agreed and approved by Miss Pedretti. 
@ Work being carried out this year by Miss Pedretti is designed 
to find ways of defining these differences, and of expressing 
them in a common Language. Initial results are promising. 
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Origin of Aims 
The origin of the aims of this experiment lie in the 
difficulty found by, amongst others, architectural students, of 
expressing their concepts of space in a non-cartographic metric 
(and, indeed, of even believing such concepts to be possible). 
Furthermore, the few attempts that have been made to permit of 
such expressions of personal space (other than those mentioned 
herel have rapidly moved from the personal experience to a loose 
generalisation that tallies very weakly with that experience (as. 
elaborated in the Introduction). Yet, space, whether on an urban 
or a domestic, a mystic or an atomic level, is a matter of personal 
experience, &ad therefore worthy of examination, even if only by 
ourselves, in this way. I 
Previous attempts at providing means for the articulation 
of such views (excepting those in the previous two sections, which 
did allow such an expression, but which had different aims) have 
Iken. ded to stumble because of three difficulties: difficulty in 
explaining to experimental subjects what is wanted of them; 
dIfficulty on the part of the subjects in actually finding a means 
of expression for their personal spaces (the influence of the 
cartographic metric is so profound that the construction of maps 
is virtually always assessed by the subject against a cartographic 
model as being "correCtn or "incorrect"); and the difficulty in 
actually comparing the expressions of different subjects on the 
occasions that sucl. expressions occur, because of the differences 
in Languages. 
Condttions and Repeats 
- The mrperiment involves the participants in two stages. 
la the first stage they were invited to mark in locations on a 
form, which they felt were equi-distant from each other, in the 
directions shown. given a basic scale against which to make their 
f 
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judgements. (For fuller details, see later). This form filling 
was done individually, without any reference woiks (e. g. maps) 
being available. The experimenter then takes these forms, and, 
using the locations given on them, prdducesta map, 'in, which the 
locations are marked in their positions using the cartographic 
metric (in this case an Ordnance Survey map of London at 2JII to 
the Mile was used). The lines used in the forms were then 
projected onto these maps, through the locations as they appear on 
the cartographic metric, resulting in a "distortion", of Ahe form 
of the forms as their locations were transformed from the equi- 
distant relationship shown, in a personal space to the irregular 
relationship shown in a cartographic metric. These transformed 
maps were then shown to the participants by the', experimenter, in 
a group, and a (taped) general discussion and interpretation 
allowed, in which the participants were encouraged to state their 
surprise, and account for the "irregularities". 
The experiment has been carried out three, times: twice 
with students and staff in the first year course at the 
Architectural Association School, using each of the two forms 
designed; and once with faculty and students in the post- 
graduate courses in Cybernetics, Education, and Psychology at 
Brunel University. In this report, we will only detail one of the 
tests with the Architectural students, since the other two tests 
confirm the findings - although we will briefly describe them. 
Form of Languages and Questions , 
The test was put to the participants In the following 
manner. Two form types were prepared (as attached). One, 
consisted of a regular gr. idded matrixlof, 9 x9 nodes (i. e. 81 
total). The other of a regular radiation of 8 lines. from a 
common centre. with 5 equi-distant points marked on each of the 8 
lines, giving a total of 33 nodes. (It is with this form that we 
4 
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shall primarily concern ourselves in this report). The centre of 
each of these forms was described as the location of Centre Point, 
in London. One of the lines in the radial form was called the 
tube station in Camden Town. The centre point of one side of the 
matrix was similarly referred to 
@ 
The participants were given a form and asked, starting 
with the line Centre Point to Camden Town, to state the location 
of the 1, j and I way points on this straight line, as they 
understood it. Keeping the angles and pattern as shown in, the 
forms (i. e. grid or radial), they were asked to name the locations 
of the other nodes, regularly distributed. 
The nodal locations on the thus-filled-in ýforms were then 
marked on a sheet laid over an Ordnance Survey Map, according to 
their cartographic co-ordinates, and the connecting lines drawn 
between the thus-rharked points. In the case of the radial form, 
rings were drawn round the centre node, connecting points equal 
distances out from the centre, making "circles". This was intended 
to highlight the distortions. 
These maps are the maps that were shown to the participants 
to engender discussion. 
At this point, it is worth briefly discussing the 
various Language forms. 
Tpe participants had an Object pointed to, to which they 
attributed a behaviour (B). This obsefved behaviour was stated 
in a Language (also pointed to), to which was attributed a 
behaviour (B), held to be identical to the Object's behaviour (B), 
@ In the case of the Brunel experiment, in which the matrix was 
used, these fixed locations were intentionally omitted. The 
distortions in the cartographic transformations were not 
affected. 
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as seen by that observer. All observers were given the same 
Language (the form) and the same Object (location of places in 
London according to distance and direction). 
The Object's observation of itself was represented, not 
by the invisible Essence, but by a representation of a 
Behaviour (Bo), through a consensus observation of a Behaviour (Bo) 
of a Language - in this case the Ordnance Survey Cartographic 
Metric-Projection. 
The representations by individual participants were 
transformed into representations using the consensus Language 
Behaviour (B 0 ), and these new forms of representation were shown 
again to the individual participants. The difference between the 
observer's attribution of "equi-distant and equi-directional", and 
the attribution as seen in the consensus representation "non- 
equi-distant and non-equi-directional" produced a genuine surprise 
amongst the participants. 
Experiments - Results, typical evidence 
The results of the experiments can be summarised as 
follows (again, we are discussing the radial form in detail, but 
the statements hold generally true for other experiments con- 
ducted). In general, the following characteristics were found 
in almost all of the transformed maps produced: 
a) The transformed maps were marked didtortions of the regular 
forms the participants were asked to produce. 
b) The distortion tended to be, primarily, along one axis, rather 
than "random". 
C) Almost all participants found an area for which they could not 
make locations at all. 
d) There was a tendency to invert places in one of two ways; 
either directly inverting (i. e. location I way along axis 
should, cartogrkphically, actually be outside the end point); 
or locations were "switched" across axes. 
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e) The (cartographic) areas covered by each participant were very 
different (in spite of the f ixed given scale) , in the total 
size of the area covered. 
f) Each participant marked in quite different locations (even 
along the fixed axis). 
The attached examples bring out these points. 
Forms and Maps (See over) 
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-subjective space 
radial form 
name date 
(D annetta pedretti 74 
157 
subjective space 
grid form 
CT 
name date 
(D annetta pedrett 74 
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An unusually regular. small scale map. 
The main distortion can be seen in the SE direction (where the map 
crosses over the Thames. 
A 
-->Z 
162 
Irt the discussions following the presentation to the 
participants of these transformed maps, there was one underlying 
tendency (apart from astonishment)! 
Almost all participants tried to invent reasons for 
themselves, and for each other, to explain these distortions: and 
some of the invented explanations were completely fantastic 
because they involved one participant extrapolating from another 
participant's map, a reason, stated as a necessary fact, about an 
aspect of that participant's life of which they were usually in 
complete ignorance, and which turned out, eventually, to be 
"untrue" of that participant. 
-Improvements in the tests are currently being tried, 
which are intended to (amongst other things), improve the giving 
of explanations of these distortions. 
Conclusions 
The experiments carried out have shown that, using the 
forms provided as Languages, and transforming the results into the 
Language of a consensus cartographic map, it is possible for 
observers to make statements of their personal conceptions of 
space - and for different observers' views to be compared. Not 
surprisingly, the view expressed by each observer was found to be 
different. 
. 
But, in their present forms, the experiments do not 
in any way account for the differences bf*these personal spaces. 
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EXPERIMENT FOUR: REPORT 
SIMULTANEOUS REPRESENTATION OF SEVERAL BEHAVIOURS (B) OF ONE 
OBJECT (LEADENHALL MARKET). ' 
Included in this experiment is an example of the 
successful representation, together, of several views of one 
place. The individual maps, etc. have been left out, since they 
are not critical. The picture has been assembled from'their 
contradictions and ambiguities, by simply putting the various 
alternatives together (as can be clearly seen). 
This work was produced by Tim Richardson; a student at 
the Architectural Association, under the tutillage of myself and 
Leon van Schaik. It is included, virtually verbatim, with the 
maps omitted (as noted), with his'permission. 
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Leadenhall Market 
APPROACH: I chose to study the mental space of the 
market. The method adopted was one much advocated by the current 
Bible-- "Mental Maps" - basically asking people to draw maps of an 
area, comparing and extra-polating. 
I chose this for a simple reason. I was fortunate 
enough to have a whole mine of map-drawers right next to the market 
in Lloyds Building. My father works there, and his Right Arm, 
Mr. Adams, was willing to spare a few minutes to help me. ,I asked 
him to draw a map of Leadenhall Market showing the routes and 
shops. Okay so far, until the work started. After a fast start 
things got decidedly rough around the stationers and almost ground 
to a halt by the pet shop. However, dogged determination pre- 
vailed and a detailed map was produced. I don't know which of us 
was more fascinated, Mr. Adams feeling, sure he could see until he 
looked, or me discovering what an exhilarating and educational 
experience this can become to the drawer. I thought that '- 
Mr. Adams's next trip through the market would be wide-eyed and 
discovering. After this I introduced a memory game - giving 
questions. related to things I had noted while walking through the 
market as 'things not immediately seen'. I asked for the-position 
of two clocks in the. market. The clock by the centre was know, 
but the clock by the Butcher's was more difficult to remember. 
This was interesting since I had found the Butcherlsoclock to be 
much more visual. However, on a later trip, in the evening, I 
could hardly find the Butcher's clock because of the bad lighting 
and the tangle of butchers' hooks hiding it. Lighting may account 
for a universal lack of knowledge as to what was sitting on the 
columns surrounding the crossroads of the market. The Gryphon 
managed to elude everyone's memory. The tracery motif was known 
by quite a few of the contestants to exist at the ceiling of the 
entrance arch to the market. Fourth question - how many doors 
a 
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to the Lamb pub? This was dropped because it was a trick 
question, one set of doors being closed by a fruit machine. The 
last question was asking the name of the Supermarket opposite the 
Lamb. Every person said immediately that they had no idea about 
the names of any of the places. 
Mr. Adams's enthusiasm thus aroused, we headed for the 
canteen in the basement, where four members were accosted and 
asked to draw a pap in five minutes. Although four people 
together found it easier to do it than four individuals, they did 
comment that it was surprisingly difficult to do and, a, good test 
of the memory. Týe response so far rosy we headed upstairs, 
Mr. Adamsis five minutes having already extended to a half hour, 
and started going through the offices looking for map drawers. 
Altogether eight people managed to draw a map. Again I think the 
contestant gained as much from it as me, one person going so far 
as to thank me for making him realise how little he knew. A five 
minute deadline was set, and then the questions were asked. Again 
most people got the clock at'the cross-roads but not at the 
butchers, the Gryphon was identified as either a lion, a dragon or 
a mouse, and the Supermarket drew a complete blank. 
The attached written Guide, to. -Leadenhall, Market-. vwas 
assembled from the eight maps provided by the eight contestants. 
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A Guide to Leadenhall Market 
(Compiled from the memories of, over eight esteemed gentlemen of 
Lloyds and thus considered a fair assessment). 
First there is a pub at a crossroads called the Lamb. 
There'is a Post Office separated from the pub by a blank space. 
There is a cafe separated from the Post Office by a blank space. 
Next to the pub on the other street is a cheese shop or possibly 
a supermarket or possibly a huge dominating Lloyds Old Building, 
or Lloyds might come af ter the cheese shop/supermarket or there 
may be, no Lloyds at all. Next to one of these there is a bank 
which may in fact be Lloyds (not the bank). This bank forms a 
corner to Lime Street and the street leading to the Lamb. The 
rest of the bl6ck is occupied by Lloyds, unless Lloyds occupies 
the entire block apart from the Post Office. 
Secondly, the block to the north of the pub: (the bank- 
pub axis continues northwards, or eastwards, so probably north but 
in fact west, which is in fact irrelevant). On the right the 
block consists of butchers/poulterers and a tailor at the top 
called either Acumen or Aquascutum forming a corner with 
Gracechurch Street. A clock on this street is definitely non- 
existent, but there is one at the crossroads. 
On the eastern axis the butcher at the corner opposite 
the pub might be next to a blank space or a stationer or the 
stationer might be a cafe or the cafe might come after the 
stationer. 
On the left-hand side of the north axis. of the cross- 
roads is another block. Opposite the poulterers/butchers are 
more poulterers/butchers. Moving northwards there may be a fish 
shop, then a florist, then a pub forming a corner with 
Gracechurch Street, but this corner may also contain a tailor or 
nothing at all. If we look at this block on a West-East axis 
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and look at its southern flank, this contains, from right to left, 
a grocer, then a petshop, or it may be the other way round. What 
comes next is a subject of intense discussion, but it is thought 
that the following shops, in order unknown, may exist: cafe, 
bookmaker, florist, greengrocer, tailor, electrician. 
The fourth block is split by alleyways - one or two in 
an East-West direction and one in a South direction, forming an I, 
shape since the South alley does not reach Lime Street. These 
will form one or two 'islands' but more likely one. It is evenly 
divided as to whether the fourth corner of the crossroads contains 
a supermarket or a grocer. Moving downwards (opposite pub-bank) 
there is either a chemist or a cafe, or there may be a greengrocer 
in an alley. Then there is an electrician followed by a cafe, 
fruit shop and building site, the building site forming a corner 
with Lime Street. 
On the north facade of the block, left of the alley is 
a sweet shop, but the alley only contains a chemist, and maybe a 
cafe opposite the chemist. Moving right to left from, the sweet 
shop memory starts to fade, but there may be a bookshop, butcher 
or grocer, followed by a beauty salon, then an electrician next to 
a cafe, then a tailor where the street joins to Lime Street - this 
block might be triangular. At this point the gentlemen are tiring 
and anyway have more pressing business to attend to, so a halt Is 
called to the proceedings. 
a 
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CONCLUSIONS 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this Thesis was to produce a philosophy that 
better accounted for the contradictions in views of Architecture 
held by different observers, -and to permit means of expression of 
such views (observations) to be made; and to apply such a 
philosophy to demonstrate that its theoretical claims could be 
substantiated (i. e. that it could be made to work). 
The reports on the Experiments (and especially 
Experiments 1 to 3, Experiment 4 (executed by Tim Richardson) 
being primarily an example of a means of aggregating the expres- 
sion of many views in such a way that their differences are 
maintained), show that the aims claimed for the Thesis have been 
achieved in several different contexts: in the first example, 
the different behaviours attributed to an Object, their contra- 
dictions, and th6 use of a consensus referent were demonstrated; 
in the second, the change in behaviours at different times of 
observation, and the creation of appropriate languages for the 
expression of the observations were shown (as also were. dif- 
ficulties in observing the Object, and in finding an appropriate 
language): and in the third (an experiment designed and conducted 
by Annetta Pedretti) a means for demonstrating to participants 
the difference between their attributed behaviours, and the 
behaviour attributed by a consensus metric (accepted generally, 
as "true", and representing, as closely as we can, the Object's 
self-observation) were shown. 
In this way, the main intentfons of our philosophy were 
shown to be operational. But the construction of the philosophy 
itself produced various unexpected side-effects (some of them not 
so peripheral), which can be pointed to here. We will not, 
however, summarise other findings of the Thesis here - that was 
done at the time in the Main Text, and also In the Abstract. 
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Initially, then, the self-observing Object was shown to 
support different behaviours, made by different observers. But 
the observer, to be an inhabitant of the Universe, had also to be 
an Object. The functioning of a self-observing Object, being 
shown to be similar to that of an oscillator, generates, for each 
Object, its own time sense. Yet the observer, and the observed 
Object, have to correlate with each other for an observation to 
occur. Thus, not only does our Thesis produce, in each Object, 
its own sense of local time, but also these times are obliged to 
correlate for an observation to occur. 
The same can be said for any other Object, including 
one, the behaviour of which will represent the behaviour 
attributed to the initial Object, by the observer. And it is 
through the types of correlation of these times of observations 
that we can produce the logical systems through which Models and 
Languages can represent Objects, and through which individual 
observers can construct hierarchies of Objects, logically related, 
and hence their own cognitive structures. In this, we believe 
this Thesis to be unique, for no other philosophical work of which 
we know can derive its own logic from its system of units. 
-The process by which these observations are made was 
also subjected to an analysis that arrived at a system for 
analysing forms of argument, reducing them to their most economic 
form (through reference to the same logic of relations that was 
derived in the philosophy), and dimensioning the Modelling stages, 
from which it was suggested that a means of mapping cognitive 
processes, and a method for improving the performance of 
computers, might be developed. 
Other problems were also resolved: G8del's was shown to 
be essentially irrelevant, for example, and Wittgenstein's 
insistence on the unobservableness of the Object was negated. 
The problem of psychological overload was accounted 
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for, as was the gradual loss of definition of Objects, as they 
are observed more and more. 
These "peripherals", peripheral only in the sense that 
they were not primary design considerations in the construction 
of this Universe, leave areas for follow up, to further test the 
physical viability of this Thesis. Over the years, I may 
attempt some. And the list here is not intended as exhaustive: 
the possibility of using versions of the Experiment forms 
contained here to assess, or to let students assess, progress, 
leaving style (as Pask does), understanding, and their own con- 
ception of a field (e. g. "Architecture") is also open: indeed, 
it is the inclusion of work by students of mine which Validates 
this claim (and there is much more being done now). 
This Thesis moves outside its fields of "Architecture" 
and "Language": indeed, these fields are, in many ways, now 
irrelevant to it. Substantial claims might be made for it, on 
hunches. But this has been only an attempt to account for its 
relationship to its two initial fields of investigation: to 
discuss some of its surprises: and to mention some extensions. 
The testing of its value, and the checks of these projected 
experiments, lie ahead, in the hands of others. 
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STORIES 
(When You First See This Place) 
(Now That You Can See Me) 
(Seeing Is Believing Oblique Killing) 
(A Fred Blogg's (R. I. B. A. ) Eye View) 
(A Superman's Eye View) 
(A God's Eye View) 
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WHEN YOU FIRST SEE 71ITS PLACE: 
When you first see this place it is all dark but growing 
instantly lighter - in the gloom you can see nothing but your own 
buzzing. But you can't be elsewhere in other buzzings than yours. 
Little lights glimmering, brighter brighter, each one 
buzzing as it admires itself, looking over its shoulder and saying 
This is how I look to others, This is what I am, This is what they 
are. But they are not, and it is not. 
As little lights, growing brighter brighter, ochre coming 
out of the pitch blue dark, stars of wider dimensions, infinitely 
small, shining dim ochre in vacuous night sky as far and as near, 
as little lights shine, they buzz, or so it seems to me looking at 
my own little light buzzing. 
I stop and look over my shoulder where I can be, and 
survey the frozen landscape of voids. 
Little lights which buzz, near, near, all is near, all is 
far, bigger than the stars while infinitely small, looking at them- 
selves and therefore buzzing, equally spaced and yet near. Who 
said the caveman's magic lanterns just-out-of -reach were incorrect? 
And what of the sound? A little murmering of each ochre, 
dimly vibrating, invisibly and inaudibly, so indistinct that there 
is only a hint of a suggestion, as each ochre sways in its appointed 
place, murmering its buzz to the vacuoucity of others. 
Growing brighter, sound growing louder, this place seems 
to become accessible each time I am there looking, seemingly I can 
see it all and hear it all, but I can't 6 there. I look over my 
shoulder, pat my back, and that is what I am doing there. But 
that is not, and it is not. 
Each light makes its pure ochre, swaying in the pitch 
blue, each light makes its murmer inaudibly heard by others, the 
buzz buzz of this world, frozen in its eternity, noticing its 
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multiplication one moment from the next, and its paling as it fades 
In parts while I see it more clearly and hear it with louder 
inaudibility. 
With each light growing brighter in its dimming, buzzing 
its murmer, there becomes clear a difference in each, at least to 
me where I am, for, buzzihg, and travelling in the pitch blue, the 
vacuous silence, sometimes two pass through each other visibly and 
with a difference never colliding on the way, passing with a 
loneliness so total as to be chilling, were it not that this place 
is cold already, with only the buzzing ochres searing hot if one 
were to touch them, but you can't be there. 
Passing through each other, it appears they don't even 
notice their intrasection while they don't collide; perhaps it is 
me? 
And yet, I can't be there. I am looking at myself over 
my shoulder, pat on the back, the loneliness of the lone description 
silently divorcing itself one step at a time, shedding a mock 
silent tear to its own audience, lost in the searing chill of 
ochre murmers, reporting to myself the fact of this aloneness of 
all as if I could see it all, and each buzzing's buzz. 
While looking then at my searing ochre murmers, suddenly 
neon lines start drawing and undrawing themselves around some or 
more of the buzzes, weaving patterns, pushing them into small herds 
of indifferent differences, collecting them together, and this with 
the process of intrasection hiding some ochre lights while colouring 
them around with blue, green, red and yellow racers, enlivening 
this place with a kinesthetic game of automatic playing, causing 
the little lights to all but disappear on occasion, so diverting 
is this game enlivening the twilight of pitch blue. 
And yet, even this diversion pales, and gives no solution 
to the sadness of the isolation, for ultimately it is a very sad 
world: ultimately there is no possible communication between the 
4 
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little oebres,. murmering. searing, buzzing, neon-lining: 
ultimately each is alone, quite alone, unique. The rest is an 
illusion to fill in the ceaseless fading time and space. 
When you first see this place you are lost. 
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NOW THAT YOU CAN SEE ME 
Now that you can see me, let me first tell you what 
you've done to me, lying here on my clean adjustable table, in my 
white tiled room, surrounded by you, glazed tiles glaring, grey 
metal filing drawers sliding in and out, High Speed Morgue, now that 
you can see me, all of you shining eyes, turn off the lights. 
Now that you can see my white, bright, whiteman flesh, 
my spurting red blood, my vague blue eyes, my long mouse hair, my 
white clean overalls, my cleaned cut nails, now that you can see 
all that, let me tell you what you've done to me. 
This room is vast, white, speckless, boundless. Floors, 
tiled in white glazed tiles, trimmed with drains, meeting walls, 
tiled in white glazed tiles, only with this difference, an inter- 
spersal of grey metal filing drawers. The ceiling may be there 
but is hidden behind a downpour of bright electric light and cannot 
be seen. The whole very clean, damp, cold, bright. And in it 
you, thousands of you, millions, busy acting. For this room is 
the theatre in which you operate on me. 
Sitting secured on my table, there is nothing. I can do 
about this, even if I would, no way I act on you, can exert 
pressure. You are a thousand free agents and I am your corpse. 
Now you can begin. 
Taking a thousand identical taUles, a thousand free 
agents set to work, with a whirring instantness. 
You, brown eyed man, with green and purple striped 
flesh, let me watch you your actions. 
On the table you build - facsimile me - as the coconut 
postage stamp is the Carribean tree : opening a grey drawer, take my 
arm, screw it to an imaginary corpse, wrong way round, or right; 
another drawer, another arm, a leg, a testicle, a beard : kidney- 
less you build me and gutless, to carry out your experiment. 
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Comparing now the new-me to the old-me, you see the same, 
same but for the things you don't want, you dontt see, the-same all 
through, the grey drawers can keep the rest. 
Transform. 
S. ý. ll pump attached to belly button - no danger there, 
the new-I is gutless you pump. At the same time a creyidrawer 
opens, there's another limb, screw it on, 3 arms, 11 testicles, 
7 beards. Now, am I how you want me? 
Compare to original. - suddenly, mysteriously, old-I has 
3 arms, beards, balls. Maybe no guts though - the kidneys have 
walked off - but what price is that to pay for your pleasure. 
Set me up -I walk in your mock field, I collapse, done 
for, little grey drawers opening and closing with the fury of an 
amok juke box. 
Or you take me, assembling your facsimile, life-like 
(except for the kidneys - no barm : not to piss is a blessing in 
disguise). beautiful, true, bleed me like a pig, wrench off the 
arm, break the back, cause me to walk and I flop. 
And all the time the counter point of wretched. breaths, 
the drumming of terrified hearts, the clatter of slamming drawers, 
the din of your knives. 
Transformed. 
Even the original cannot survive this blight. 
But now the others - all thousand of you - 999 now - 
emergency emerging, all at once, drawer open, blood spurts, limbs. 
fly, you've got his leg, confused intrasection, a thousand, sorry, 
999, spewing anomolies like war veteraný, all at once - what can I 
, -N do? 
You do unto me as you would do unto me. 
Clean theatre, white, sterilised, hygenic, your operating 
space. All wildly screwing, bleeding, blowing, tables and 
originals, transform. 
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Small beady eyes Peering around, a thousand pairs, under 
that bright deceiving ceiling light, looking at the home brewed 
me's. 
And all the time the counterpoint of wretched breaths, 
the drumming of terrified hearts, the clatter of slamming drawers, 
the din of your screams. 
And now, I, still there, changed and mutilated, constant, 
what type of animal am I? 
Flash of the old grey bulb, parting of, tbdiblinds. 
Now that you can see me - tell me. 
0 
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SEEING IS BELIEVING OBLIQUE KILLING 
Erasing the mistake of life, seeing is believing 
oblique killing. 
In the shining blue darkness, surgical tables gleaming, 
flashing like the old film, flicker visible invisible alone. The 
buzz of each an endless din, the buzz of each flickering while the 
lights shine searing. 
Tables, adjusted, objects, squealing, you adjust to suit 
your whim, buzz buzz together yet all is the same in the dif- 
ferences you execute. Limbs fly through neon lines, passed round 
like the proverbial buck, fantasies projecting out of the 
amputated ochre, flicker buzz flicker buzz the blinds part. 
At each parting, grey plates absorb the situation, white 
beards flash, looking at the new limbs, where they are now, the 
little ochre lights out of reach and on the tables, their 
introverted shimmerings contradicting their flickering projections, 
projections you give them. 
Little voice, quietly insisting with a tongue of wagging 
silence, ochre purple, screw on leg, new picture now goes out, 
broadcast movie, flicker in the shutter, grey blinds close. 
Message passed, picture seen, message passed, medium, 
medium, he i's there, that being discovered in the searing buzzer. 
the flicker of ochre, the blood spewing Victim, the green and 
purple object of the multiple amputations, lobotomised, born, no 
doubt there, no longer alone, talking gibberishly a din of 
-reverberant rubbish, and attacking you too. 
Now he too is there, now he is in the battle, conscripted 
to live and chatter, chilled teeth in chilled ice, quiet messages 
emanating, chewing others. Multi-storey theatres, parked 
bodies, flickering ochre, silent din, savage thrusts cutting 
through to. projectzthe SeVe'red., utabilicAlzsilence, 
iso 
Each little body, screaming as it buzzes ochre, caught 
in the parting grey blinds, each little body, loaded with limbs, 
blood drunk by vampire surgeons, inflate now to the neon racer, 
shine green, what is left of that body on the rack, stretched over 
barbed wire and pulled by a thousand free agents' mad deceptions 
projecting skywards like the ancient candles. WalkIpg., fore- 
shortened corpses, burdened with images, legs collapsing, handling 
projections and skinning themselves on the way, the survivors of a 
cross-country extravaganza of insistent pain. Each little body 
drinking its own blood, the blood of others, any blood, operational 
and limbless. 
And yet the neons cut, fields hedged, each amputated 
body, each string of motion pictures projecting, swamping the 
isolated target, buzz buzz, the murderous hacking at the isolated 
corpses. 
Chill cold pitch blue around the glaring white glazing, 
the opening closing grey metal drawers permeating space, bisecting 
neons, the blood spurting from the ochre buzzers, the fluttering 
of the flickers, the lies told and projected, the weight-of the 
false limbs, the body dies from prolonged application, the light 
blinding, the body dies, and so do you, weighed down by the icy 
false chattering in the dim silent din, by the projections sliced 
by neon. 
You build yourself up to your own death killing others. 
Seeing is believing oblique killing for companionship in 
the impossible vacuiun. 
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A FRED BLOGGS'S (R. T. B. A. ) EYE VIEW: 
Fred Bloggs can see himself, and he can see that he sees 
himself, and what he sees is his Essence, but he doesn't know that 
it is his Essence, or that it is any different to the observations 
he makes about other Objects in the Universe. Nor does it occur 
to him that maybe he doesn't see the whole thing; what he sees is 
the truth, and a fact. 
So Fred can't see that others see things differently and 
that they can't see things just like he does, and he certainly 
can't see that his view of himself cannot be shared by others. 
What Fred does see, however, is not the Objects themselves, (he 
can't guess this of course), and he thinks he sees the Objects, 
but then he doesn't understand about Essences. What Fred does 
see is the Model Facilities of the Objects he believes he sees, 
and that's what he believes the Universe Is made of: Objects 
which are Model Facilities but which he believes are Objects. 
Fred won't easily accept that there could be such a person as 
Superman or a God. Not that he minds God; its more that he 
isn't really interested in him. 
However that may be, Fred can definitely see things, 
and he knows them, and he knows that. Ile can see just what 
things are, and what they can do, and what their properties are. 
Not that he decides these properties - that's obvious - the things 
speak for themselves, don't they? Well, they don't, but Fred 
won't worry about that. Each thing has its appointed place, and 
Fred is not one to interfere with that. 
So that, while Fred does attribute behaviours, he Is not 
aware of this, but believes the converse. And thatts partly why 
Fred finds it so hard to see all the other views, or to allow that 
there might be others which make sense. But at least its unlikely 
Fred will want to become a surrealist, and attach inappropriate 
4 
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attributes, and Dadaist he could never be. 
Fred can also communicate his views, vehemently and 
without any great interest in discussion. He can, given generous 
conditions, carry on a conversation, but he doesn't often bother: 
he Is more content to make statements of facts, not that they are 
facts, nor that anyone but the most closely attuned fellow could 
really understand what he was talking about. But, under such 
closely controlled, and perfectly fitted conditions, Fred can 
actually carry out a conversation with another and he can even begin 
to appreciate the behaviour that another gives to an Object, and 
which Fred believes is the Object. On a really good day, Fred may 
even learn something from another view, thinking that it was his 
all the time. 
And Fred has a memory, which of course he does really 
have. And he unde'rstands his own individual time. Not that 
Fred is in any way to be belittled or put down by anyone, else, least 
of all me: he is happy, and he gets on very well in the Universe. 
Why should he ask Superman's questions anyway? 
To Fred, the world consists of himself, and other Objects 
which aren't himself, and which have properties he can see, and 
which are self-evident. He can also remember them, and talk about 
them to close friends, modifying them occasionally. That the 
Objects are really Model Facilities, that he is his Essence, that 
properties are behaviours, that language is an Object, doesn't 
matter to him, and why should it? 
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A SUPERMAN'S EYE VIEW 
Superman arrived from another Universe, and he can 
occasionally remember that, and that's why he can see so much more. 
Not that coming from somewhere else makes him invincible, far from 
it. Ile can be cut down by green kryptonite, and he doesn't know 
how to get rid of that inconvenience. Anyhow, Superman, having 
come from somewhere else, realises that he can never really be like 
everyone else; that he is really alone and isolated and that he 
can never really know others. 
-Superman, however, does have some special powers, as his 
name and antecedents might suggest. Ile can outguess most people, 
and he can see their point of view, sometimes, and that they have 
one, often. 
Superman can also see that he, being unique, has no 
reason not to assume that others are also. Indeed, having come 
from other worlds, he understands that there are things clear to 
him that no-one else can see or understand; and that there is no 
way that he can understand or see the whole of anyone else. So 
he does see that he has an Essence, and that everyone else has an 
Essence, and that that's private, and that he can't see anyone 
else's Essence, (or even that it is there: all he can see is that 
there is a need for it to be there). And seeing that there must 
be Essences for all things, Superman can see that that is not 
what he can observe about them, nor is it what any other observing 
Object can see, unless it is'looking at itself, and that that is 
noncommunicable. So that he sees that whatever a. characteristic 
of an Object is is not what the Object thinks it is itself, at 
least as far as other observers are concerned: so he thinks that 
the behaviour of an Object is attributed by the observer, and that 
each observer has his own way ýof looking at things. and that is 
why he can sometimes perform feats of great strength, and even 
predict things before they happen. 
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However that nay be, Superman knows that he can talk to 
people about what they think, not in terms of the way he thinks, 
after all that's from another Universe, but by using another 
Object to put things in terms of. So he knows about language 
being an Object just like any other Object, acting as a surrogate 
for discussions, and he knows that there are discussions too, 
with conversational idioms and conventions, so that he can listen 
to what he thinks the other side says. And he measures the 
difference, and adjusts his views, and he learns from what others 
have found, which is a good thing, because it he did not, he might 
never have been able to understand anything about the strange 
Universe into which he was plunged when the planet Krypton exploded. 
Being a star, Superman knows too that everyone looks at 
him, too, and that they build up a behaviour they attribute to him. 
too, and being kind, he tries to stick to what he understands of 
their picture, not that it is the same as his picture, of himself: 
it isn't, but it is the best that can be done, and he knows that, 
too. In fact. he is quite aware of the things that can be known, 
and those that can't be, and that some of the unknowables are 
necessary for any theory of this Universe to exist. 
And, knowing as he does, that he came f rom anothor world, 
and that he occupies his own place and time, he reallses that his 
sense of space is unique, Is part of himself, and that everyone 
else has something like that too. And that language Is a means 
of transposing this, using a space; to map your ideas onto, and 
synchronising the clocks while the conversations happen. Time is 
something he is aware of, at least when he tries to talk. 
Superman can follow the logic of his views and experience 
thought, and he knows he is of his own space and time. But he can 
see others, not as they see themselves, but in the same way that 
they see him. Superman has a double identity. Come in, 
Clark Kentl 
0 
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A GOD'S EYE VIEW: 
"Given the existence as uttered forth in the public 
works of Puncher and Wattman of a personal God qua qua qua qua 
with white beard qua qua qua qua beyond time without extension? ...... 
When his white beard is not blowing in front of his 
eyes, and when he happens to be looking, God has a grandstand view 
of things, if there is anything to see, and if he wants to look 
hard enough to see the little vibrations happening beneath the 
surface, and the lines re-aligning themselves. 
From his grandstand seat, he can see all the Essences, 
they have no secrets from him, if he wants to look into them. 
Not that they will know this, or that he is looking, he is like a 
spy in their midst, or a grass. He can see all the Inhabitants 
too, obviously, since he can see their Essences. And so he can 
be like them all at any time, and he can see all the combinations, 
because he can see all the Essences of all the Objects. 
Similarly, he can see all the possible Model Facilities, 
all the possible Objects, and every possible language and con- 
versation: not that he needs to, of course, seeing all the 
Essences, he needn't discuss the Objects anyhow, Ile understands 
them all and doesn't need to do any exploring, because he has 
..... "the kAby". Similarly, he can see all the possible Objects 
and all the behaviours, and every assembly and attribution. Not 
that he needs to - for he has ...... "the key". 
"The key" is the view and is the clock. God. behind 
his white beard, has a special clock, a universal clock which ticks 
for everyone all the time, and yet which doesn't tick for God; 
who can see it all at once, seeing the roles of the inhabitant 
Objects and observers, and who is bored because he has all the 
a Beckett(*119) 
186 
possibilities, all the facts, and not even any time to fill in. 
God doesn't spend much time looking, anyway. He hides behind his 
beard, invisibly. Ile goes to sleep, disinterested in a qURgmire 
of simultaneous synchronities, not being interested in the time. 
He can control nothing. Ile is bored. 
Poor God, he can't exist anyway. He is in an impossible 
position. He is just so ordinary and he is not there. 
If he is in the Universe, he is one of its subjects, and 
he cannot see the Essences of other Objects. 
If he can see the Essences of other Objects, he isn't in 
the Universe. 
If he can see the Essences hý is not in the Universe, and 
he cannot be talked about or observed. 
If he cannot be talked about how can we say what he 
knows? 
If he is not in the Universe, how can he see the Essences 
which are the direct product of the Universe. 
God is a very sad figure: God is our saddest most alone 
inhabitant: he is nowhere, not sure if he is part of the Universe, 
not sure if he can see and be seen, or if he doesn't really exist 
at all. 
I'm glad I'm not God. 
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APPENDIX I 
CORRESPONDENCE 
+ There once was a man who said, "God 
Must think it exceedingly odd 
If he finds that this tree 
Continues to be 
When there's noone around in the Quad". 
+ Dear Sir, 
Your astonishment's odd: 
I am always around in the Quad 
And that's why the tree 
Continues to be, 
Since observed by, 
Yours Faithfully, 
God. 
Dear God, 
Why did you forget me? 
I don't need another to see: 
I don't neeO no bod 
Around in the Quad: 
I'm observing, 
Yours Faithfully, 
Tree. 
+ Traditional. 
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@ Dear Sir, 
I'm astonished to see 
A pretentious address from a tree. 
If I wasn't there 
There'd be noone to hear 
Let alone make remarks. 
Yours, 
Jahweh. 
Dear Jahweh, 
-I see that your name 
Makes you assume you can claim 
That a pretentious Tree 
Can continue to be 
Only because it's your aim. 
@ Dear God, 
Here's a real hot potato! 
Alright; forms are enough - but just wait, though! 
If you don't have to see 
To conceive of a tree 
Why create? 
Yours Ideally, 
Plato. 
Dear Sir 
Your Ideals are wrong. 
A potato can't be hot for long. 
Of the tree you evince 
We have not caught a glimpse. 
Your creations were myths all along. 
0 Composed by Stephen Mullin, and included with his permission. 
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@ Dear Sirs, 
I'm afraid to report 
You are all of you quite "Out of Court". 
Since you're all in my dream 
You can't be what you seem 
To believe that you are, N 
Aleph Nought. 
If I am what you think I am, 
You may find that you have to ram 
The words that I thought 
About "Aleph Nought" 
Down your throat: and, if not, I am. 
Dear Sir, 
As a God who can see 
That I am not, myself, quite a tree, 
I feel that you've caught 
My friend, Aleph Nought, 
By the short hairs, 
(Yours Barberously. ) 
Dear Tree, 
I'm astonished to think 
That you'd dream of the way that I sink 
Into depths of despair. 
Having trimmed my short hair, 
Aleph's Samson Act's now on the blink. 
a Composed by Stephen Mullin, and included with his permission. 
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Dear Sir, 
Now I find myself equal 
To trees, and, no doubt, also treacle; 
To Platonic forins, 
Odd Quads and norms. 
Yours Faithfully, 
God. (Or His sequel). 
Pear God, 
I am sorry to hear 
Of the depth and the width of despair 
Which is wracking your brain 
With increasing pain 
Since observing me, Tree! It's unfair! 
Dear Sir, 
I am bound to admit 
That I think that this discourse lacks wit. 
The Logic of Thoughts 
Which herein one sports 
Can hardly substantiate it. 
Dear Sir, Gpd and Tree, 
I must say 
That I feel you are drifting away 
From the meanings you meant 
Before Limericks bent, 
Re-inventing your thoughts in this way. 
As the Tree which started this spiel 
I find I'm beginning to feel 
That it's useless to say 
That I see it "This way": 
For, ultimately, all is real. 
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APPENDIX 2 
SIGNIFICATION IN FREGEIS TRIANGLE 
In developing his logical theories of meaning, 
Gottlob Frege made use of three elementary concepts: "sign", 
"sense" and "reference" (loosely translated). 
Ogden and Richards later assembled these three together 
in the form of a triangle, known as Frege's triangle, summarising 
the stances that can be taken within Frege's Universe, with his 
three elementary concepts. This triangle is: 
sign 
reference-sense 
In terms of the work of this Thesis, it Is interesting 
to note that we also have three basic "Object types": Objects, 
observers, and Languages (or Models). And, the ways in which we 
observe in our Universe are quite similar to Frege's terms. 
Thus, Frege's "reference" is our "Object", and Frege's "sign" is 
our "'Language". The "sense" is an observer generated "Meaning". 
Our Universe has the three basic "Object types", 
Object, Language, and observer. which also relate together as a 
triangle: 
Language 
b 
ýýver 
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However, this representation does not fully describe 
our Universe, because of its two levels. Nor does our triangle 
work in quite the manner of Frege's, because it is based on 
operational roles which may be switched around between the parts. 
Our triangle could be more accurately represented by a 
change in terms which represent the relationships between the 
components. Thus, -it is not the Language or the Object which is 
observed, but the behaviour of each which is then equated: 
Language 
behaviour 
Object 
behaviour observer 
This can now be re-represented to reflect the level 
structure of our Universe (using our familiar representations). 
Urguage 4(P 
L 
0 
%.. RX c) -0 Vz 
I& 
Ob <OCL>=E 
Object observer 
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We may also wonder why we have the Language Object: in 
-our Universe, there is no assignation of the 'role Language with- 
out some purpose: which is, of course, to communicate to another 
observer an observation about an Object. We may therefore add a 
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fourth point, and build a square. But we will not show all 
possible relationships - merely those used for the observer Pb 
to communicate his observation of an Object 0a via a Language 
Lc to a second observer P d' (and thus all Essence and Object 
statements are being omitted). 
listener 
Pd 6 Ad(Lcj'--[Pd 
14,4Language V LC 
"U 
0 rr 
'&0 Cr 
CL 
n Object Ai 
Pa Q-10 observer 
v Pbl=) Ab(0& Ov Pb 
Thus, Frege's triangle, In discussing purposive 
signification becomes a square, and operates on two levels, 'In our 
Universe. 
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APPENDIX 3 
TUNF INTO MEMORIES OF YOU 
Instructions for Performance 
This piece is for three orchestral groups, each of 
eightplayers. 
The groups should be placed at three points around the 
edge of the auditorium, forming the apexes of an equilateral 
triangle. 
The audience should be allowed to sit where they like 
in the room. 
The groups should be made up of homogeneously timbred 
instruments, as, for example: cellos and violas (violins should 
not be used in this piece unless essential), cellos and trombones, 
clarinets and saxophones, trombones and french horns, flutes and 
french horns, whistles and recorders, clarinets and trumpets, and 
other similar combinations. There is no reason why there should 
be only two types of instrument, as long as they all blend: e. g. 
trombones, cellos, violas or clarinets, horns, saxophones and 
trumpets could be excellent. Each group should have aýsimilarainake- 
up. - 
The score consists of one continuous tune of seventeen 
minute's duration, with no rests. There is also, in the score, 
a blank stave for writing in analytical notes and other useful 
Information, although parts should not be written out (see later). 
Each group should choose one starting place. (lettered 
A to F). The individual groups shoul4 choose secretly, and for 
every run through. 
The piece will start 120 seconds before this point (if 
there is a tied note at that point, the tie will be disregarded). 
The introductory 120 seconds will be a slow crescendo to the level 
shown at the chosen starting point. The score will then be 
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followed round once, cyclically, until the starting point is 
reached again. There will then be a further 120 second 
diminuendo after this. The piece will thus be exactly 21 
minutes long in performance. 
The performance consists in IMPROVISING a suitable 
accompaniment to the tune. The tune is thus not played (except 
where the performer considers that his accompaniment co-incides 
with the tune. Rests may, of course, be left in the accompaniment, 
and key phrases may be written down and referred to. 
The performers will need a time keeping device, in the 
form of a conductor, a team of conductors, stop watches, light 
display, programmed tapes or whatever. They can decide on the 
best way of dealing with the timing and synchronisation. 
It is recommended that there are rehearsals, and that 
performers are experienced in improvisation. 
0 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 'USED 
211 
GLOSSARY OF MAIN TERMS WITH SIGNS (where relevant) 
Ll gn No-me and Meaning 
Algorithm 
The Algorithm is that which connects Information to a 
Model, thus re-creating the Object, 
In the case that the Model is reflexive (that is, the 
Information can be extracted from the Model itself), the 
Algorithm shows how this is done, 
Qý-4M(f) 
awareness 
An awareness Is an observation made of another Object by 
an observer, recorded from the observer's viewpoint. it 
complements a behaviour, 
Abl('-ý[(Xa)Pb] 
An awareness is made by the observer and the observed 
Object, and no others may share it. 
0 A Awareness 
The Awareness of an observer is the sum of many 
observations of other 6bjects made by that observer, 
recorded from the observer's viewpoint. The sum of all 
Awarenesses in the Universe is the same as the sum of all 
Behaviours, 
---A b" 2: 1QPb] 
0 
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Anti-Hodel 
An Anti-Model is a primary Model type in which the Object 
is wholly contained within the Model. It is designated 
thus, 
Q 
An Anti-Model may adumbrate many Anti-Models within itself. 
Anti-Remainder 
That which is added to the Object when making an Anti- 
Model of the Object. The Anti-Remainder constitutes the 
Information and the Algorithm, 
Q 
R 
behaviour 
A behaviour is an observation made of an Object by an 
external observer, recorded from the Object's point of 
view. It complements an awareness. It is what the 
-observer believes the Object being observed to be, during 
the observation, 
BC1(-- KXa)pbl- 
A behaviour*is made by the observer and the observed 
Object, and no others may share it. 
BO Behaviour 
The Behaviour of an Object is the sum of all observations 
of the Object made by external observers, recorded from 
the Object's view point. The sum of all BehaViours in 
the Universe is the same as the sum of all Awarenesses, 
0 
a 
[(Xci) PJ 
b. (lm) 
AD 
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ConversRtion 
A Conversation is a paradigm by which communication can 
take place between two observers, with some degree of 
certainty of understanding. It involves the formulation 
of the views of observer one about some Object, the con- 
sequent formulation of observer two of observer one's 
views, and finally the formulation of observer one's 
views of observer two's views (of observer one's views). 
With these three steps, observer one can compare his 
original view to his view of the other observer's view, 
and thus adapt his formulation of his view until it 
appears that observer two has understood. 
Essence 
The Essence of an Object is the observation of an Object 
made by itself, and referring only to itself, it is unique 
and private to that Object observer. It is what the 
'Objecp believes itself to be, 
E&=FCýPcj]. 
The Essence and the Behaviour are mutually exclusive. 
The Essence and the Awareness are equally so. 
Information 
That which makes the difference, when connected to the 
Model by the Algorithm, between the Model and the Object. 
In the case of an Interior Model, Information will be 
added to make the Object: in the case of an Anti-Moael, 
---subtracted, 
0 (--4 MMI 
Q(-ýPml 
In some cases, there is no visible Information, it being 
a part of the Model. 
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Interior Model 
A primary Model type, which is wholly contained within 
the Object. The Interior Model is designated thus, 
0 (--M 
An Interior Model may adumbrate many Interior Models 
within itself. 
Language 
A Language is an Object put in a role surrogate to 
another Object by the observer. This is achieved by the 
observer observing a behaviour which appears to be the 
same for both the Object and the Language, 
<Oh)=BW=KXa)pbjj 
Lc =Bc(--[(Xc)Pý. 
Pa ( )Bc* 
A Language is similar to a Model, but it has a different 
role: a Language permits an observation to be observed 
by others. 
Level 
Our Universe has two levels of existence: the "private" 
(which is the Object's self -observation); and the "public" 
(which is the external observer's observation of the 
Object, or the observer's observation of an external 
Object). The terms "private" and "public" refer to the 
self-containedness of the observation, and not to its 
communicability. "Private" existence of-both observer 
and observed is an a priori requirement for a "public" 
existence. 
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Lifespan 
Lifespan is the measure of the growth of an Object's 
Behaviour. An Object is "born" when it is first 
observed by an external observer. An Object "dies" 
when the next observation made by an external observer 
through its Model Facility would result in an observation 
the same as the Essence. This can never happen, but it 
can be approached. The "time" between "birth" and 
"death" is the Lifespan. 
Model 
A Model'is gn Object put in a role surrogate to another 
Object by an observer. This is achieved as with a 
Model's surrogate role. 
A Model is similar to a Language, but it has a different 
role: a Model permits a transformation to be applied, 
via the surrogate Object (the Model), to an Object (as 
observed). Models may be typed as either Interior, or 
Anti, according to it they are, when seen from the view- 
point of the transforming observer, smaller or larger than 
the Object of which they are'Models. 
X Model Facility 
The Model Facility is the means by which an Object is 
observable (both by itself and by external observers). 
It is a necessary part of an Object, but cannot exist by 
itself. Thus, 
Bcý--[()Q Fq [(Xcý Oa] =ý Eý 
A Model Facility can become an Object by observing itself, 
Xa ý N) YQ - 
This Object can then be observed by other observers. 
The Model Facility also unifies all observations by making 
them all relevant to the same Object. From the Model 
Facility, Meanings are created by observers. 
a 
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Object 
A basic unit-describing all inhabitants of our Universe, 
usually taking the role of that which is observed. For 
an Object to exist in our Universe, it must be observable. 
For something to be observable by others, it must be 
there in order that it maybe observed. An Object must 
therefore observe itself, 
FG) 0a] - 
The Self-observer's view of the Object is the Essence. 
while the external observer's view is a behaviour, 
(W=[N) Oa] Ea 
b] Bc, '(Ocý=[(Xq) P 
A behaviour of an Object is also that which is represented 
by a Language or Model. 
observer 
An observer is an Object in our Universe, taking the role 
of observing (as opposed to being observed), and thus 
attributing to those Objects, behaviours, and to themselves 
awarenesses, 
Ba 4--[(Xa)Pb]4Ab 
Object 
When talking about making Models, it is more convenient to 
refer to the Object by the letter Q, meaning that there 
is. between the Object and the Model a relationship of 
behaviours. The use of Q in a string reminds us, 
therefore, that we are talking about relationships 
between behaviours, but we are not notating this fully. 
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Physi ca Il is at ion 
In making a Model of an Object, a Remainder is added or 
subtracted by the operation of an Algorithm. The Model 
is then transformed (usually). However, in order for 
this transformation to be carried through to the Object, 
the Remainder difference between the Object and the 
Model must be made up. The process of subtracting or 
adding the Remainder by the operation of the Algorithm 
is Physicallisation. 
Remainder 
That which is omitted from an Object when making an 
Interior Model of the Object. The Remainder constitutes 
the Informatiom and the Algorithm, 
M 
R 
Representation 
An Object which is surrogate to another Object. is a 
representation of that Object. Thus Languages and 
Models represent Objects. A representation is an 
Object, and both representation and original Object are 
connected by an act of the observer making a similarity 
between the behaviours. 
S time state 
A time state is measured in our Universe by a local 
individual clock in each Object, such that each self- 
vIDGervation of an Object advances its local clock one 
time state (consisting of two half-cycles), and the 
output of each Object's self -observation is an infinite 
regress. An Object has also an ability to correlate 
its clock with the clocks of other Objects, and thus to 
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observe and represent. An Object can observe itself 
and another Object simultaneously. Each complete self- 
observation is marked by a gain of one*time unit (hence 
S (S - 1) (S - 2) (S +3) Each half-cycle is marked by a 
dash (hence S (S+I) (S+2 ) (s+3)). 
Universe 
The Universe of our investigations Is the Universe of 
existence of Objects by knowledge. All inhabitants of 
the Universe are Objects, and all know they exist. No 
Object that does not know it Exists is a part of the 
Universe. This does not mean to say that it cannot 
exist, in some other Uaiverse. 
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GLOSSARY OF MAIN OPERATIONS USED 
SiLyn SImple Translation 
"gives rise to". 
"implies" (in this case, that which is on the left-hand 
is conditional upon thai which is on the right-hand side: 
the direction of the arrow is reversible). 
"equals" (the bi-conditional). 
O'does not equal". 
A "and". 
'for" (inclusive or). 
"the sum of". 
that which is contained within the brackets is named. 
that which is contained within the brackets is operated through. 
that which is contained within the brackets is the 
observation. 
11 
used for large groupings. 
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